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 3
1 INTRODUCTION: THE US COMMITMENT TO OPPOSING NUCLEAR 
PROLIFERATION AND ITS RELATIONS WITH PAKISTAN AND INDIA 
 
The United States is officially strictly devoted to opposing the spread of nuclear 
weapons. Nuclear weapons can cause instability in international relations, and the 
more there are of nuclear weapons in a greater number of countries, the greater the 
chances of nuclear weapons ending up in wrong hands, to people who might use or 
threat to use them against the US or its allies. The US promotes the international 
nuclear non-proliferation regime, and its punitive actions against countries like 
Iraq, North Korea, Pakistan, and India show how great an impact the policy of 
opposing horizontal1 nuclear proliferation can have on the relations of the US with 
other countries. 
 
India and Pakistan became overt nuclear states by conducting nuclear tests in May 
1998. Taking into account the importance the US has given for halting the spread 
of nuclear weapons, it seems a little surprising that the US has not succeeded in it 
with respect to Pakistan and India. As the US non-proliferation efforts have not 
been successful in South Asia, one can wonder whether they will be successful 
elsewhere, either. 
 
Furthermore, the US has indirectly even contributed to Pakistan’s acquisition of 
nuclear weapons. Although the US has stated its opposition to the Pakistani nuclear 
ambitions, it has had mutual defense agreements with Pakistan and given it 
considerable economic and military support. That help has strengthened the 
position of the military in the country and given resources that Pakistan has in part 
been able to use for its nuclear program. Without the assistance from the US, 
Pakistan might not have been able to proceed with its nuclear program as fast as it 
has. With respect to nuclear proliferation in Pakistan, the US seems to have acted 
against the principles of its foreign policies. 
 
My study is about the policies of the US towards the nuclear weapons programs of 
Pakistan and India. I consider the nuclear programs of both India and Pakistan as 
well as US policies towards both of them because the two nuclear programs have 
been dependent on each other and can best be understood in connection to each 
other. The actions of the US towards the two countries have affected the power 
relations between them, which has in turn had impact on their motivations to 
acquire nuclear weapons. On the other hand, the US attitude towards one of the 
programs has maybe also given the other country signs of what to expect itself. 
Although the US has in principle been against all horizontal nuclear proliferation, it 
has treated different threshold states in different ways. In South Asia, the US 
attitudes towards Pakistan may have been more complex than the ones towards 
India because Pakistan has been a US ally, unlike India, towards which the US has 
been able to be more critical. However, because the Indian program has been 
largely indigenous and was started early, the US has had less room for action in 
India’s than in Pakistan’s case. 
 
                                                          
1 With horizontal proliferation, I mean the spread of nuclear weapons to new countries. Vertical 
proliferation, on the other hand, is the acquisition of more or better nuclear weapons by countries 
that already have nuclear weapons.  
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India and Pakistan are not just neighbors who both have nuclear weapons. They 
have also been more or less in conflict with each other throughout their whole 
independence, especially because of the Kashmir region, which lies between them 
and which each states considers to belong to it. The conflict dates back to the 
independence and the separation of the two countries in 1947. It was decided that 
Pakistan would be created to become a state for the Muslims in India. The princes 
governing the areas, of which were to become the predominantly Hindu but 
officially secular India and the Muslim Pakistan, were allowed to choose to which 
state they wanted their lands to belong. In Kashmir, the prince chose India although 
most of the population was Muslim. This gave reason for the conflict that is still 
going on because Pakistan considers that Kashmir should really belong to it. The 
conflict has led to three outright wars, numerous smaller clashes, the death of over 
a million persons, and over ten million refugees. Kashmir is also a symbol for an 
ideological conflict between India and Pakistan. India has seen it necessary to keep 
Kashmir as a part of itself in the fear that otherwise dissension and separationism 
could spread all over India. As the raison d’être for Pakistan is religious, it would 
be extremely difficult for Pakistan to accept that the Kashmir Muslims would 
remain on the wrong side of the border. Pakistan has been willing to negotiate a 
solution with US help, but India has been against a third-party intervention. The 
conflict has been on agenda of the United Nations (UN) since the organization was 
born. 
 
The situation in South Asia is made even more difficult by the relations of the 
neighboring China to the two countries. China has had border disputes with India, 
while it has long supported Pakistan, thus acting according to the principle that 
“my enemy’s enemy is my friend”. Because India claims that China is in principle 
still a threat for it, it has not been willing to participate in bilateral nuclear 
disarmament with Pakistan. 
  
Early on, both the Pakistani and the Indian nuclear programs were only aimed at 
the civilian uses of atomic energy. The relevant decision-makers in the both 
countries became gradually interested in and devoted to the pursuit of nuclear 
weapons. The decisions to start nuclear weapons programs matured gradually 
during the 1960’s and the early 1970’s.2 
 
India was active in the research of nuclear physics from very early on. With its 
wide power plant program, India has tried to benefit from the peaceful uses of 
nuclear energy. Nuclear energy has been considered important for industrialization 
and therefore for the elimination of poverty from the country. In principle, India 
has opposed nuclear weapons and spoken for universal nuclear disarmament. 
Because of its huge population, it has expected to be acknowledged as a major 
international player, equal to China. However, as this did not happened as long as 
India did not have nuclear weapons, India thinks that it can have nuclear weapons 
just as legitimately as the five permanent members of the UN Security Council, 
especially as nuclear weapons seem to be the only way to reach such a status.3 On 
the other hand, with its nuclear weapons, India has tried to improve its security 
against China and Pakistan. 
 
                                                          
2 Ganguly 1999, pp. 152-159; Ahmed 1999, pp. 182-183. 
3 Tamminen & Zenger 1998; Singh 1998; IFPA 1997.  
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In Pakistan, the military and the bureaucracy instead of the political parties have 
held power throughout the country’s independence, if not overtly then in practice at 
least behind a façade of a democratic government. The military has also controlled 
the country’s nuclear program. The Indian threat has been the primary motivator of 
the Pakistani security policies, which have sought favorable alliances with major 
states to counter India. Pakistan opposes Indian hegemony in the region, and 
considers that it has the role of an obstacle to such ambitions.4 
 
The US has for decades promoted international cooperation in halting the spread of 
nuclear weapons. The most important international agreement to regulate nuclear 
weapons is the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) from year 1968, complemented 
with the safeguards systems of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), 
which was originally set up in 1957. The possibility of developing countries 
acquiring nuclear weapons has been considered as a threat in the US especially 
after the first energy crises in 1973, which highlighted the conflict of interests 
between the developed and the developing countries5. 
 
With my study, I hope to increase understanding about the region and to give light 
to the reasons that have led to the nuclear weapons race in South Asia and made of 
the region “the most dangerous place in the world”6. On the other hand, I aim to 
shed light into the strategies, goals, and choices of the US. I find the South Asian 
nuclear weapons programs a very interesting and also timely subject for research. 
This year, the increased tensions between India and Pakistan have again reminded 
the public of the oldest on-going international conflict on the UN agenda. India and 
Pakistan, having already been more or less in conflict with each other for the last 
fifty years, have proclaimed that they are nuclear states and South Asia is 
considered the most likely region in the world for a nuclear war to take place. The 
war on terrorism has also focused the attention of the whole world on the problems 
of South Asia and of Pakistan in particular. Nuclear proliferation is happening also 
elsewhere in the world. The unsuccessfulness of the US non-proliferation policies 
in South Asia raises questions on whether they can be successful elsewhere, either. 
Therefore, it is important to find out why they have not been successful. New ways 
to halt non-proliferation have also emerged, as implied by the current US plans to 
start a war against Iraq mainly because of the Iraqi efforts to get weapons of mass 
destruction (WMD). It is possible that the unsuccessfulness of the somewhat softer 
policies in South Asia has contributed to a consideration of harder policies.  
 
I will proceed by first discussing in Chapter 2 the questions considered in this study 
and the scope of this study in more detail. Thereafter, in Chapter 3, I take a look at 
the theoretical models and concepts relevant for my study. Based on these, I 
formulate my starting hypotheses in Chapter 4. That is followed by the empirical 
examination of the two nuclear programs and the US actions towards them, 
Chapter 5, which forms the core of this study. In Chapter 6, I will try to answer the 
questions posed in Chapter 2 and summarize about the actions of the US. I also 
take a look at the future prospects for the two nuclear programs.  
 
                                                          
4 Ahmed 1999; IFPA 1997. 
5 Ganguly 1999, pp. 155-158; Ahmed 1999, p. 184. 
6 President Clinton’s view before his journey to South Asia in 2000. Ayoob 2001. 
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2 RESEARCH PROBLEM 
 
2.1 Research questions 
 
I am interested in how the US has acted with regard to the nuclear weapons 
programs of India and Pakistan. I approach this research subject through the 
following research questions: 
1) I consider the Indian and the Pakistani nuclear weapons programs and the 
reasons behind them. I examine how the nuclear weapons have affected the 
mutual relations of the two countries. 
2) I examine US policies towards the two nuclear programs and consider whether 
or not they have been successful and why. 
3) I am interested in why the US has acted the way it has – or refrained from 
acting. Thus, I ask what kind of goals and interests behind the goals the US has 
in South Asia. Furthermore, I consider how important the goal of opposing 
nuclear proliferation has been in relations to other US goals.  
The first two questions are for a large part about finding out facts, examining what 
has happened. The third question is more about interpreting these facts. 
 
 
2.2 The scope of the study 
 
I consider the Indian and the Pakistani nuclear programs as well as US actions 
towards them from the year 1945 onwards, as the Indian nuclear program was 
started that year. I emphasize the developments from the mid-1960’s onwards 
because before that neither the Indian nor the Pakistani nuclear program was 
targeted at the development of nuclear weapons. It was also that time when the 
spread of nuclear weapons became more of a concern for the US. For practical 
reasons, the end-point of the time-span of the study is the end of the year 2001. 
 
I discuss military, political, and economic actions of the US at the state level. This 
means I focus on the actions that can be considered as a part of the official policies 
of the US. For example corporations’ and citizens’ organizations’ actions are left 
outside of my study. I study how the US has “officially” acted in the region, and 
what the “official” US wants to achieve there. I do not concentrate much on the 
processes internal to the US that lead to its foreign policy decisions. 
 
To be able to understand the US actions towards India and Pakistan, it is necessary 
to gain knowledge about South Asia and power relations there in general. The 
national security of each state and also the nuclear weapons programs can probably 
be explained by the interaction between the US, China, Pakistan, India, and Russia, 
which forms a greater regional balance-of-power system. 
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2.3 Methods and materials 
 
In practice, the study is done by the means of a critical literature analysis. My 
research strategy is a non-experimental case study and my primary method is the 
analysis of existing literature. A qualitative research method is an arguable choice 
in the case of ideographic research: in explaining unique, historical situations.7 On 
the other hand, the subject of my study can also be seen not as a unique situation 
but as an example of a more general phenomenon. In that case, the US policies 
towards the South Asian nuclear weapons programs can be considered as examples 
of US non-proliferation policies in general and be compared with other 
proliferation cases. As the scope of a master’s thesis is rather limited, I have not 
chosen this kind of a research strategy. 
 
As research material, I use books, articles, and statements about geopolitical and 
Realist theories, US non-proliferation policies, and the South Asian nuclear 
weapons programs. For the basis of my theoretical framework, I have chosen texts 
from prominent authors from the schools of thought in question. I base my 
discussion of the two nuclear weapons programs until about 1990 especially on the 
book Nuclear Ambitions by L. Spector, the former Director of the Nuclear Non-
Proliferation Project of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace in 
Washington. Spector has examined nuclear proliferation in the world country-by-
country. He moved to the US Department of Energy in 1997 and after that, R. 
Jones and M. Donough have undertaken to continue his work. Their book Tracking 
Nuclear Proliferation is another central source in my study. Other important 
sources for the examination of the nuclear programs include articles India’s 
Pathway to Pokhran II and Pakistan’s Nuclear Weapons Program by Š. Ganguly 
and S. Ahmed, respectively, (published in International Security in the spring of 
1999), where the developments in the nuclear weapons programs and the reasons 
for them are discussed. I use statements and reports of the US Administration, 
especially of the Department of State, as a basis for the official US stances. With 
respect to the general goals of the US, I use the US Department of State Strategic 
Plan but rely also quite much on Z. Brzezinski, a long-time influential within the 
US governmental circles.  
 
 
 
3 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK  
 
The theoretical framework of the study stems from the (Neo-) Realist and the 
geopolitical theories of international relations (IR)8. These two theoretical 
traditions do not have to belong together, but geopolitical theories usually also have 
a Realist perspective on international relations9. I chose this kind of a theoretical 
framework because I am interested in questions of balance-of-power and of the 
                                                          
7 Alasuutari 1994, pp. 28-29. 
8 I use the term Realism, Realist, Neo-Realism, and Neo-Realist to indicate schools of thought, not 
to mean that someone understands the reality. I use IR to indicate the academic subject of 
international relations to distinguish it from international relations in general. 
9 One reason for this is that same authors, for example Spykman (see below), have shaped both 
schools of thought. Wilkinson 1985, p. 91. 
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distribution of power between states as geographic entities. In the following, I will 
first discuss the Realist and the Neorealist theories and thereafter the geopolitical 
and the new geopolitical approaches to international relations. Thereafter, I will 
continue by considering theoretical views on nuclear weapons in particular. 
 
 
3.1 Realism and Neo-Realism 
 
The Realist school of IR considers the relations between states as anarchic by 
nature. In the absence of an international sovereign, the selfish promotion of one’s 
own interest leads to a situation where no state can trust another and interprets 
other states’ actions as hostile and threatening. Therefore, war is natural. The 
relations between India, Pakistan, and China, characterized by distrust and arms 
race, can be seen as this kind of a classical security dilemma. 
 
Although international organizations try to manage international relations and to 
have influence over states, anarchy often still seems to reign in international 
relations. International organizations are dependent on states’ and especially the 
major powers’ support and that support is dependent on states’ and the major 
powers’ own interests. The conflict between India and Pakistan has been going on 
since the independence of the two countries but the UN (or any other instance) has 
not been able to help solve the conflict. The conflict is not interesting enough for 
other states to put effort in trying to solve it. The US, the only superpower, 
occasionally tries to bring order to the international system but does it rather 
selectively.  
 
According to Realism, power is both a means and a goal. Power and struggle for 
power are considered central in political decision-making and politics is a struggle 
for control over resources and prestige. In Realism, the primary source of power is 
usually military or political. Neo-Realism is different from Realism in that that 
states’ goal is not power as such but the security that power can give. For Neo-
Realists, states’ interests are also political and economic in addition to the military 
ones that the Realist theories concentrate on. According to the Neo-Realists, the 
primary source of power can be economic strength, military, culture, or religion.10 
 
In the case of the South Asian nuclear programs, the security of the nation instead 
of power seems to have been the primary goal, especially at the level of rhetoric. 
Originally India launched its nuclear weapons program to counter the Chinese 
threat, whereas Pakistan felt insecure because of the growing nuclear capabilities 
and of the conventional military superiority of India. However, power as such has 
also been a goal of the Indian program, as ambitions to strengthen country’s 
international status have played a role in its program, too. To some extent, the 
Pakistani program has also aimed at making Pakistan the leading Islamic state.11 
 
                                                          
10 Tuomi 1996, p. 32; Visuri 1997, pp. 97, 207; Huntington 1993; Rusi 1997; Waltz 1990; Waltz 
2000. 
11 Whether the US seems to rely on military or economic and political sources of power is discussed 
below in Chapter 3.2.  
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According to Realism, states are likely to adopt balance-of-power politics, i.e. try 
to prevent strong states from expanding and becoming too strong. The threatening 
states are not necessarily only nearby states but also more distant ones that could 
become new neighbors if allowed to expand.12 Following Burchill who has defined 
balance-of-power as “the absence of a preponderant military power in the 
international system”, I use a definition according to which a balance-of-power is 
the absence of a preponderant military power in the international or in a regional 
system. In my view, a balance-of-power can be also a regional, not just a global 
phenomenon, where some kind of a balanced situation exists between the powers 
of two or more states.13 Although balance-of-power as a concept seems to refer to a 
stable situation and this view is used to justify the seeking of a balance-of-power, it 
can also be an unstable situation. States can namely not actually seek a situation of 
balance-of-power but a position for themselves that is superior to that of others. A 
balance-of-power might therefore not be a stable situation because all states try to 
change it and prevail over others.14 
 
With its nuclear weapon, Pakistan has achieved some kind of a balance-of-power 
with India as the nuclear weapon has made Pakistan far more an equal partner with 
India than it would otherwise be. Alone and in terms of conventional military 
might, Pakistan would clearly be in a secondary position in relation to India. 
However, with its nuclear weapon and with the US assistance that has been aimed 
at ensuring that Pakistan remains its ally and does not turn to anti-Westernism and 
Islamic fundamentalism, a certain balance-of-power system between the two states 
has been formed. The interventions of an outside actor have prevented a hegemony 
from being born and have instead produced a somewhat artificial balance-of-
power, or a situation of “arrested unipolarity”15. Without the US support and the 
nuclear weapon, Pakistan could not have been challenging the status quo in 
Kashmir for decades but India would have prevailed long ago. The consequences 
of the Indian willingness to prevail on the region and the Pakistani efforts to 
prevent this can be seen in the regional power relations and in regional conflicts, 
especially in the Kashmir conflict. The great amount of resources that the two 
states have put on developing nuclear weapons has also contributed to the ceased 
economic development of the region. 
 
 
                                                          
12 Wilkinson 1985, pp. 88-89. 
13 Burchill 1996, p. 40. The term balance-of-power was originally used in the context of the 
multilateral European system, where several states of approximately equal strength formed different 
alliances to counter other alliances or states that were growing stronger than others so that they 
posed a threat to the others. F. von Gentz formulated the common use of the concept in 1806 as 
“that constitution which exists among neighbouring states more or less connected with each other, 
by virtue of which none of them can violate the independence or the essential rights of another 
without effective resistance from some quarter and consequent danger to itself”. Gentz 2002, p. 307. 
The concept has been given various meanings, which has caused confusion about what is actually 
meant with it. E. Haas has listed eight different meanings for balance-of-power: “1) any distribution 
of power, 2) equilibrium or balancing process, 3) hegemony or the search for hegemony, 4) stability 
and peace in a concert of power, 5) instability and war, 6) power politics in general, 7) a universal 
law of history, and 8) a system and guide to policymakers”. Quoted in Dougherty & Pfaltzgraff 
1996, p. 37.  
14 Wilkinson 1985, pp. 88-89. 
15 Ayoob 2001. 
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Neo-Realism considers system-level (i.e. international system) and unit-level (i.e. 
individual states) factors separately though sees them as interconnected. The main 
difference between Realism and Neo-Realism is that in Neo-Realism, the structure 
of the international system is considered to have great impact on the possibilities 
states have; the type of the system restricts the array of potential outcomes in 
international politics. The basic types of system are unipolar (e.g., Classical Rome), 
bipolar (the US and the Soviet Union during the Cold War), and multipolar 
(Europe from the 17th to the early 20th century).16 
 
Although the US is currently the only superpower with a global reach, the system is 
not really unipolar, but as S. Huntington has put it, a hybrid type of uni-
multipolarism, where several other major powers balance the sole superpower. A 
unipolar superpower could impose its will internationally on its own, and no 
potential alliance of other states could effectively oppose it.17 Currently, if several 
other great powers allied with each other (although this does not seem likely at the 
moment), they could together oppose the US. 
 
Huntington also considers uni-multipolarism an unstable situation, unlike 
unipolarism, bipolarism, and multipolarism, where the major powers can be 
assumed to try to maintain the system. He claims that currently, the other major 
regional powers (France and Germany, Russia, China, Japan, India, Iran, Brazil, 
South Africa, and Nigeria) would prefer a multipolar order, because then they 
would be able to more freely promote their own interests. Huntington claims that 
other states are provoked into building coalitions against the US by its hegemonic 
actions, which include, e.g., trying to ensure that other states do not acquire 
weapons that could be a threat for the US; promoting international sales of 
American armaments and preventing other states from doing similarly; and 
punishing states that do not adhere to the American will by sanctions or ultimately 
by labeling them “rogue states”, thereby pushing them outside of international 
cooperation,. This is implied for example by the formation of the European Union 
and by trilateral meetings between France, Germany, and Russia. Also as a 
counterpart to the US, alliances between India, China, and Russia have been 
suggested as well as ones that include Iran, too. According to Huntington, also the 
US is unsatisfied with the current situation because other states do not accept its 
hegemony. Huntington claims that other states increasingly concentrate on 
promoting their own interests, which often are inconsistent with those of the US. 
The current system is thus unstable and likely to give way to a new balance-of-
power in a multipolar system.18 
 
The US is trying to stop its position from weakening, but according to Waltz, the 
task of sustaining unipolar world hegemony is too great for its economic, military, 
demographic, and political resources. Because the US considers itself as more 
powerful than it actually is, its hegemonic actions become unsustainable and 
actually weaken it. The US capability to impose its will is decreasing: for example, 
its sanctions do not work as planned when other states do not support them, as is 
often the case. Hegemonic actions are tolerable as long as the hegemon provides 
other states with public goods, for example security and stable and efficient 
                                                          
16 Waltz 1990. 
17 Huntington 1999. 
18 Huntington 1999; IFPA 1997. 
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international institutions. As the US ceases to do this, the support for it 
diminishes.19 Although I concentrate on the actions of the US, the actions of other 
states in whether or not they are supportive of the US policies are also of great 
importance for the success of the US policies. 
 
In practice, the US does not often seem very willing to impose its will in a military 
sense. It does this to protect its the most vital, direct interests, like ensuring the 
access to the Middle Eastern oil or combating international terrorism that directly 
threatens the US. On the other hand, exactly these cases have at least so far 
eventually not led to the strengthening of the position of the US but have instead in 
fact contributed to an increasing opposition to the hegemonic actions of the US at 
least in the Muslim world. The Kashmir and South Asian proliferation cases, on the 
other hand, do not directly touch the most vital US interests and therefore, the US 
has not been willing to act very decisively. 
 
In the current system, the regionally preeminent powers, including India in South 
Asia, often face rivaling secondary regional powers like Pakistan. According to 
Huntington, alliances or cooperation between a secondary regional power and the 
US are likely because both benefit from opposing the major regional power. 
Huntington asserts that the US should not waste its resources in trying to maintain 
order internationally but it should let the regional powers to take care of their 
prospective regions. However, he considers interventions as justifiable in cases 
where violence is likely, including in South Asia.20 
 
Realism and Neo-Realism were among the leading paradigms in the field of IR for 
the most of the last century. The collapse of the Soviet system and the end of the 
Cold War, however, seemed to bring about a profound change in the international 
system. Only one superpower was left, and its commitment to liberal democratic 
values gave hope of a New World Order of more peaceful international relations21. 
 
Realism and Neo-Realism, however, survived the liberal momentum. The unipolar 
US momentum was soon passed as the numerous conflicts of the 1990’s showed 
that the era of wars is not over22. In fact, the world might even have become less 
stable as the former bipolarity might have suppressed conflicts. Realists argue that 
Realism has explanatory power, as it would only become obsolescent if the 
international system changed so that it would no longer be a self-help system where 
no one can ultimately be trusted.23 
                                                          
19 Waltz 2000, pp. 26-35; Huntington 1999.  
20 Huntington 1999. Huntington considers South Asia prone to violence because the major and the 
secondary regional power belong to different (i.e. Islamic and Hindu) civilizations. For 
Huntington’s thesis that differences between civilizations are becoming the major source of conflict 
after ideological conflicts, see Huntington 1993. 
21 Already during the 1980’s, liberal democracies’ tendency not to fight each other, the so-called 
democratic peace, received attention both in academic circles and in actual politics. At the end of 
the Cold War, it seemed for a while that the world could indeed become less war-prone through the 
spread of democracy. For a discussion of the democratic peace theory, see Brown et al. 1996. 
22 The new wars are at least partially of another kind, the principal actors often being non-state level 
ethnic groups and guerilla forces. The theory of the democratic peace cannot bring much light into 
this situation because it only applies to states. 
23 For example, K. Waltz argues that the end of the Cold War notwithstanding, the international 
system founded in the Peace of Westphalia in 1648 has not changed, and Structural Realism still has 
explanatory power. A. Rusi argues that because no world government or the like emerged from the 
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The Realist school of thought has contributed much to the theories on nuclear 
weapons, too. I will discuss these theories below in Chapter 3.3. 
 
 
3.2 Geopolitics and new geopolitics 
 
In Realism, geographic factors are only one dimension of a state’s power. In 
geopolitics, on the other hand, the focus is in states that seek power in 
geographically defined areas, which are somehow natural. Geopolitical theory can 
be defined as the study of spatial political divisions and its causes and 
consequences; geopolitics focuses on the impact of geographical factors on 
national power and international actions. Because of their permanent nature, 
geographical factors have even been considered to have the most decisive impact 
on states’ foreign policies. Geopolitics agrees with Realism that war and conflict 
are normal features of international relations because states seek power and 
domination over each other.24 
 
The most influential geopolitical theories have been the ones about the continental 
and the maritime powers. In 1904, H. Mackinder presented his thesis about the 
importance of controlling the heartland of Eurasia, the “natural seat of power” with 
enormous resources. The heartland would be controlled by the state that had 
control over Eastern Europe.25 
 
N. Spykman agreed with Mackinder on the importance of controlling Eurasia and 
therefore on the importance for the US of preventing any other state from gaining 
such a position. They also shared the view that during different times, different 
regions become pivotal and especially important. But unlike Mackinder, Spykman 
claimed that in his time of writing in 1942, it was the rimlands of Eurasia - the 
peninsular Europe and the coastal areas in the Far East - that were of central 
importance: control over them was the key to world power. Russia, the power of 
Eurasia, should not be given access to warm waters, because that would make it too 
powerful; on the other hand, as long as it did not try to prevail over the rimlands, it 
could be a suitable ally for the US. Spykman claimed that it was necessary for the 
US to prevent Europe or the Far East from unifying into a hostile coalition. 
Spykman preferred interventionist instead of isolationist US policies because he 
                                                                                                                                                                 
unipolar momentum to ensure world peace, the system remains anarchic and dangerous. He claims 
that at the same time as the Westphalian state system has become global, it has also become 
obsolescent: although the whole world is covered by nation-states, the states “have lost a full control 
over the territories that once defined them”. For Rusi, the question is whether a new hegemonic war 
will ensue, or whether the era of hegemonic wars is finally over. Waltz 2000, pp. 26-35; Rusi 1997, 
pp. 114-142. For criticism towards the Westphalia-centered view of the international system, see 
Osiander 2001. 
24 Tuomi 1996, pp. 32, 142; Rusi 1997, p. 12; Zoppo 1985, pp. 3-6. At a practical level, geopolitics 
perceives the world as divided into competing regional political and economic groups that promote 
goals related to geographic locations. As a science, geopolitics looks for theoretical causes for the 
division of space in the world and for the behavior of communities. Geopolitics considers both the 
usefulness of an area’s resources in attaining political goals and the use of political means to 
achieve and to use resources. Tuomi 1996, p. 11; Visuri 1997, pp. 163-164. 
25 Zoppo 1985, p. 3; Visuri 1997, p. 166. 
 13
thought that the US could not withstand economic isolation and could therefore not 
ignore the rest of the world. 26 
 
The US politics of containment during the Cold War were in accordance with this 
theory. Especially the foreign and defense policies of President Reagan have been 
described as been based on a view of US - Soviet relations as a quest for control 
over the Eurasian rimlands.27 This was also behind the US interest in Pakistan: to 
constrain the Soviet Union in the vital Gulf region, the US tried to prevent the 
Soviets from gaining control over Afghanistan, whereby it needed the help of 
Pakistan, which the US also wanted to have as a link in the pro-US chain 
surrounding the Soviet Union. 
 
Controlling Eurasia is still today considered fundamentally important. Z. 
Brzezinski, the former National Security Adviser of President Carter, claims in his 
1997 book that “it is imperative that no Eurasian challenger emerges, capable of 
dominating Eurasia and thus also of challenging America”. Although the US is 
currently the sole superpower, the primary arena where the struggle for primacy in 
world politics takes place is Eurasia, the largest continent in the world. Brzezinski 
elaborates further that the continuation of the US domination in Eurasia 
necessitates that the central and northern areas of Eurasia are tied towards the 
West, the South is not dominated by any one actor, and that the East is not united in 
a way that would forbid the US from using its offshore bases. 28 Thus, in South 
Asia, the US should prevent India from becoming too strong. 
 
The idea that control over Eurasia is of primary importance is on the other hand 
relatively banal. It is quite natural that control over world’s biggest and most 
populous areas with most of the world’s resources is of primary importance. What 
the rimlands theory does point out is the importance for the US of controlling the 
heartland power(s) on several fronts simultaneously.  
 
Brzezinski defines as “active geostrategic players” states that have the ability to 
have influence beyond their own borders to the extent that affects the current world 
order. Although geostrategic players usually are powerful countries, all the 
powerful countries are not necessarily geostrategic players. Geopolitical pivots, on 
the other hand, are states that are not powerful themselves, but that are important 
because of their location or because of the consequences for the geostrategic 
players from the alteration of their positions. In 1997, Brzezinski defined France, 
Germany, Russia, China, and India (in addition to the US) as geostrategic players, 
and Ukraine, Azerbaijan, South Korea, Turkey, and Iran as geostrategic pivots, 
although the latter two are also to a certain degree geostrategically active. 
Brzezinski claims that despite India’s regional hegemonic aspirations, its actions 
have only a little effect on the US interests in Eurasia.29 
                                                          
26 Visuri 1997, p. 167; Wilkinson 1985, pp. 80-81. Wilkinson provides a thorough discussion on 
Spykman as well as the differences between Spykman and Mackinder. 
27 Hsiung 1983, p. 177. 
28 Brzezinski 1997, pp. xiv, 28, 35. 
29 Ibid., pp. 40-41, 46. Geostrategy has been defined as the strategic management of geopolitical 
interests, as the geographical foundations of a strategy, and as the application of geopolitics into 
practice. Brzezninski 1997, p. xiv; Visuri 1997, p. 165. I define strategy in general as the seeking of 
chosen goals by consistent actions. Goals are given in a strategy, and a strategy consists of the 
actions by which the actor assumes to reach the goals in an optimal way. The concept “strategy” has 
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The war on terrorism and the attention the US has lately given Pakistan suggest 
that today also Pakistan can be considered a geostrategic pivot, especially because 
of its role in the Muslim world. Already before the attacks, the Bush 
Administration stated that “Pakistan has historically played a pivotal role in this 
part of the world and will continue to do so”30. If Pakistan would turn into 
fundamentalism and/ or anti-Westernism that would definitely have impact on the 
position of the US in the region and would affect nearby states, too. 
 
Towards the end of the 20th century, it became topical to ask whether states will 
remain central actors in the world. Similarly, it can be asked whether it is still of 
interest to talk about states’ geopolitics31. I consider, however, states still as central 
actors on the international arena. International organizations are grounded by states 
and depend on states’ continuing support. When facing global market forces, some 
small states may feel having lost part of their sovereignty, but at least the US as a 
state still has considerable influence in the world. The US is a geopolitical actor as 
much as before, both regionally and globally. 
 
As examined above, one difference between Realism and the Neo-Realism is 
whether power is considered as a means or as a goal. Similarly, old geopolitics was 
based on the primacy of military power in international relations but in new 
geopolitics the primary means and measure for national power is the economic 
potential of the nation. Geopolitics is no longer based solely on the need for 
military security but also on political and economic security. Struggle for power is 
still considered important, although it is changing: foreign policies are still based 
on the geographical characteristics (e.g., location and size) of a country.32 
 
The arms race between India and Pakistan highlights the importance of military 
might and therefore old geopolitics is a more suitable framework for viewing their 
nuclear arms programs. On the other hand, the capability to develop nuclear 
                                                                                                                                                                 
often been defined in a purely military context. For instance, R. Betts has defined strategy as “a plan 
for using military means to achieve political ends”, and C. von Clausewitz as “the employment of 
the battle as the means towards the attainment of the object of the war”. During the Cold War, it 
became common to speak about a grand strategy, which includes political, economic, military, and 
spiritual factors. Strategy helps in finding the best course of action in all circumstances, and guides 
actions in practice. Betts 2000, p. 2; Clausewitz 1997, p. 141; Visuri 1997, pp. 8-12, 300. The 
actions themselves, however, do not directly tell what the goals behind them are, and a strategy 
cannot be directly deduced from actions. There can be intervening factors that may cause a situation 
where action A will not have the expected consequences and therefore it might be necessary to 
resort to action B to correct the situation. Thus action B need not necessarily be a part of the 
execution of the original strategy, but of a “saving” strategy. Both actions still aim at the same goal. 
As goals can also change during the execution of the strategy, two successive actions can belong to 
totally different strategies. 
30 US Department of State 2001b.  
31 In geopolitics, states and alliances between them are seen as the only really important actors in 
international politics. Tuomi 1996, pp. 29, 150; Brzezinski 1997, pp. 37-38. 
32 Tuomi 1996, pp. 12, 257-8; Visuri 1997, p. 171; Brzezinski 1997, p. 38. Geopolitical behavior is 
the ambitions of a geographically defined community to improve its political, military and 
economic position in regard to other similar communities by the means of management of space. 
Tuomi 1996, p. 11. Rusi sees the most likely future of the international system in the development 
of a binary world system, centered in competing trade blocks. He has even suggested that the whole 
concept of geopolitics could be replaced by that of geoeconomics. He predicts that geoeconomics, 
driven by commercial competition, will replace geopolitics, driven by military and political 
competition, as the primary arena of international relations. Rusi 1997, p. 142. 
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weapons is of course strongly dependent on the availability of resources to do so. 
The US aid to Pakistan has enhanced Pakistan’s economic potential and therefore 
its capabilities to develop nuclear explosives. 
 
The US has, however, in this case emphasized the means of new geopolitics and 
Neo-Realism; it has tried to use its political and economic instead of military power 
to get the two countries to give up their weapons programs for example by using 
economic sanctions. This does not mean that the US would not consider military 
power important but that the US considers the use of military too extreme a 
measure because the two nuclear programs do not directly threat the US or any 
other states but only the two adversaries themselves33. The US has also given 
Pakistan both economic and military assistance to improve Pakistan’s military 
security. 
 
After the Cold War, the importance of economic and political power seemed in 
general to rise in relation to that of military power. After the attacks of the 
September the 11th, however, the importance of classical, military security of the 
nation has again become a more central question also for the US as it can no longer 
be taken as granted. The importance of military power is likely to become 
highlighted in circumstances of acute conflicts, whereas the economic strength of a 
nation is more decisive in the absence of major conflicts. In fact, economic and 
political factors might become more important only after military security and 
power are already secured. On the other hand, economic power must underlie 
military power. 
 
 
3.3 Theories on nuclear proliferation 
 
3.3.1 Several reasons for proliferation exist 
 
Although nuclear weapons are extremely powerful, not all states try to acquire 
them. When developing policies to counter nuclear proliferation, it is of foremost 
importance to understand the reasons why some states try to acquire nuclear 
weapons while others do not. Otherwise non-proliferation efforts are not likely to 
be effective.34 
 
According to the traditional, Realist arguments, states seek nuclear weapons to 
counter the security threats they face. The extraordinary characteristics of nuclear 
weapons make it necessary for every state, whose adversary possesses a nuclear 
deterrent, to acquire the shelter provided by nuclear weapons. This can be done 
either by developing own nuclear weapons (costly strategy not available for all 
states) or by trying to gain a (albeit ultimately always unreliable) nuclear guarantee 
from a nuclear state. According to the Realist view, the demand for nuclear 
weapons always exists, and nuclear weapons can be limited mainly by restricting 
                                                          
33 Although India claims that it also counters the threat of China with its nuclear weapons, its 
weapons are not targeted towards China. 
34 Different US approaches to non-proliferation are discussed in Chapter 3.3. 
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their supply. The existing efforts to control the spread of nuclear weapons, 
including the NPT regime, are largely based on this view.35 
 
According to the Realist view, nuclear proliferation has thus occurred as a chain 
reaction, because every state that acquires nuclear weapons in order to balance the 
nuclear threat posed by an adversary becomes threatening to some other state, 
leading it to seek nuclear weapons in its turn. The chain reaction view seems to 
have some explanatory power with regard to South Asia: the Pakistani nuclear 
program is for a great part a response to the Indian program, which in turn has been 
dependent on the Chinese program. 
 
Security threats notwithstanding, however, not all states seek the shelter of nuclear 
weapons. Many industrialized nations could in principle develop nuclear weapons 
but have chosen not to. Security threats can be countered by other means, too. If 
also those states who do not try to acquire nuclear weapons, anyway face security 
threats, there has to be some other factors that affect whether a state wants to 
develop a nuclear arsenal or not. In addition to countering an adversary with 
nuclear or immense conventional military forces, a state might acquire nuclear 
weapons to create a means for blackmailing an adversary. Also domestic politics 
and the development of international norms are factors that affect a state’s decision 
to acquire nuclear weapons36. The scientific community of a country, for which a 
nuclear weapons program can bring money, work, pride, and prestige, can also 
promote the acquisition of nuclear arms37. 
 
S. Meyer has identified three groups of explanations why states acquire nuclear 
weapons. First is the technology hypothesis: if the technology is available, 
governments cannot resist the temptation to acquire nuclear weapons. Second is the 
political and military hypothesis: states use nuclear weapons to achieve foreign 
policy, military, or domestic objectives and therefore develop nuclear capabilities 
when it is viable from the political-military point of view. Third is the ideographic 
hypothesis: specific events and the individuals lead countries to develop nuclear 
weapons.38 
 
 
3.3.2 Nuclear proliferation can be countered in various ways 
 
For the US or any state that tries to prevent horizontal nuclear proliferation, a range 
of policy options is available. The choice of US policy is dependent on the foreign 
policy orientation of the state that tries to acquire nuclear weapons: on its relations 
to the US and to other states in the region. Whether and how much the US 
ultimately opposes the acquisition of nuclear weapons by some state depends on 
whether the acquisition is supportive or counterproductive of the goals of the US 
(discussed in Chapter 4).39 Although the US in principle would be against all 
                                                          
35 Sagan 1996, pp. 57-59.  
36 Ibid. Sagan points out that if the reasons for nuclear proliferation vary, the policy 
recommendations for countering proliferation can even be conflicting. 
37 Lefever 1979, p. 21. 
38 Meyer 1984, p. 9. 
39 Lefever 1979, pp. 120-121. 
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nuclear proliferation and especially would not publicly support any state’s 
acquisition of nuclear weapons, it may choose to act against the threshold40 country 
more or less harshly. Punishing the threshold country very mildly or not at all can 
in practice mean that the US accepts the acquisition of nuclear weapons even if its 
publicly does not support it. Especially in the case of Israel, the US has not been 
willing to ensure that the country does not possess nuclear weapons. The US 
cannot directly support any country’s nuclear weapons program if it wants to 
support the NPT, but it can choose not to do anything against the threshold 
countries. 
 
There are two basic approaches to halting nuclear proliferation: policies to affect 
supply- and demand-side conditions of nuclear proliferation. Supply-side policies 
aim at making the acquisition of nuclear technology and materials difficult or 
impossible through export controls and also indirectly through denying foreign 
assistance. Demand-side policies try to affect the reasons why states try to acquire 
nuclear weapons. 
 
In practice, three different policy lines have been identified that the US uses to halt 
nuclear proliferation by trying to affect both the supply and the demand of nuclear 
weapons. First is to promote international cooperation and institutions designed to 
halt nuclear proliferation. The principal means for this are the NPT and the IAEA 
safeguards. As only political agreements, these are not always very effective in 
preventing the spread of nuclear weapons if a country is determined to acquire 
them. The IAEA does not have an enforceable sanction system, and a party to the 
NPT is also allowed to withdraw from the treaty if it is faced by a threat to the 
country’s vital interests. Countries can even proceed relatively far on the way 
towards acquiring nuclear explosives before they actually violate these 
agreements.41 Promoting international institutions is a supply-side strategy in that 
that the institutions mostly try to control states’ possibilities to acquire critical 
technologies. On the other hand, promoting international cooperation can also work 
as a demand-side strategy. Such treaties can change the public’s views on the 
acceptability of having or acquiring nuclear weapons. They can also improve 
states’ trust on that others will not acquire nuclear weapons, affecting in that way 
the demand for nuclear weapons.  
 
 
                                                          
40 E. Lefever has identified four, somewhat overlapping levels of a state’s nuclear forces that 
determine the value of the forces. 1) Most countries have totally refrained from acquiring nuclear 
weapons. 2) In threshold countries, the nuclear capabilities are being widely developed, pushing the 
government to undertake nuclear tests. 3) After a nuclear test or after otherwise developing nuclear 
explosives, a country is on the token nuclear force level where it remains until it develops a military 
significant nuclear force that convinces other governments of its viability. 4) When a country also 
has a reliable delivery system that survives in most circumstances, the country has reached the level 
of a military significant force. This level is divided into four sublevels. At the lowest of these, a 
country’s nuclear force is significant against its non-nuclear neighbors, at the second level, against a 
nuclear neighbor of approximately the same level, at the third, against a medium nuclear power, and 
finally at the highest, against the US or Russia. Both the Indian and the Pakistani nuclear forces are 
now significant against their non-nuclear neighbors, against whom the forces are not targeted, 
though, and against each other. The Indian nuclear forces have some significance against China but 
are not targeted towards it. Lefever 1979, pp. 10-11. 
41 Lefever 1979, pp. 4-5, 127-128; Dunn 1996, pp. 28-30. 
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Parallel to promoting international non-proliferation agreements and regulations, 
national US legislation has been created to tackle the problem of non-proliferation 
unilaterally. The national US regulations complement the international regulations 
and have in general been stricter than the international regulations. 
 
Second is to reduce incentives and increase disincentives for nuclear proliferation. 
One way to do this is to improve the object state’s feeling or perceptions of security 
by providing it with US security assistance and/ or guarantees.42 This policy is 
probably the most effective one as the objective and subjective feeling of insecurity 
is the major reason for states to acquire nuclear weapons. Giving the object state 
what it needs or wishes - security - helps create a positive attitude within that state 
towards the US. The most effective way to provide a state with improved sense of 
security is to give it security guarantees. The mutual defense agreements between 
the US and Pakistan have included implicit security guarantees, though it is 
debatable whether nuclear guarantees have been included. The content of the 
agreements has been that the US will act appropriately if Pakistan is attacked or 
seriously threatened by a third party.43 With the significant military and economic 
aid (see Chapter 5) the US has given to Pakistan, it has also tried to improve 
Pakistan’s sense of security. This is a demand-side strategy. On the other hand, 
denying a country the assistance it would otherwise get can also be a policy of 
denying access to nuclear weapons i.e. a supply-side strategy44. 
 
The third policy option for the US is to deny states access to the technology needed 
to build nuclear explosives. The technical constraints are not expected to halt 
proliferation altogether themselves but to buy time and give more time for 
diplomatic efforts and possibly for the regional and domestic factors to change so 
that programs will be halted. The US has put much emphasis on this policy and has 
succeeded in making the acquisition of technology quite difficult. However, it 
might be impossible to make export control systems (heavy)waterproof especially 
because a wide array of technologies and materials that can be involved in the 
development of nuclear weapons are of dual-use nature and can also be used for 
other purposes. Thus transferring them can seem innocent, although they might end 
up being used in weapons programs.45 In the case of dual-use products, the 
suppliers can also play or feel innocent and export controls often cannot restrict the 
spread of the technologies. Technical constraints are another supply-side strategy. 
 
The US can use rewards or punishments to implement its policies and to influence 
the behavior of governments that consider the acquisition of nuclear weapons. The 
aid the US has given Pakistan is an example of positive incentives the US has used 
for promoting restraint from nuclear arms. In principle, the US can use both denial 
and punitive policies as negative sanctions but in practice it has stuck to using 
denial policies only.46 
                                                          
42 Although Dunn and Lefever otherwise classify the US policies similarly, with respect to this 
category their views differ somewhat. Dunn speaks more broadly of reducing incentives and 
increasing disincentives, whereas Lefever considers only improving the object state’s perceptions of 
security by providing it with US security assistance and/ or guarantees. 
43 Lefever 1979, pp. 122-127; Dunn 1996, pp. 28-30 
44 Cronin & Leitch LePoer 1993, p. 5.  
45 Lefever 1979, pp. 129-132; Dunn 1996, pp. 28-30. The Indian “peaceful” nuclear test was an 
example of an extreme dual-use claim. 
46 Lefever 1979, pp. 132-133. 
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3.3.3 Differing views on proliferation: threat to security or increasing 
stability? 
 
The non-proliferation policies of the US seem to be based on the conventional 
thought that nuclear weapons are bad and undesirable. Of course, the US does not 
seem to think that its own nuclear arsenal is undesirable but only that the spread of 
nuclear capabilities to even more countries is. It is often thought that the five 
acknowledged nuclear powers have learned to live with their weapons, but that the 
potential new nuclear powers could not do this and would be more unreliable, 
especially because the potential proliferators are mostly less developed countries 
where the society and the government often are not very stable. And even if the 
potential new nuclear states are not considered any less capable of dealing with the 
weapons than the old ones, an increase in the number of the weapons and of people 
in charge of them alone rises fears of accidental or unauthorized use. 
 
In some cases, other states’ nuclear weapons could also pose a direct threat to the 
US or its allies. In the case of South Asia, this kind of threat might exist if radical 
Islam gained more power in Pakistan and got access to the country’s nuclear 
arsenal. Such developments could be especially threatening towards Israel. The 
South Asian nuclear weapons programs affect US interests in Middle East, 
especially because they can affect the military balance between Israel and the Arab 
states as India and Pakistan have close relations to countries with those countries47. 
 
The US can oppose the spread of nuclear weapons even in cases where it would be 
extremely unlikely that the US would become their target because they possibly 
have destabilizing effects. Nuclear weapons are in some respects similar to 
powerful conventional weapons because conventional weapons can cause 
significant destruction, too. But nuclear weapons differ from conventional weapons 
in that that the time within which immense destruction can be caused is very short. 
Also even if a state possesses only very few nuclear weapons, it can use them to 
blackmail other states because if it succeeded in causing even only one nuclear 
explosion, it could cause immense destruction. Therefore, with a nuclear weapon, 
also otherwise small and powerless countries can temporarily change at least 
regional power relations and gain power on international relations. 
 
Furthermore, as the number of countries with nuclear weapons increases, so does 
the danger that nuclear weapons end up in hostile, possibly unauthorized hands. As 
K. Waltz points out, nuclear weapons also make the conventional forces of the US 
less capable for action and restrict the room for action the US has48. 
 
A further possible reason for the US to oppose the Pakistani nuclear weapons 
program is that has wanted to keep its ally dependent on it. As long as Pakistan did 
not have nuclear weapons, it had to hope that the US would ultimately come to its 
help if a major war would take place. Thus the US could count on being able to 
exert influence on Pakistan. Good relations with the US have been seen as 
desirable also by the Pakistani military. As long as the US can have this kind of 
influence in Islamabad that ensures that Pakistan does not turn to Islamic 
                                                          
47 Cronin & Leitch LePoer 1993, p. 3. 
48 Waltz 1997, p. 160. 
 20
fundamentalism or anti-Westernism and that its relations with Pakistan continue to 
rather promote than disturb US interests, especially those related to energy, in the 
nearby areas. 
 
For several decades, the US tried to stop categorically all nuclear proliferation. 
This was because of the belief that proliferation was always against the interests of 
the US. Martel & Pendley claim that there also was a case for that kind of policy 
for a long time during the Cold War. First, the phenomenon of proliferation seemed 
controllable because of the difficulties involved in acquiring nuclear weapons. 
Second, the US and Soviet security guarantees made many states willing to give up 
the possibility of acquiring own nuclear weapons. Third, it was feared that because 
of the bipolar international structure, nuclear weapons possessed by a regional 
power could provoke escalation into a nuclear war between the US and the Soviet 
Union.49 
 
On the other hand, if the US aims at stability, it might in practice choose not to act 
very harshly against nuclear weapons if they improve stability. Claims and also 
evidence exist that suggest that nuclear weapons might at least in certain 
circumstances improve stability. Nuclear weapons have so far calmed down the 
behavior of their possessors and have not been used after the World War II50. 
Because of the history of peaceful relations between the nuclear powers, a notable 
group of IR scholars have advocated the view, most powerfully presented by K. 
Waltz in 1981, that the spread of nuclear weapons can actually promote stability in 
the world and can therefore even be desirable. The logic of the argument is that 
because of the immense destructive power of nuclear weapons, no state dares to 
use nuclear weapons against its rival if there is any chance of retaliation: “the 
presence of nuclear weapons makes States exceedingly cautious”. Moreover, the 
destructive potential of nuclear weapons is so great that virtually anyone 
understands not to use them, so that strict rationality on the side of the decision-
makers does not need to be assumed. 
 
Waltz also expects nuclear powers to fight each other with conventional weapons 
only when vital issues are not at stake, because otherwise the fear of escalation 
would be too great for any conflict to start. Also large-scale arms races in both 
conventional and nuclear forces could be avoided because when states posses 
nuclear weapons, it is unnecessary to match the adversary’s capabilities both 
quantitatively and qualitatively. Instead, it is necessary to possess enough nuclear 
weapons to ensure a second-strike capability and an ability to cause so major losses 
on the adversary that it could never totally recover. Also nuclear blackmail is 
unlikely because a country threatening with the use of nuclear weapons would have 
to expect to be punished by a nuclear strike if it really did use nuclear weapons.51 
 
                                                          
49 Martel & Pendley 1996, pp. 211-212. For an argument that the latter fear has been unnecessary, 
see Waltz 1981. 
50 According to Visuri, the reasons for this also include: 1) the fear of moral condemnation; 2) the 
lack of suitable targets; 3) the unwillingness to break the taboo of resorting to nuclear weapons as it 
would be easier for others to do the same afterwards; and 4) the superiority of the nuclear powers 
also in other respects. Visuri 1997, pp. 383-384. 
51 Waltz 1981. This relatively popular view has been specified for example so that nuclear 
proliferation is desirable to states that have nuclear rivals because that is a way to ensure that a 
conflict between these states will not become nuclear. Sagan 1994. 
 21
However, the deterrent has to be relative to the goal. The bigger the possible gains 
for the adversary, the bigger the deterrent has to be. On the other hand, the smaller 
the goals of the adversary, the smaller the deterrence has to be to be credible. This 
diminishes the force of nuclear weapons as a deterrent because they are not a 
credible deterrent in other than major matters.52 
 
Thus when both adversaries like India and Pakistan have nuclear weapons, their 
use is restricted by the possibility of the adversary to strike back and to cause 
serious damage. According to these optimistic views, wars between India and 
Pakistan could be avoided because of their nuclear arsenals, and nuclear weapons 
may stabilize the subcontinent and can therefore be actually desirable. If this is 
believed, the US would not have to be against proliferation.  
 
For example S. Sagan has criticized the pro-proliferation view. He claims that 
Waltz’ argument builds on three assumptions, which Waltz considers as realistic. 
The assumptions are that 1) while a state is still developing a nuclear weapon, its 
adversary will not launch a preventive war; 2) the adversaries both develop an 
invulnerable second-strike force; and 3) there is no fear of unauthorized or 
accidental use. But because of the characteristics of military organizations that 
make them imperfectly rational, Sagan points out that the three major assumptions 
of the pro-proliferation view are not always true with certainty. Therefore, one 
cannot count on new nuclear states not using their weapons, even if using them 
would work against their national interests. Pakistan causes special worry for 
Sagan because its nuclear program and weapons are not controlled by civilians but 
by the military.53 
 
Thus, the weapons do not necessarily bring stability to South Asia. The 
assumptions 2 and 3 above are not necessarily true in the case of the two countries. 
At least in the near future, the invulnerability of the nuclear forces cannot 
necessarily be guaranteed. The command and control systems of the two countries 
are not yet so developed that unauthorized or accidental use would be impossible in 
all circumstances. 
 
M. Ayoob considers the nuclear build-up in South Asia as threatening because of 
fundamental perceptual gaps between the two states. First, Islamabad sees the 
regional distribution of power as bipolar, and wants the status quo in Kashmir 
change to reflect this view. New Delhi, however, sees itself as a unipolar hegemon 
in the region. Second, the view of Islamabad seems to be that nuclear weapons 
make all wars, except for proxy wars, between their possessors impossible, and 
therefore counts on India not escalating the Kashmir crises from the level of a local 
conflict into an interstate war. New Delhi, however, seems to consider 
conventional warfare as possible even between nuclear powers.54 
 
                                                          
52 Visuri 1997, p. 369. 
53 Sagan 1994. 
54 Ayoob 2001. Ayoob claims that there are two ways to maintain regional order; either a regionally 
dominant power takes over the task of maintaining stability and ensuring security, or two 
approximately equal powers balance each other. He considers India as the pivotal and preeminent 
regional power. 
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India has long been a proponent of total, universal nuclear disarmament. Although 
many consider total nuclear disarmament as impossible because nuclear weapons 
cannot be de-invented, India has pointed out the example of the Chemical Weapons 
Convention. It has also based its opposition to the NPT on the argument that the 
five acknowledged nuclear powers do not seriously undertake nuclear 
disarmament, although the NPT in principle aims at it. In practice, the nuclear 
powers are willing to participate in nuclear disarmament only as long as the 
disarmament efforts do not affect their capability to cause major destruction. The 
steps that the US and Russia take towards nuclear disarmament are significant 
because the less there are of nuclear weapons, the fewer nuclear warheads might 
end up in unauthorized hands. The disarmament actions do not, however, really 
affect the power of the US and Russian nuclear forces as they in any case remain 
very strong. Neither China, France, nor the UK has been willing to participate in 
nuclear disarmament.  
 
As another side of the same token as some find nuclear proliferation sometimes 
desirable, it can be argumented that nuclear disarmament may be undesirable. Even 
if all states would publicly commit themselves to nuclear disarmament and 
extremely intrusive verification mechanisms would be in place, it would be 
impossible to ensure that all existing nuclear weapons would be permanently 
destroyed in a way that would not allow them to be reassembled quickly, and that 
all states would give up their nuclear programs. Nuclear explosives are small and 
can thus be easily hidden. If one state clandestinely hid some nuclear explosives or 
had the capability to reassemble weapons significantly faster than anyone else, it 
would have tremendous opportunities to blackmail its adversaries. Therefore, it 
would be in the advantage of all nuclear states to clandestinely retain some nuclear 
weapons if just for the case that someone else did the same. Furthermore, even if 
all existing nuclear weapons would be destroyed, it would always be possible to 
redevelop them because they cannot be de-invented. And if states would after all 
start redeveloping nuclear weapons, these new weapons would probably be less 
secure than the current ones because the command and control mechanisms would 
have to be rebuilt, too.55 
 
Even if policy-makers in the nuclear states might think that nuclear total 
disarmament would be undesirable, to support the NPT, the nuclear powers have to 
appear committed to nuclear disarmament. If the nuclear powers do not take steps 
towards nuclear disarmament, their right to nuclear weapons loses some of its 
legitimacy because the existing nuclear order of NPT calls for eventual nuclear 
disarmament. At the same time, however, they retain significant nuclear arsenals.  
 
 
 
                                                          
55 Glaser 1998. For example J. Schell has advocated a transformation of nuclear arsenals into virtual 
nuclear arsenals, which would not be ready to use but could be assembled quickly. In a system of 
virtual arsenals, the possibility of accidental or unauthorized use would diminish. Waltz has, 
however, strongly opposed this view by arguing that such a system would be unstable, largely for 
the same reasons as why he considers nuclear disarmament as unfeasible. Waltz 1997. 
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4 STARTING HYPOTHESES   
 
I now proceed to make starting hypotheses about the subject of my study, based on 
the theoretical discussion in Chapter 3 and especially taking into account my 
research questions. 
 
I expect that the Indian and the Pakistani nuclear weapons programs are for a large 
part a consequence of the security threats that they have faced and face. As far as 
Indo-Pakistani relations are concerned, I expect that the nuclear weapons have 
brought some stability to South Asia at least so that major wars are avoided 
because the two countries cannot risk large-scale fighting in the fear of escalation. 
Nuclear weapons should be an effective deterrent with respect to the Kashmir 
question because the conflict seems to be of great importance for both states. 
 
Because both India and Pakistan have acquired nuclear weapons and in 1998 
proclaimed that they are nuclear powers, the US policies do not seem to have been 
ultimately very successful. I expect that the US policies have not had the wished 
consequences because they have not addressed the real reasons for proliferation. 
Another possible reason for the unsuccessfulness of the US policies might be that 
other states have not supported them because they might not have agreed with the 
US either on the goals or on the measures to reach these goals. If other states do not 
find US views and actions justified, they might even become sympathetic for India 
and Pakistan. 
 
Possibly the US did also not find it absolutely necessary to halt the programs. The 
US may in principle have believed that nuclear weapons could provide the 
subcontinent with increased stability, or at least wanted to believe this especially 
after it was obvious that the programs could not be easily halted and India and 
Pakistan had became de facto nuclear states. 
 
Because of its current global hegemony, the US is a relevant, albeit in many cases 
latent actor everywhere in the world. I assume that the policies of the US on the 
Indian peninsula, as well as elsewhere, reflect the geopolitical worldviews of the 
successive US leaderships. I assume that particular US actions cannot be explained 
only by the particular situations themselves but by a more general, global 
geostrategy and the geopolitical views of the US. The US interventions in South 
Asia have been largely a product of its global aspirations. 
 
From the perspective of the international system, the goals of the US can be 
reduced into a few guiding thoughts, which can be considered as its overall 
strategic goals. First, during the Cold War, the US aimed at balancing and 
overcoming the power of the Soviet Union; its primary goal was to stop the 
communist sphere of influence from growing and therefore to surround the Soviet 
Union by own allies. Second, after the Cold War, the US is the only superpower in 
the world and tries to extend the period of its superior power; as Brzezinski points 
out, this entails preventing the rise of new great powers that could challenge its 
hegemony even at a regional level. I consider these two as its primary goals in 
different time periods.56 
                                                          
56 Mearsheimer 2001; Brzezinski 1997, p. 40. Brzezinski further suggests that the post-Cold War 
international order institutionalizes many qualities of the US system internationally. Thus another, 
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In my study, I thus expect that with its policies towards the two states and their 
nuclear programs, the US has tried to promote a regional balance-of-power 
favorable from its point of view. This balance-of-power would be a stable regional 
situation with no state (especially in this case India) powerful enough to be able to 
prevent the US from ensuring that its interests are being served or to endanger the 
US capability to ultimately impose its will when needed. Cooperation between the 
US and Pakistan, the secondary regional power, can be expected, as they might be 
able to gain from joint opposition to India, the major regional power — the US to 
make sure India does not grow too powerful so that the US possibility to impose its 
will would be endangered; Pakistan because cooperation with the US can provide it 
with improved security. 
 
When India had strong ties to the Soviet Union, it could have been unfavorable for 
the US if India would have become more powerful. On the other hand, India’s 
orientation towards the Soviet Union could maybe have been avoided if the US 
itself would have developed closer relations with India. Also even if India 
prevailed over Pakistan, China would check Indian power in a wider Asian context. 
A stronger India could on the other hand be able to check China, but China is in 
any case constrained from other directions by other major powers: Japan, Russia, 
the US, and Korea57. Therefore, India is in the sense end relatively unimportant for 
the US. Pakistan and India do not seem overly important for the US also because 
the US has not got more engaged in trying to solve the Kashmir conflict. 
 
But there are also reasons for the US to be interested in South Asia. Specifically in 
South Asia, US goals include “deterring or limiting nuclear and missile 
proliferation, averting conflicts, and making sure that US relations with regional 
states are a source of positive influence on US interests in the Middle East/ Persian 
Gulf region, and not a source of instability”58. The factors that affect the regional 
power relations can also influence states that potentially could challenge the 
unipolar position of the US, especially China. Pakistan is strategically interesting 
for the US because of its location between India, China, and Russia and near the 
Middle East because of its relations to the Islamic world and to China. India’s great 
size and population make it significant both as an economic area and as a regional 
power. The controversies between these two states have had a great impact on the 
general development prospects of the region. A great amount of the resources of 
the two poor states has been devoted to developing nuclear weapons, and for 
example trade between them as well as tourism have suffered from the Indo-
Pakistani conflict. Nuclear proliferation in Pakistan and India also make US 
attention necessary because the US has committed itself to opposing it. 
 
                                                                                                                                                                 
long-term foreign policy goal of the US is to institutionalize these features of the international order. 
The examination of such phenomenon, however, is outside the scope of my study. 
57 IFPA 1997. Brzezinski considers the US as a natural ally for China. China is surrounded by 
suspicious neighbors it cannot trust. With the US, China has had neither territorial grievances nor 
experiences of humiliation. China also needs American investments. The US aspirations for world 
hegemony, however, have so far made the US China’s “unintentional adversary rather than its 
natural ally”. Brzezinski 1997, pp. 151, 169, 207. 
58 Cronin & Leitch LePoer 1993, p. 3. These goals are from a report of the Congressional Research 
Service, and although the report is from the year 1993, I think these goals can be considered as 
mostly unchanging. Currently, fighting international terrorism should probably be added on the list. 
 25
South Asia is also of interest for the US because the region can be used to support 
possible operations in the Gulf region, which is vital because of oil. The US wishes 
to see Pakistan to have such relations to the Middle Eastern Muslim states that are 
beneficial for the US interest there. The great natural reserves of natural gas and oil 
in Central Asia are also a reason for the US interest in the region, as finding, using 
and controlling new energy resources is becoming ever more important in the face 
of the growing energy consumption in the world. Access to these resources is of 
great importance. The access has been controlled by the Soviet Union and 
thereafter by Russia, and it is clearly in the interest of the US that alternative 
transportation routes and pipelines are constructed that deny Russia the sole 
control. The route could be either from Central Asia to the Mediterranean through 
Azerbaijan and Turkey, or to the Arabian Sea through Afghanistan. The latter 
possibility could also benefit Pakistan.59 
 
At a somewhat more specific level, the explicit goals of the US foreign policy, 
stated in the US Department of State Strategic Plan, include to “secure peace; deter 
aggression; prevent, and defuse, and manage crises; halt the proliferation of 
weapons of mass destruction; and advance arms control and disarmament”. The US 
aims at preventing “regional instabilities from threatening US vital national 
interests”, because “left unresolved, such threats can result in loss of life, regional 
and global disruption in the flow of goods and services, and the need for protracted 
US intervention”.60 Thus, promoting stability i.e. the absence of war and abrupt 
change is a general US goal not only because the US wants to avoid war itself but 
also because stability promotes economic and political development that can 
benefit the US. Furthermore, stability increases the likelihood that the US can 
maintain its position and does not have to use its resources to ensure that no other 
state grows too powerful or disrupts the international order. Instability could 
endanger the hegemonic position of the US.61 The US attitude towards the Indian 
and Pakistani nuclear programs should thus be dependent on whether they seem to 
enhance or decrease the stability of the system. As noted above, if the US considers 
that nuclear proliferation improves stability, it might in principle not oppose it. The 
US explicitly aims at reducing “the threat to the United States and its allies from 
weapons of mass destruction”62, but in the case of South Asia, the nuclear weapons 
do not seem to pose a direct threat to the US.  
 
However, I assume that the goals of checking the Soviet Union and trying to extend 
the period of superior power have been of foremost importance for the US. Its other 
foreign policy goals, including the ones of aiming at the absence of regional 
conflicts and of preventing nuclear proliferation (if this really was its goal in South 
Asia), are submitted to the first goals and cannot always be promoted if they are in 
conflict with the first ones.  
 
                                                          
59 Brzezinski 1997, pp. 125, 139-140. 
60 US Department of State 2000c. Goals related to economic prosperity, protecting US citizens and 
borders, law enforcement, democracy, and humanitarian and global issues are also included in the 
long-term foreign policy goals of the US in the US Department of State Strategic Plan 2000. 
Although the Strategic Plan is from the year 2000, I think these goals can be considered as mostly 
valid already before that.  
61 However, I assume that preventing conflicts is a US goal as long as that is supportive of the 
foremost goal, to sustain the US hegemony. 
62 US Department of State 2000c.  
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5 THE SOUTH ASIAN NUCLEAR PROGRAMS AND THE US ACTIONS 
TOWARDS THEM 
 
So far, I have approached the subject of my study from a rather theoretical point of 
view. In this chapter, I go on to an empirical examination of the subject. This 
examination is the source from which I try in the concluding Chapter 6 to find 
answers to the research questions and based on which the hypotheses from Chapter 
4 could be confirmed or refuted. 
 
 
5.1 The early nuclear age: proliferation to developing countries not 
seen as a major threat 
 
5.1.1 The US Atoms for Peace -program 
 
The US has been trying to stop horizontal nuclear proliferation already since 1945. 
It has primarily tried to do this through legal arrangements and safeguard systems. 
Originally the US wanted to restrict the spread of nuclear technologies altogether. 
However, it soon became obvious that it would not take long before it would lose 
its monopoly on them because the Soviet Union would also succeed in developing 
nuclear weapons.63 Thus, in 1946 the US came up with the Baruch Plan, where 
international control of atomic energy was proposed. According to the plan, while 
nuclear weapons would have been abandoned, the peaceful use and research on 
atomic energy would happen under an international monopoly that could not be 
vetoed by any state. The Soviets did, however, not accept the plan.64 
 
After the US lost its monopoly on nuclear weapons after the 1949 Soviet test, the 
US became interested in exporting nuclear technologies and materials for peaceful 
purposes because of both political and economic reasons. It started actively doing 
this after President Eisenhower in 1953 launched the Atoms for Peace program, 
concretized in the 1954 Atomic Energy Act. Within the program, the US offered 
other states assistance in the realm of civilian uses of atomic energy, if they in 
return refrained from developing nuclear weapons.65 The civilian uses of atomic 
energy were seen as potentially very beneficial for development. Behind the plan 
was also the development of a hydrogen bomb by both the US and the Soviet 
Union. The new explosive was even greatly more destructive than the earlier 
nuclear bombs, and the emphasis given to the peaceful uses of atomic energy was 
supposed to make public around the world less critical of atomic energy in general 
                                                          
63 The major difficulty in producing nuclear weapons is to acquire the nuclear material for the core 
of the explosive. The material can be either highly enriched uranium that contains at least 90 % of 
uranium isotope 235 or plutonium. The explosive energy of a nuclear weapon results from a fission 
where either uranium or plutonium is used and/ or from a fusion where thermonuclear materials like 
lithium are used. In the more modern thermonuclear explosives, a fission reaction is often enhanced 
by a fusion reaction. Plutonium that does not appear in nature can be reprocessed from uranium 
fuel, and therefore the amount of plutonium potentially available for nuclear weapons has grown as 
the number of nuclear reactors in use has risen. For a primer on nuclear weapons, see, e.g., Spector 
1990, pp. 417-422. 
64 Quester 1970, pp. 18-19, 103. 
65 Heiskanen 1995, p. 25; Lefever 1979, p. 3. 
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and also of the nuclear weapons of the US. Being at the time the only state capable 
of exporting nuclear technology, the US could with this carrot also possibly win 
neutral states on its side.66 
 
It was realized in the US that as a less desirable consequence of the program, also 
less developed countries could in the future have a capability to develop nuclear 
weapons because plutonium could be produced from the fuel used in the nuclear 
reactors the US was to supply. Therefore, especially because of pressure from the 
Congress to do this, the Eisenhower Administration demanded bilateral safeguards 
from the recipient countries.67 An international safeguard system was introduced by 
the creation of the IAEA in 1957. 
  
Since the Atoms for Peace program, the US has been active in exporting nuclear 
technology, with the US Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) assisting the 
American industry. The US is, e.g., the world’s biggest exporter of enriched 
uranium. Although the US exports only to countries with safeguarded nuclear 
facilities, it has not always been able to make sure where its exports eventually end 
up.68 
 
The Atoms for Peace program has later on been blamed of clearly improving 
capabilities to nuclear proliferation, as knowledge, reactors, and plutonium 
production capabilities were distributed around the world.69   
 
 
5.1.2 A wide civilian nuclear program launched early on in India 
 
The Indian nuclear program originated in 1945, when the Tata70 Institute for 
Fundamental Research, designated for the research of nuclear physics, was opened 
in Bombay. In newly independent India, the father of the Institute, physicist H. J. 
Bhaba, sold Nehru the idea of the usefulness of nuclear power for the 
industrialization of the country. Before becoming the Prime Minister, Nehru had 
thought that because of the preponderance of nuclear force in the international 
system, it was necessary for all countries to acquire the shelter provided by nuclear 
weapons. Later on, however, he opposed nuclear weapons. Bhaba was given the 
lead in the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC), which was set up in 1948. The 
atomic energy program became under the control of the Prime Minister early on 
highly autonomous and covered from the public. The Indian Department of Atomic 
Energy was created in 1954.71 
                                                          
66 Quester 1970, pp. 98-99. 
67 Ibid., p. 99. Plutonium did not seem a suitable material for hydrogen bombs. However, although it 
was maybe not evident at the time the Atoms for Peace -plan was launched, plutonium works well 
on more sophisticated fission explosives. Quester 1970, p. 143-144. 
68 Lefever 1979, pp. 3, 13. 
69 Quester 1970, p. 143. 
70 Named after the influential Tata family that provided financing for the Institute. 
71 Ganguly 1999, p. 150; Tamminen & Zenger 1998, p. 232; Chellaney 1999. From the point of 
view of the civilian uses of atomic energy, the Indian program has not lived up to the great 
expectations. Although India has the widest nuclear power program in the developing countries, the 
importance of which for the economy has been emphasized in public, only 2,5 % of Indian 
electricity was produced with nuclear power in 1993. The civilian nuclear projects have been 
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Originally India was not interested in acquiring nuclear weapons but was devoted 
to the promotion of nuclear disarmament, being loyal to the Gandhian principles of 
non-violence. India was supposed to become a great country exactly because it 
prioritized the economic wellbeing of its citizens more than the development of 
expensive nuclear weapons. It was India who in 1954 raised international 
opposition to the US nuclear tests in the atmosphere. Similarly, Prime Minister 
Nehru first suggested in 1954 an international treaty forbidding all nuclear tests. 
India also lobbied for an universal test ban treaty during the Geneva negotiations, 
for a non-discriminating non-proliferation treaty in 1965, for a treaty prohibiting 
the use of nuclear weapons in 1978, for a freeze of nuclear programs in 1982 and 
for a gradual program for giving up nuclear weapons in 1988. The Indian nuclear 
weapons policies have been targeted at either a global nuclear disarmament or the 
principle of equal and legitimate security for all.72 On the other hand, India has 
long sought the status of a major power, for example in the form of a permanent 
seat in the UN Security Council. This is has, however, not been granted. As the 
permanent members of the Security Council are also the only acknowledged 
nuclear powers, there seems to be grounds for the Indian complaints about the 
important status given for nuclear weapons in international relations. 
 
India was among the countries for which the US offered assistance within the 
Atoms for Peace program. In the same spirit, the first Indian nuclear research 
reactor was built with Canadian help in 1956. Canadians also assisted in building 
the CIRUS reactor that started operating in 1960 and that made the production of 
nuclear explosives possible for India. In 1964, India acquired the capability to 
produce plutonium, being the fifth country in the world to succeed in this. But 
because India was not able to enrich uranium itself, the US committed itself to 
supply a light-water reactor in Tarapur with enriched uranium for 30 years after its 
opening in 1969, a commitment that became a source of schism between the two 
countries (see Chapter 5.2.6 below).73 
 
On the other hand, in the spirit of India’s program for economic self-reliance, it 
was considered important to keep the atomic energy program as indigenous as 
possible. India did also mostly not accept international safeguards, which it 
considered as intrusive, on its facilities.74 The Soviet Union lined up with India in 
opposing the safeguards that the capitalist US demanded.75 
 
The US did not see India in a totally positive light in late 1940’s and early 1950’s. 
Reportedly, in a US State Department report from 1949 India was considered even 
as Japan’s potential “successor in Asiatic imperialism”. Furthermore, in the same 
report it was allegedly stated that “in such a circumstance a strong Muslim bloc 
                                                                                                                                                                 
subject to constant delays, mainly because the country has not been able to become technologically 
and materially self-reliant as fast as planned. Also safety issues have caused significant delays. Both 
India and Pakistan have pressing energy needs, and the lack of energy makes it difficult for them to 
become attractive for foreign manufacturing investors. Tamminen & Zenger 1998, pp. 232-233; 
Sharma 1987, pp. 224-226; Cronin & Leitch LePoer 1993, p. 50. 
72 Tamminen & Zenger 1998, p. 231; Singh 1998, p. 44; Lifschultz 1998. 
73 Jones & McDonough 1998, p. 112; Tamminen & Zenger 1998, p. 232; Chellaney 1999; Meyer 
1984, p. 122. 
74 Tamminen & Zenger 1998, p. 232; Jones & McDonough 1998, p. 112. 
75 Quester 1970, p. 100. 
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under the leadership of Pakistan and friendly to the US, might afford a desirable 
balance of power in South Asia”.76 
 
Nehru, an opponent of the use of force in international politics, had publicly turned 
against the development of nuclear weapons. However, he gave Bhaba, the head of 
the AEC, wide freedoms in developing the Indian nuclear program. Bhaba 
considered the acquisition of nuclear weapons already in 1958 and started 
equipping a plutonium-reprocessing facility the same year, although it was 
allegedly meant for civilian uses. The Indian defeat in the Sino-Indian war in 1962 
strengthened Bhaba’s interest in nuclear weapons and made him lobby for them in 
public. The Indian Atomic Energy Act granted the nuclear program privacy and 
gave the chairman of the AEC wide freedoms of action with regard to the nuclear 
program. The chairman was only accountable to the Prime Minister.77   
 
 
5.1.3 Alliance with the US improves Pakistan’s security 
 
During the 1950’s, especially after Indian opposition in the UN to the US policies 
on Korea, Pakistan became an ally of the US. The US had interest in allying with 
Pakistan because of its location near the Soviet Union, China, and the Middle East. 
In Pakistan, the pro-Western bureaucratic élites and the anticommunist military 
prompted the alliance. Pakistan’s joining of several US-led security arrangements 
(e.g., Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) and the Baghdad Pact) made it 
a recipient of US military and economic assistance. To promote US-Pakistan 
security cooperation, the US also arranged visits and education for Pakistani 
military officials in the US. The US support enhanced the domestic position of the 
military, and strengthened the military’s view that allying with the West was a 
viable way to ensure security against India. In 1959, Pakistan and the US signed a 
mutual defense agreement, under which the US could, although very unlikely 
would, response to a nuclear attack to Pakistan with the same measure.78 
 
Although Pakistan’s defense was during the first decades of independence based 
solely on conventional weapons and nuclear weapons were not seriously 
considered, there was some interest in nuclear power as far as its peaceful uses 
were concerned. The Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission (PAEC) was set up in 
1957 for the research and development of peaceful nuclear capabilities. Both the 
sole Pakistani research reactor and the heavy-water nuclear power plant in Karachi 
were brought under IAEA safeguards.79 Unlike India, Pakistan did not build up a 
wide civilian nuclear program. As the nuclear program grew, it was mostly for 
military purposes only.80 
 
                                                          
76 Kapur 1995. 
77 Ganguly 1999, pp. 150-152; Sharma 1987, p. 223; Jones & McDonough 1998, p. 112. As noted 
above, Nehru’s stance on nuclear weapons before he was Indian Prime Minister did not indicate 
total opposition to nuclear weapons. However, he might have considered nuclear weapons as a 
necessary evil. 
78 Karim 2001, p. 133; Ahmed 1999, pp. 180-181; Lefever 1979, p. 43. For a discussion on the role 
of the military in Pakistan, see Samad 1994 and Malik 2001. 
79 Ahmed 1999, p. 181. 
80 FAS 2000b. 
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5.2 Rising US concern on proliferation 
 
5.2.1 Security threats increase interest in nuclear weapons in India and 
Pakistan 
 
The dramatic defeat in a border war against China in 1962, followed by the first 
Chinese nuclear test in 1964, marked a clear turning point in the Indian strategic 
thinking in general and for its nuclear program in particular. Especially the rightist 
opposition impugned the liberal foreign policies of Nehru that had aimed at 
countering the threat posed by China by trying to improve relations with it. With 
his personal authority, Nehru was able to calm down the debate on nuclear 
weapons, but after his death in 1964, the pro-lobby got louder. It was feared that if 
India did not develop nuclear weapons, China would periodically blackmail it, 
though making it in a subtle enough way to avoid Western criticism.81 
 
The new Indian Prime Minister L. B. Shastri opposed the acquisition of nuclear 
weapons on the grounds of their costs, of their antagonizing effect towards 
Pakistan, and of their little value against China unless a large nuclear arsenal would 
be acquired. He stated publicly that India would not acquire nuclear weapons and 
announced in December 1964 that India was instead trying to get a nuclear 
guarantee from the nuclear powers. In May 1965, his Foreign Minister S. S. Singh 
admitted, however, that the hope for a guarantee had been in vain. India’s quest for 
nuclear guarantees was complicated by the country’s insistence on preserving its 
non-aligned status. On the other hand, the US had given India support during the 
1962 Sino-Indian war, and this implied to some Indians that India had an implicit 
US security guarantee against China and did therefore not need an explicit one.82 
 
Tensions were also increasing in Indo-Pakistani relations. In Pakistan, this led to a 
gradual attitudinal change towards nuclear weapons. Pakistan’s relationship with 
the US also experienced its first splintering when the US supported India during the 
1962 Sino-Indian war. Because of the apparent Indo-US rapprochement, Pakistan 
developed very near relations with China, US opposition notwithstanding. This 
relationship, however, contributed to the rapprochement of the US and China. 
Pakistani Foreign Minister, Z. A. Bhutto, was in favor of developing nuclear 
weapons and tried to persuade the head of Pakistani military dictatorship, M. A. 
Khan, to investigate the possibilities of developing nuclear weapons. A. Khan 
turned the proposition down on account of his belief that if needed, Pakistan could 
acquire nuclear weapons by simply buying them from its Western allies.83 
 
In 1965, India and Pakistan got into a war over Kashmir, which had been a reason 
for a conflict between the two states already when they became independent in 
1947 (see Chapter 1). The Soviets helped to negotiate the Tashkent agreement of 
January 1966 that ended the war and marked a return to the status quo ante. The 
war led India to increasingly rely on the Soviet Union. On the other hand, the 
support China had given Pakistan during the war highlighted the Indian security 
                                                          
81 Ganguly 1999, pp. 151-152; Tamminen & Zenger 1998, pp. 236-237. 
82 Tamminen & Zenger 1998, p. 237; Ganguly 1999, pp. 153-155; Lefever 1979, p. 29. 
83 Ahmed 1999, p. 182; Shah 2001, p. 350. 
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dilemma: it was surrounded by two enemies that had close relations with each 
other. Shortly after the war, Shastri still opposed the adoption of a nuclear weapons 
program, partly because of the costs of such a project. However, as the public 
pressure grew and the threat of a two-front war was real, he announced that the 
accomplishment of nuclear delivery systems by China would lead to a 
reconsideration of Indian nuclear policies. In 1965 he also commissioned the AEC 
to start a classified project for preparing an underground nuclear test. It was 
estimated that the preparations would take three years, but it is uncertain what the 
level of technological preparedness was at the time. The preparations were, 
however, halted in 1966 when Bhaba died because his successor, V. Sarabhai, was 
strictly against developing nuclear weapons.84 
 
The US punished both India and Pakistan for the conflict over Kashmir by cutting 
off the supply of weapons in 1965. This made Pakistani leaders more interested in 
nuclear weapons because India started to gain a clear superiority in terms of 
conventional weapons as the Soviet Union supplied it with armaments. The US-
Soviet détente also diminished Pakistan’s value as an ally for the US.85 
 
After Shastri’s death in 1966, I. Gandhi formed the new Indian government. She 
continued to seek nuclear guarantees from the US and the Soviet Union. At most, 
the superpowers were willing to jointly declare that they would not use nuclear 
weapons against non-nuclear states. These qualified propositions were only offers 
of negative guarantees (i.e. nuclear states do not themselves use the nuclear 
weapons to attack non-nuclear states) and not enough for India, which feared a 
Chinese attack, and sought a positive security guarantee (i.e. guarantee of support 
against aggressive third parties). At the same time, Sarabhai continued to improve 
the nuclear infrastructure of the country. The first Chinese hydrogen explosive test 
in 1967 increased the willingness in the Indian parliament to conduct own nuclear 
tests.86 
 
In 1971, another war broke out between India and Pakistan. For Pakistan, the war 
was a traumatic experience as it led to the division of Pakistan into two and to the 
neutralization of the former East-Pakistan, now Bangladesh. Pakistani President, 
Army Chief Y. Khan, was blamed for the unsuccessful war, and in the aftermath of 
the war, a powerful group within the military removed him from office and 
replaced him by Z. A. Bhutto, who had won the general elections in West-Pakistan 
in 1970. Islamabad was disappointed with the US not providing Pakistan with more 
support against India, which increased its sense of insecurity. The Soviet support 
for India also increased Islamabad’s hostility towards the Soviet Union, a feeling 
that was later reinforced by the Afghanistan war.87 
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The 1971 war made the Indian pre-eminence over its adversary obvious. As 
Pakistan became less a threat, more Indian resources became available for the 
defense against China. On the other hand, the war made India’s security threats 
evident again. During the war, it became apparent that the US, Pakistan, and China 
had approached each other. The US intervened in the conflict by moving an aircraft 
carrier towards the Bay of Bengal, thereby constraining India from invading West 
Pakistan.88 Many in India have seen that this meant that the US in fact threatened 
India with nuclear weapons.89 
 
In March 1972, Z. A. Bhutto adopted a secret nuclear weapons program, which was 
not only to counter both India’s conventional and nuclear forces but also to help 
build a new national identity after the division of the country and to improve the 
status of the defeated military. In late 1972, the first Pakistani nuclear reactor 
capable of producing plutonium started operating. The Pakistani decision to seek 
nuclear weapons was sealed with the Indian nuclear explosion in 1974 (see below). 
On the other hand, in November 1972, Pakistan proposed a nuclear weapon free 
zone (NWFZ) to South Asia, a proposition it has often repeated.90 Pakistan has also 
in general regularly proposed bilateral Indo-Pakistani nuclear arms control 
measures and also usually been willing to participate on the multilateral ones, too, 
if India would join them as well. 
 
 
5.2.2 Indo-Soviet friendship 
 
Under the guidance of I. Gandhi, moral considerations slowly but steadily started 
to get subordinated to more mundane imperatives in the Indian foreign policy. 
Although India was strong enough to check Pakistan alone, against China it needed 
an ally91. Thus instead of adhering to the principle of non-alignment, India drew 
nearer to the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union was a major exporter of military 
equipment to India from the 1960’s onwards, the terms of trade being very 
favorable to India. The arms trade between the two countries continued until the 
very end of the Cold War and even beyond. The Soviet Union, however, in 
principle opposed nuclear proliferation in India.92 
 
India’s relations with the US had deteriorated after 1967 because of considerable 
disagreements on trade, foreign aid, and investments. In the face of increasing 
tension in South Asia and of the US-China rapprochement, India and the Soviet 
Union sealed in 1971 their relationship with a twenty-year treaty on peace, 
friendship, and cooperation, which virtually included a security guarantee for India 
from the Soviets, although the treaty was not binding. On the other hand, India did 
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not have to totally give up its non-aligned status, as the treaty did not explicitly 
include a Soviet nuclear guarantee.93 
 
Until the 1971 Indo-Pakistani war, the relationship with the Soviet Union was 
important for India because the steady supply of arms improved its security. After 
the war, Indian security threats were greatly diminished as Pakistan was defeated 
and divided. China, too, changed its foreign policies into a more moderate 
direction. In the 1970’s and 1980’s, it was thus quite unlikely that India would get 
involved in a major war. That time, the supply of armaments from the Soviet Union 
served another purpose: namely, to support India’s desire to become a strong 
regional hegemon.94  
 
 
5.2.3 The international non-proliferation regime 
 
After the US had lost its nuclear monopoly in 1949, the superpowers shared an 
interest in preventing further states from acquiring nuclear weapons, as they 
wanted the international system to remain bipolar and stable. The possibility that 
the states defeated in WWII, especially the Federal Republic of Germany, would 
seek nuclear weapons, made the superpowers willing to work together to come up 
with legal arrangements to restrict the spread of nuclear weapons.95 The main 
framework through which they have worked and by which nuclear weapons are 
internationally regulated is the NPT, which has been strengthened by the export 
controls of the Nuclear Suppliers’ Club (NSC) and by the Missile Technology 
Control Regime (MTCR). Also treaties on a complete ban on nuclear tests and a 
cut-off in fissile material production have been sought but so far, these efforts have 
been hampered by, e.g., Indian and Pakistani opposition (see Chapter 5.4.4).  
 
China’s acquisition of nuclear weapons gave new impetus for the US and the 
Soviet Union to seek a multilateral treaty to halt the spread of nuclear weapons. As 
a consequence of the US 1953 Atoms for Peace program, plutonium production 
capabilities had spread in many countries.96 Guidelines for the treaty were created 
in 1965 in the United Nations Political Committee and the NPT was eventually 
signed by the US, the UK, and the Soviet Union in 1968. The treaty became into 
force in 1970.97 
 
As a promoter of nuclear disarmament, India was active in the negotiations and in 
drafting the treaty. The final treaty also includes two aspects that had been 
especially important for India. First is the access to the peaceful applications of 
nuclear technology given to the non-nuclear states in return for them accepting not 
to obtain military nuclear technology. The other is the inclusion of the ultimate 
                                                          
93 The treaty required joint military consultations if the security of either party was threatened and 
prohibited the parties from joining a military alliance against each other and from assisting third 
parties in conflicts against each other. Ganguly 1999, pp. 158-159; Tamminen & Zenger 1998, pp. 
239-240; Lefever 1979, p. 34; Thakur 1993.  
94 Thakur 1993. 
95 Eskelinen 1995, p. 3. 
96 Quester 1970, p. 253. 
97 Ganguly 1999, pp. 155-158. 
 34
goal of universal nuclear disarmament in the treaty  (Article 6). The stumbling 
block that eventually stopped India from signing the treaty was its insistence that 
all countries would be allowed to carry out peaceful nuclear explosions. The US 
could not accept this because of the impossibility of separating peaceful from 
military nuclear explosions.98 
 
Furthermore, India continued to demand nuclear guarantees for the non-nuclear 
states from the nuclear powers. Indeed, in 1968 all permanent members of the 
Security Council excluding France voted for a UN Security Council Resolution on 
Security Assurances to Non-Nuclear Nations. The resolution welcomes assistance 
from the nuclear powers to non-nuclear states if the latter are threatened by nuclear 
weapons, but it is totally unbinding. Both India and Pakistan abstained from voting 
for the resolution, because it did not give strong enough guarantees.99 
 
The Indian attitude towards drafting the NPT became more passive after the Indo-
Pakistani war of 1965, and when a draft of the treaty was examined in 1967, Indian 
Secretaries’ Committee, Foreign Minister, and Prime Minister agreed on rejecting 
the treaty. India has claimed that the treaty was discriminatory as it grants some 
states a right to nuclear weapons but to others not. India has also criticized the 
treaty on the grounds that the nuclear powers have not filled their obligation to 
nuclear disarmament, and that the treaty gives legitimacy to the five acknowledged 
nuclear powers’ nuclear weapons. Furthermore, India claims that the treaty is 
dangerous because certain non-nuclear parties to the treaty have secretly violated it. 
Also Pakistan decided to stay outside the NPT. Its rejection of the treaty was 
mainly caused by New Delhi’s decision, and Pakistan was not so much against the 
treaty in such.100  
 
The Indian demands targeted at the restriction of the military power of nuclear 
weapons so that countries would not be in unequal positions: the non-nuclear states 
would not need to fear to get blackmailed or attacked by nuclear weapons, and the 
whole division between nuclear and non-nuclear states would eventually cease to 
exist as the former would undertake nuclear disarmament. As the NPT did not 
satisfy these demands, India preferred to stay totally outside of it and maintain an 
option to acquire nuclear weapons. 
 
The NPT denies nuclear powers from transferring nuclear explosives to non-
nuclear countries and from aiding or encouraging non-nuclear states in the 
acquisition of nuclear weapons. Similarly, it prohibits non-nuclear countries from 
accepting such help or nuclear explosives if these are offered to them. In the Article 
3, the IAEA is given the mandate to monitor compliance with the treaty and the 
peaceful uses of nuclear energy in non-nuclear states. All parties to the NPT are 
supposed to cooperate for the peaceful uses of atomic energy. The nuclear states 
are supposed to agree on nuclear disarmament, which ultimately aims at the 
complete abandonment of nuclear weapons. 101 187 states, excluding Israel, Cuba, 
India, and Pakistan have signed the treaty. The nonproliferation regime, however, 
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lacks effective enforcement and punishment mechanisms, and has therefore not 
been able to prevent a determined state from developing nuclear weapons, as the 
Indian and the Pakistani examples show. 
 
The NPT defines a nuclear power as a state that has built and successfully exploded 
a nuclear explosive before January the 1st, 1967. This is the only definition of a 
nuclear power in international law, and has necessarily frozen the number of legal 
nuclear states into five. The treaty does not leave any possibility for states that have 
acquired nuclear weapons after that date for joining in or to be accepted as nuclear 
states. It is thus impossible for such states to become parties of the treaty unless 
they permanently give up their nuclear weapons. Otherwise the whole treaty should 
be re-written and accepted, signed, and ratified by all the members of it. 
 
 
5.2.4 The first Indian nuclear test 
 
Already in 1970, India had announced it was making research for an underground 
nuclear explosion for peaceful purposes.102 The preparations for the test were 
completed by the end of 1972. By the early 1970’s, India was both capable and 
motivated (see Chapter 5.2.1 for a discussion of the Indian security situation) to 
carry out a nuclear test. Thus, that India conducted its first nuclear test in 1974 was 
by no means totally unforeseeable. Only the political decision to carry out a test, its 
costs (e.g., sanctions imposed by other states) notwithstanding, was needed. The 
decision was probably made in the winter 1970-1971. The eventual timing of the 
test was largely dependent on I. Gandhi’s declining domestic standing after the oil 
crises had put the economy under strain103. The secretive nature of nuclear research 
implied that the discussion about the test was taken in a small circle and that public 
debate was limited. The public opinion in India was in any case mostly favorable to 
testing. The world including the US was, however, surprised by the test when it 
was carried out on May 18, 1974.104 
 
India claimed that the test was made for peaceful purposes: nuclear explosions 
were supposed to be useful for example in building tunnels and channels.105 Spinn-
offs from nuclear research to other technologies were also expected. The peaceful 
nature of the celebrated “Smiling Buddha” explosion was questioned everywhere 
from the outset as there is no way of separating peaceful from non-peaceful nuclear 
explosions. Besides, if India really would have been researching the peaceful uses 
of nuclear explosives, it should have carried out several tests, not just one. 
 
The claimed peaceful nature of the test was a compromise between the pro- and 
anti-nuclear elements in India. Even a “peaceful” explosive could be used as a 
powerful threat; on the other hand, India did not have to give up its pacifist 
rhetoric. The explosion marked a start of a nuclear obscurity or option strategy for 
India. The capability to produce nuclear explosives could be used as a threat. At the 
                                                          
102 Lefever 1979, p. 25. 
103 Ganguly 1997. 
104 Ganguly 1999, pp. 159-160; Chellaney 1999; Lefever 1979, pp. 27, 33. For a discussion on the 
preponderance of domestic factors in the Indian nuclear program, see Sagan 1996, pp. 65-69.  
105 So far, no tunnels or channels have been built with the help of nuclear explosives. 
 36
same time, however, India assured that it had not taken the final step of assembling 
nuclear weapons and did not possess them, thus avoiding the negative international 
responses and sanctions that overt nuclear weaponization would have caused. As to 
the Indian definition of a nuclear weapon belong both the nuclear warhead and the 
delivery system, it could claim it did not posses nuclear weapons as long as these 
two were not combined. India has also emphasized that its nuclear program is a 
part of its policy of non-alignment and continuously reaffirmed its willingness to 
participate in universal nuclear disarmament together with other nuclear powers.106  
 
The 1974 test has been considered as more a symbolic and political gesture to 
improve India’s international standing rather than a new military approach. First, 
India waited long after China had acquired nuclear weapons before it developed its 
own weapons. Second, India did not build up a nuclear arsenal in a long time after 
its test. The test, combined with India’s conventional weapons build-up, were ways 
for India to search the status of a major regional power that could no more be 
pressurized the way it was during the 1971 war when the US moved its aircraft to 
the region.107 
 
The test was domestically first greatly celebrated, although the original euphoria 
did not last long. The international reaction was also less favorable than India had 
expected. France did congratulate India, and China showed mild criticism. China’s 
stance was that not only the superpowers had a right to nuclear weapons, but it 
called the Indian test nuclear blackmail against Pakistan.108  
 
Canada’s reaction was strongest, which was understandable because it had had 
extensive cooperation with India on the nuclear realm, and because the plutonium 
used in the test originated in the CIRUS reactor built with Canadian help. Canada 
ended all nuclear cooperation with India, something that India had not expected.109 
 
The Soviets simply announced that India had conducted a peaceful explosion and 
was committed to not acquiring nuclear weapons. This reaction was partially 
dependent on the Soviet Union itself insisting on conducting peaceful tests for 
researching the possibilities to use them for mining. In 1976, the Soviet Union also 
agreed to sell heavy water to India after Canada had cut off its supply.110 However, 
in principle the Soviet Union was against nuclear proliferation in India. 
 
Bhutto responded to the test by stating that also Pakistan needed to acquire nuclear 
weapons, an “Islamic bomb”111. Immediately after the Indian test, Pakistan tried to 
benefit from the negative international reactions and called for nuclear assurances 
from all five nuclear powers or at least one of them for states that were faced by 
potential nuclear blackmail. However, no new assurances were given. Pakistan also 
repeated its proposition for a South Asian NWFZ but India rejected the idea. In 
February 1975, after Pakistani persuasion and Indian protests notwithstanding, the 
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US lifted the 1965 ban to sell conventional arms to the two countries. Pakistan tried 
to build stronger ties with Iran and Turkey as also these states were also concerned 
about Indian nuclear activities. In the latter case, the efforts hardly led anywhere 
but Iran became a source of military hardware and training.112 
  
The US also reacted negatively, although not very harshly. In August 1974, the US 
International Development Association Act was amended so that the US would 
oppose any loans to non-NPT-member countries that develop nuclear explosives. 
The US suspended shipments of enriched uranium to India but removed the 
suspension in September 1974. Thereafter the US tried to closely scrutinize that its 
shipments of enriched uranium did not end up being used as a material for nuclear 
explosives. In December 1974, the Senate cut bilateral aid to India. As US attempts 
to persuade India to accept non-proliferation measures (for example IAEA 
safeguards) failed, the US lost interest in nuclear cooperation with India.113 
 
The US lost its hegemonic position as an exporter of nuclear technology in the 
1970’s. The market became divided between several exporter countries, which 
could not agree on export rules. As the Indian test made it obvious that the existing 
export control systems were lacking, unclear, and varied from country to country, 
the suppliers of nuclear technology met in 1974, setting up the London Nuclear 
Suppliers’ Club (NSC), which aimed at creating common rules for the export of 
nuclear technologies and materials.114 
 
The strong international reactions kept India from carrying out more tests. It is 
surprising, though, that India showed restraint at this point, especially as further 
tests could have seriously have damaged the NPT regime, which was already 
tottering because of its first test.115 
 
 
5.2.5 Pakistan builds nuclear capabilities 
 
In the 1970’s, financing from Libya and other Arab countries set the Pakistani 
nuclear weapons program going.116 Z. A. Bhutto even apparently agreed with 
Qaddafi that Pakistan would provide Libya with several nuclear weapons later on 
as a payback for financing and uranium that Qaddafi offered to provide. China 
started assisting Pakistan in its nuclear program in 1974 by sending twelve 
scientists. In 1975, China helped Pakistan in building a nuclear research plant. As 
noted above, in the 1970’s and early 1980’s, China did not oppose nuclear 
proliferation in new countries because it thought that was a way to decrease the US 
and the Soviet influence.117 
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From early on, the Pakistani nuclear weapons program was divided into two 
competing sections: the plutonium and the uranium program. As far as the 
plutonium program was concerned, in 1973 Z. A. Bhutto tried to buy a nuclear 
reprocessing plant for the enrichment of spent uranium fuel to plutonium from 
France, although pretending that the plant was to be used for peaceful purposes 
only. France first accepted to sell a plant but eventually cancelled the deal (see 
below). The plutonium program of Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission (PAEC) 
was led by I. Ahmed. However, after Dr. A. Q. Khan arrived in Pakistan in 1975, 
he apparently managed to convince the Pakistani leadership of the advantages of 
uranium over plutonium.118 Thus Pakistan started also taking steps on the uranium 
route by undertaking clandestine efforts to build a uranium enrichment plant. Khan 
became the head of the uranium program (separated from PAEC in 1976) of Khan 
Research Laboratories. He was considered as the father of the nuclear program and 
a national hero. Khan had worked at a nuclear plant in the Netherlands where he 
presumably obtained knowledge and information that he later used for the benefit 
of the Pakistani nuclear program. The construction of both the Sihala pilot facility 
and the Kahuta full-scale facility was started in 1978.119 The Pakistani nuclear 
program soon became heavily dependent on clandestine transfers of nuclear 
hardware and technology (discussed in more detail in Chapter 5.3.2). 
 
In 1977, China and Pakistan planned together to build and test Pakistan’s first 
nuclear weapon, but these plans were abandoned when the military coup of General 
Zia ul-Haq took the power from Z. A. Bhutto in July 1977. Bhutto claimed that he 
had been removed from office because of his commitment to the nuclear program. 
Zia, however, soon continued the nuclear program.120 It has been claimed that the 
reason for removing Bhutto was that he did not enjoy Washington’s support121. 
 
M. Desai, Indian Prime Minister since 1977, opposed overt weaponization, 
assembling nuclear weapons. The Pakistani efforts to acquire nuclear weapons 
started to be apparent towards the end of 1970’s, which gradually led to new 
attitudes towards weaponization in Indian statements. After Desai's government fell 
in 1979, it was followed by an interim government of C. Singh. During Singh’s 
tenure it was in 1979 no longer claimed that India would not even think of 
acquiring nuclear weapons. Instead, it was admitted that India might do so if 
Pakistan was to make a nuclear test.122 
 
The major threat India was countering with its nuclear weapons had originally been 
China. Now the program was given new direction as it was for the first time made 
dependent on the actions of Pakistan. The Pakistani threat became gradually the 
overt reason for the Indian nuclear weapons program, while China has remained 
the covert reason. 123 
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After returning to power in 1980, I. Gandhi proceeded to further develop the 
country’s nuclear capabilities. Despite significant US pressure, critical facilities 
were not placed under IAEA safeguards.124 Around the turn of the decade, India 
also started efforts to develop a thermonuclear bomb, although this became 
publicly known first in 1989125. 
 
 
5.2.6 US non-proliferation regulations tightened 
 
In 1976, the increasing worry about nuclear proliferation, caused in part by the 
Indian 1974 test, resulted in the US Congress in the Glenn-Symington Amendment 
o the International Security Assistance and Arms Export Control Act, which denied 
US military and economic assistance from countries importing unsafeguarded 
enrichment and reprocessing technology (the former needed on the uranium and the 
latter on the plutonium route to developing nuclear weapons). The amendment was, 
however, later to hit Pakistan but not that much India because the latter’s program 
was quite indigenous, making it unnecessary for India to import so much 
technology. The Amendment authorized the President to waive the enrichment-
related sanctions if he was convinced that the importing country was not seeking 
nuclear weapons. Since the law was passed, no President has ever been able to state 
that with respect to Pakistan.126  The reprocessing-related sanctions could, 
however, be waived more easily and even indefinitely if the President considered it 
was in the US interest127. 
 
By 1976, also the Pakistani program had become a source of worry in Washington. 
The plutonium reprocessing plant that France had agreed to sell would have 
allowed Pakistan to produce plutonium and, despite the required IAEA safeguards, 
would have enabled Pakistan to build up plutonium stocks. US Vice President H. 
Kissinger traveled in 1976 to Pakistan to lay pressure on the country to join the 
NPT and to cancel out the order from France. He promised that the US would 
supply Pakistan with new A-7 bombers, had Pakistan agreed to cancel the deal. 
This did not bring the desired results but after Paris had obtained US intelligence 
data about the Pakistani nuclear program, it eventually agreed to cancel the deal. In 
September 1977, the US halted economic and military aid to Pakistan because of 
the deal but resumed it in August 1978 after France had totally ended carrying out 
the agreement with Pakistan.128 
 
President Carter had presented himself as a strict opponent of nuclear proliferation 
already in his election campaign. Furthermore, he gave special attention to the 
Pakistan nuclear program. The Carter Administration had a policy of regional 
influentials, which meant that certain states had regionally predominant positions. 
On the Indian subcontinent, India was considered as such a state129, and the 
Pakistani nuclear ambitions interfered in this picture. 
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Towards the late 1970’s, as the use of nuclear energy had became more 
widespread, it was clear that several countries around the world were slowly 
achieving latent nuclear weapons capabilities. Therefore, a lot of research was 
conducted on nuclear proliferation, especially on its technological aspects, 
implications, and US policy options. The US was especially concerned about the 
proliferation consequences of plutonium recycling. In the 1970’s, research on 
plutonium for nuclear power generation became namely popular because the oil 
crises had highly increased the expectations of the importance of nuclear energy in 
the future and at the same time led to a worry that the uranium resources would run 
out. Also Pakistan used these fears to claim that it was researching the peaceful 
uses of plutonium. The US worry about proliferation led it to initiate the 
International Fuel Cycle Evaluation (INFCE) conference. With the INFCE, the US 
aimed at convincing other states that the spread of plutonium recycling would lead 
to nuclear proliferation, and at trying to strengthen its claims that plutonium 
recycling was neither economical nor necessary (the US claimed that sufficient 
nuclear fuel resources existed).130 The overall consequence of the research efforts 
was the focusing on the technological, supply-side dimension of nuclear 
proliferation. 
 
During the Carter Administration term, the increased US activism in non-
proliferation led to the 1978 US Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act (NNPA), where the 
US committed itself not to export critical technologies to countries that might use 
them to acquire nuclear explosives. Also technologies and material associated with 
reprocessing (i.e. the plutonium route) are subjected to strict export controls.131 The 
Act made it necessary that states that receive nuclear materials or technology place 
all their nuclear facilities under full-scope safeguards. The Act caused one of the 
few occasions where the US sanctions touched the largely indigenous Indian 
nuclear program. In 1980, the Act led to the ending of all US nuclear cooperation 
with India, eventually also as far as the sales of spare parts and fuel for the Tarapur 
reactor were concerned, although this particular reactor was under safeguards. To 
ensure that India would not abandon the safeguards from Tarapur, however, in 
1983 the US negotiated an agreement with India and France that the latter will 
provide the former with fuel and spare parts for Tarapur.132 When the term of this 
agreement was over, the US succeeded in creating a consensus among the possible 
supplier countries about making a new supply deal dependent on India accepting 
full-scale safeguards on all its nuclear installations. In this case, it was China who 
accepted to sell fuel although only the reactors in question were safeguarded.133  
 
In 1978, President Carter declared that the US will not use nuclear weapons against 
the non-nuclear members of the NPT if they are not allied or in close cooperation 
with nuclear powers. This declaration has been repeated by the other US 
presidents, too.134 The declaration was a unilateral repetition of the US-Soviet 
declaration from 1966 (see Chapter 5.2.1), and therefore not really anything new, 
although it had some symbolic value. 
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5.3 Countering the Soviet threat 
 
5.3.1 The war in Afghanistan and US aid to Pakistan 
 
By 1979, all the few Pakistani nuclear facilities were still under IAEA safeguards. 
However, in the face of growing evidence that the Pakistani nuclear program did 
not aim at peaceful purposes only, under the 1976 Glenn-Symington Amendment 
(see above), the US stopped aid to Pakistan in May 1979 after Pakistan had 
imported uranium-enrichment equipment135. Washington’s criticism towards the 
Pakistani program softened after the Iranian revolution, which led the US to think 
that Pakistan could replace Iran as a post for gathering intelligence about the Soviet 
Union. The Carter Administration’s decision to offer Pakistan increased economic 
and military assistance was strengthened by the Soviets marching into Afghanistan 
in the end of 1979, which increased Pakistan’s strategic importance for the US. 
Islamabad, however, rejected the Carter Administration’s initial offer of $400 
million.136 
 
In 1981 Pakistan accepted the offer of the new Reagan Administration for a six-
year aid package worth $3.2 billion. The US also agreed to sell Pakistan forty F-16 
fighter-bombers. This was made possible by an exemption from the enrichment-
provisions of the Glenn-Symington Amendment by the Congress, which granted 
the President the authority to waive the sanctions for ten years if this was in the 
national interest. In early 1982, the President also waived the reprocessing-
provisions of the Amendment indefinitely. By this time, Pakistan was no longer 
needed for intelligence purposes but as an ally against the Soviets in Afghanistan. 
Pakistan became a channel through which the US gave aid to the Afghan 
resistance. Washington also hoped that its aid could help restrain the Pakistani 
nuclear weapons program as Pakistan was provided with advanced conventional 
weapons that enhanced its national security.137 This view was propagated until 
1989 also by both Presidents Reagan and Bush138. 
 
Already this time, differences between the US legislative and the executive in the 
views on how to best work against nuclear proliferation could be seen. In this case, 
it the US Congress was keen to ensure that the Afghan resistance was given enough 
support, whereas the Administration was afraid that the assistance could make 
Pakistan a target for Soviet retaliation139. Usually however, the Congress has 
preferred stricter policies against nuclear proliferation than the President, who has 
wanted to have flexibility to ensure that the overall US interests are being served. 
 
Also China collaborated with Pakistan and the US in supporting the Afghan 
resistance. This connection strengthened the basis on which Pakistan and China 
built their extensive cooperation in the realm of nuclear and missile programs.140 
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Thus although the Pakistani nuclear program was going on, the US was willing to 
make special exemptions from its own non-proliferation legislation, when other, 
more important US interests were so served. During President Reagan’s term, 
countering the Soviet Union was the primary foreign policy objective, and other 
considerations had to be adjusted to serve this goal. The President did not only 
perceive Soviet Union as a balance-of-power rival but also as a real threat to the 
existence of the US-led capitalist system. The relations of the US with a foreign 
country were dependent on the “usefulness” of the country in the anti-Soviet 
crusade. Therefore, the Communist China and the undemocratic Pakistan were 
likely to have closer ties with the US than the democratic India that had been tilted 
towards the Soviet Union.141 
 
Though India was not directly threatened by the support the US gave Pakistan 
during the Afghanistan war, it made it impossible for India to act unconstrained as 
a major regional power and gave Pakistan a chance to act independently in regional 
matters, also with respect to the Kashmir question. Another source of worry for 
India was Islamic revival in Pakistan that Zia propagated, which resulted in 
Pakistani support for the Afghan fundamentalist guerillas and in Pakistani links to 
the Persian Gulf states and the Khomeini government in Iran.142 
 
 
5.3.2 Clandestine efforts to acquire nuclear capabilities 
 
The Pakistani nuclear program has relied heavily on clandestinely exported 
materials and knowledge. Also the Indian program has benefited from such covert 
transfers. Nuclear transfers are strictly regulated by the NSG and the NPT 
Exporters’ Committee Guidelines. However, towards the end of 1980’s it became 
obvious that India and Pakistan had obtained nuclear technology and materials also 
from and through Western Europe. Sometimes the agents that worked for India or 
Pakistan got involved in outright smuggling, for example by using falsified or 
lacking export documents. In other instances, export licenses were obtained from 
the supplier countries because of the negligence of officials or gaps in regulations. 
On the other hand, a wide array of technologies and materials used for nuclear 
weapons production are of a dual-use nature. Transferring them can seem innocent 
and the suppliers can also play or feel innocent.143 
 
The Pakistani uranium enrichment facility in Kahuta was largely a product of 
extensive clandestine transfers from the late 1970’s onwards. The facility 
presumably started the production of weapons-grade uranium in 1986. Canadian, 
British, Dutch, Swiss, and American companies were involved in the transfers. A 
West German agent provided Pakistan with an entire uranium conversion 
installation in 1977-1980. During the 1980’s, further Pakistani nuclear transfer 
partners were found in Sweden, the Netherlands, and West Germany. West German 
agents’ assistance was especially important for helping Pakistan to produce tritium 
for advanced nuclear weapons.144 
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Pakistani efforts to acquire critical technologies continued throughout the 1980’s. 
Although Pakistan did not hesitate to get involved in clandestine transfers, it also 
bought dual-use components for its enrichment facilities legally from the world 
market. The world market for nuclear technologies and materials became more 
competitive and when the supplier countries had to fight for market shares, they 
were not always as strict as the US in export control, which made questionable 
transfers easier. New supplier countries from outside the NPT also entered the 
market that were willing to trade with countries interested in the acquisition of 
nuclear technologies. The latter countries also cooperated with each other. The 
export license criteria varied in West European countries. Especially West 
Germany became a major supplier for the threshold states. In the end of the 1980’s, 
the export controls were finally tightened there after several smuggling scandals.145 
 
In 1984, Sweden sold Pakistan a flash x-ray machine needed in the production of 
plutonium explosives. However, the US convinced Sweden that it should send 
neither manuals and spare parts for the machine nor an expert to teach how to use it 
to Pakistan. In 1987, Pakistan tried to send two men to the US to get training on the 
use of the machine but the US did not accept them when it was found out that the 
men were atomic scientists.146 
 
Further evidence on the Pakistani efforts to improve the uranium enrichment 
capabilities came in April 1987, when a large-scale Pakistani smuggling effort was 
revealed. Pakistan had tried to transfer custom-manufactured equipment and 
blueprints for a uranium enrichment plant from Europe with the help of Swiss and 
West German companies. Pakistan denied its involvement in the smuggling effort 
and the US did not react, either. Another illegal transfer received more US attention 
in July, however, when a Pakistani-born Canadian, A. Pervez, was arrested after 
having tried to smuggle material for nuclear weapons and uranium enrichment 
facilities from the US to Pakistan. At the same time, Pakistan was also making 
major illegal transfers from West Germany that aimed at enabling Pakistan to 
produce tritium for advanced nuclear weapons. The Reagan Administration 
attempts to get Germany to halt the transfers did not meet with success.147 
 
The Indian non-safeguarded plutonium production has also been dependent on 
exported heavy water. In the late 1980’s, it was found out that India had obtained 
great amounts of heavy water through a West German agent. Most of the heavy 
water had originated in China. Other source countries, including Norway and the 
Soviet Union, were led to believe that the heavy water they sold would be used in a 
country where IAEA safeguards were in place.148 These activities that went on 
throughout the 1980’s, enhanced the Indian weapons production capabilities. 
 
Before India’s involvement in large-scale smuggling became public, India claimed 
that its nuclear program was transparent and therefore only peaceful and blamed 
Pakistan of clandestine nuclear transfers, making Pakistan seem more suspicious 
than India. After the Indian smuggling actions became known, it was hard to 
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imagine why it would engage itself into such wide clandestine transfers if they 
were for peaceful purposes only.149 
 
 
5.3.3 US policies fluctuate between threats and giving aid 
 
In the 1980’s, China was intensively involved in assisting the Pakistani nuclear 
program. According to US intelligence, China helped Pakistan operate the Kahuta 
plant and had given Pakistan enough enriched uranium for two explosives, 
followed by more material later on, including enough tritium for ten hydrogen 
bombs. China also allegedly gave Pakistan a complete model of a nuclear weapon 
in 1983. The model would have been very valuable for Pakistan because using it, 
Pakistan could manufacture reliable weapons without having to conduct a nuclear 
test. The Chinese model has indeed been considered as one reason why Pakistan 
long refrained from conducting tests. In 1983, Pakistani Foreign Minister Y. Khan 
witnessed a Chinese nuclear test, which caused rumors that the tested device was 
actually a Pakistani one. Using the Chinese model, Pakistan also reportedly built 
and tested a complete weapon with a non-nuclear core in September 1986. In 1986, 
Pakistan and China signed an atomic energy cooperation agreement. 150 
 
Although Pakistan had somewhat concentrated on the Khan uranium program, 
around the mid-1980’s, problems in that program led Pakistan to again put more 
effort on the plutonium program. China helped Pakistan also on the plutonium 
program, e.g., in the construction of the Khushab heavy water reactor.151 
 
In early 1984, Pakistan announced that it had succeeded in producing enriched 
uranium, though it claimed that it had only produced low-enriched uranium not 
suitable for nuclear weapons. In the summer of 1984, it was known both within the 
Reagan Administration and the US Senate that the Pakistani nuclear weapons 
program was continuing. As further evidence, it was found out about the large scale 
of the Chinese involvement in the Pakistani program and also that Pakistan had 
tried to smuggle nuclear weapons equipment out of the US.152 President Reagan 
responded to this information by sending a letter to President Zia in September 
1984 to express his concern about the Pakistani program and to threaten with 
grave, though unspecified, consequences if Pakistan would enrich uranium over a 5 
% -level. By accepting this limit, Pakistan would have remained significantly apart 
from actually producing nuclear explosives, because for them, uranium enriched to 
at least 90 % is needed. In the letter, Reagan required clearly more abstinence from 
Pakistan than the US legislation, which only denied Pakistan from possessing 
nuclear explosives. Pakistan seemed to assure the US that the 5 % -limit would not 
be exceeded, but later on denied having accepted a clear limit. Though the US 
pressure on Pakistan did not lead Islamabad to halt its weapons program, the 
pressure was enough to keep Pakistan from conducting a nuclear test.153 
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At the same time, the Soviet Union was moving more forces close to the Pakistani 
border and violating the Pakistani air space by bombing Afghan refugee camps in 
Pakistan. Therefore, the Reagan Administration decided to provide Pakistan with 
advanced air-to-air missiles. Also key congressional committees expressed their 
willingness to accept a new share of the 1981, $3,2 billion assistance package for 
Pakistan. Although Pakistan successfully tested a non-nuclear triggering package 
for nuclear weapons in July 1985, thus taking another important step in developing 
nuclear weapons capabilities, the Congress authorized US assistance only three 
weeks later. At the same time the Congress, however, brought the threat of 
sanctions back on Pakistan as it strengthened the US non-proliferation regulations 
by the Pakistan-specific Pressler Amendment. According to the Amendment, the 
President has to annually certify that Pakistan does not possess a nuclear explosive 
before aid could be disbursed or arms sold to Pakistan. Furthermore, the Congress 
enacted the Solarz Amendment that prohibits US assistance to non-nuclear states 
that have smuggled items for nuclear explosives out of the US.154  
 
The US seemed, however, to be willing to sacrifice its opposition to nuclear 
proliferation in the face of other important considerations, especially the rivalry 
against the Soviet Union. The US did not punish Pakistan for crossing the 5 % -
limit set in the Reagan letter although Pakistan had done that at the latest by 
October 1985. The Congress might not have been fully aware of Pakistan’s 
progress in uranium enrichment at the time of the authorization of assistance for 
Pakistan in July, but the Reagan Administration was aware of it in October when 
Presidents Reagan and Zia met in at the UN. Because Reagan did not want to risk 
losing the US ally in Afghanistan, he did not bring the subject up. The US thus 
quietly accepted to watch, or not to see, Pakistan develop nuclear weapons. 
Another six-year flow of assistance to Pakistan from October 1987 onwards, this 
time worth $4.02 billion, was announced by the Reagan Administration in March 
1986. This was possible as the waiver of the Glenn-Symington Amendment had 
been extended until the fall of 1994.155  
 
After information about Pakistani nuclear smuggling activities and Chinese 
assistance to the Pakistani program had become available, it was rumored in the 
summer of 1984 that India might make a pre-emptive attack on the Kahuta 
enrichment plant in Pakistan. After the mid-1980’s, it was also increasingly feared 
in Pakistan that Israel would make such an attack to prevent the Muslim Pakistan 
from acquiring nuclear weapons. These fears led to increased efforts to protect the 
facility. It was also rumored that India and Israel might attack the Pakistani 
facilities together.156 
 
Around the mid-1980’s, both India and Pakistan were making significant progress 
in their weapons programs in ways that made it obvious that neither program aimed 
at the peaceful uses of nuclear power only. At the same time, however, the Indo-
Pakistani relations improved so that in the end of 1985 there seemed to be hope of 
the normalization of them. These hopes were, however, crushed by internal 
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political turmoil in both countries. Also in general though the Indo-Pakistani 
relations occasionally seemed to be improving, positive developments were always 
short-lived and the relations remained tense.157 
 
Though Pakistan was developing its nuclear weapon capabilities, throughout most 
of the 1980’s, it also had another nuclear policy objective, which was to achieve 
assurances for mutual nuclear restraint with India. President Zia proposed bilateral 
measures that would have led to the ending of the two nuclear weapons programs. 
He wanted to get rid of the expensive weapons program that also caused difficulties 
with the US.158  
 
 
5.3.4 Pakistan attains the capability to produce nuclear weapons 
 
In the summer and fall of 1986, unofficial as well as official US Administration 
reports acknowledged that Pakistan was at least almost capable of producing 
nuclear weapons, had produced weapons-grade uranium, and had tested non-
nuclear parts of a nuclear explosive. Nonetheless, in October 1986 President 
Reagan certified the Congress that Pakistan did not possess a nuclear explosive 
device, as required by the Pressler Amendment. The US assistance was thus left 
unaffected the obvious Pakistani advances notwithstanding. The Reagan 
certification apparently relied on the view that Pakistan had not yet actually 
produced and assembled all the components for a weapon although it had the 
explosive material. From this time onwards, Pakistan was considered almost a de 
facto nuclear state that had material for nuclear weapons and could assemble a few 
nuclear weapons quickly if needed.159 
 
Around the turn of the year 1986-1987, Pakistan and India were drawn into a new 
crisis when India arranged the biggest military rehearsal in its history called Brass 
Tacks. The resulting mobilizations for rehearsals on both sides led to fears of a 
major clash between the two countries. Though this danger was avoided as the US 
successfully set up consultations between Zia and Indian Prime Minister R. 
Gandhi, the relations between the two countries remained tense. 160 
 
During the winter, further information was published about both countries making 
progress in their uranium enrichment efforts. In March 1987, during the Brass 
Tacks crises, a notable Indian journalist, K. Nayar, was invited to meet A. Q. Khan, 
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the head of the Pakistani uranium program. In the interview, Khan told that 
Pakistan had proceeded significantly in the enrichment of uranium and owned 
material for a nuclear weapon. On the following day Khan, however, denied giving 
such a statement. The resulting debate about the interview’s truthfulness decreased 
the political significance of the issue so that there were no consequences for the US 
aid. The alleged statement was in any case generally taken seriously, especially in 
India, although Pakistan refrained from admitting that it had nuclear weapons. This 
was the first time when nuclear weapons were used as an open threat in the region: 
Khan allegedly told that his country would use nuclear weapons if its existence 
were being threatened. In reality, Pakistan did not yet have a nuclear capability 
because of the lack of a delivery system. Soon after the Khan interview, President 
Zia gave further confirmation about the situation in the Pakistani nuclear program. 
He announced that Pakistan was capable of manufacturing a nuclear weapon if it 
wished but had neither actually done it nor manufactured weapons-grade uranium. 
It has been claimed that the Pakistani statements about the nuclear weapons made 
India willing to stop the Brass Tacks crises from escalating further in the face of 
the possibility of a nuclear war.161 Thus nuclear weapons might have been a 
stabilizing factor in the crises.  
 
In 1987, India pronounced that it was convinced that Pakistan had a nuclear 
weapon.162 Though India remained calm the apparent Pakistani nuclear capability 
notwithstanding, it tried it as an argument in lobbying for US action against the 
Pakistani nuclear ambitions and particularly for a decrease in US aid to Pakistan. 
After the Pervez smuggling affair (see above) that apparently violated the 1985 
Solarz Amendment, which prohibits US assistance to non-nuclear states that have 
smuggled items for nuclear explosives out of the US, opposition to aid for Pakistan 
increased within the US legislators. Pakistani Prime Minister M. K. Junevo tried to 
avoid such setbacks by suggesting a bilateral ban on nuclear tests between India 
and Pakistan. India rejected the proposal, however, because it did not take China 
into account. New Delhi possibly also thought that no concessions were needed 
from India at a moment when Pakistan faced high pressure from the US. The US 
Under-Secretary of State for Political Affairs M. Armacost expressed US concerns 
about the Pakistani smuggling efforts on his visit to Islamabad in August 1987 and 
demanded Pakistan to restrain its nuclear activities. President Zia did not admit 
such activities were taking place. At the same time, however, negotiations on 
Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan were in a critical phase. President Reagan 
certified the US aid again since according to his knowledge, Pakistan did not 
technically possess totally assembled nuclear explosives and in December, the 
Congress authorized $480 million of new aid to Pakistan. This happened even 
though during the congressional debate on new aid for the next year, the US 
Ambassador-at-Large for Non-Proliferation R. T. Kennedy admitted that Pakistan 
has crossed the 5 % -limit in enriching uranium.163  
 
In early 1988 in a congressional testimony related to the Pervez smuggling affair, 
the US administration admitted for the first time in public that Pakistan had a 
nuclear weapons program under way. By waiving the Solarz Amendment with 
regard to Pakistan, President Reagan indirectly admitted that the Pakistani 
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government was involved in ongoing smuggling. In March, a thorough report on 
the Pakistani nuclear activities based on Reagan Administration information was 
published in New York Times Magazine. It was stated that Pakistan had both 
enough highly enriched uranium and almost all components for several nuclear 
weapons, even if no weapons had so far been assembled.164 
 
Though the Indian plutonium build-up was obvious, the US Department of State 
testified to the Congress in early 1988 that the final step to acquiring nuclear 
weapons remained not taken for India. A few months later, however, a press report 
citing US intelligence sources claimed that India had been producing twenty 
nuclear weapons per year from late 1986 onwards. According to the same report, a 
Department of State source had stated that India had in fact produced nuclear 
devices in 1974-77, but on the other hand that the Department of state did not 
believe that India was producing nuclear weapons at the moment.165  
 
By the early 1988, the strategic situation in South Asia had changed as the 
Pakistani de facto nuclear capability ended India’s nuclear weapons monopoly on 
the subcontinent and decreased the value of India’s superiority on conventional 
weapons. This highlighted the importance for India of maintaining superiority in 
nuclear weapons, leading India to put emphasis on expanding its nuclear 
infrastructure and on developing ballistic missiles (see Chapter 5.5.1). India stated 
that Pakistan was pressing it to reconsider its nuclear policies as well as to build up 
its unsafeguarded plutonium stock.166 
 
On the other hand, India at the same time increasingly established its credentials as 
the major regional power by expanding and improving its conventional military 
forces and ballistic missile capabilities and by intervening in internal conflicts in 
Sri Lanka and the Maldives, the latter operation also gaining recognition from the 
US. Under R. Gandhi, New Delhi also started rapprochement with Beijing in order 
to make China less threatening for India as well as to decrease Chinese support for 
Pakistan. Though the Sino-Indian relations were relatively peaceful and even a 
historical summit between the two states took place in the end of 1988, border 
disputes remained unsolved, and China continued to support Pakistan. The Sino-
Indian relations continued to improve gradually throughout the 1990’s until the 
Indian 1998 tests. On the other hand, these Indian actions in turn strengthened 
Pakistan’s inclination to develop nuclear capabilities.167   
 
Around the turn of the decade, India continued to add to its unsafeguarded 
plutonium production potential. In 1990, it was estimated that India was able to 
produce enough plutonium for more than 40 nuclear weapons per year. In 1996, the 
unsafeguarded plutonium production potential was further greatly increased. India 
also started making efforts to produce advanced thermonuclear weapons. 168 
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5.3.5 Increasing US pressure on Pakistan 
 
Zia died in a plane crash in August of 1988. Benazir Bhutto, the daughter of Z. A. 
Bhutto, became Pakistani Prime Minister of a multi-party government after 
winning the elections in November 1988. Already before she was elected, B. 
Bhutto had indicated that she could be willing to halt the Pakistani nuclear weapons 
program. Furthermore, she had close ties to the US, which made it more likely that 
the US could press her into curbing the program down. Such pressure was also 
more likely to be forthcoming because the Soviet Union started withdrawing its 
troops from Afghanistan around the turn of the year 1988-1989. At the time of the 
Pakistani elections, President Reagan again certified that Pakistan did not posses a 
nuclear explosive device. However, he qualified his statement by admitting that it 
did not mean that Pakistan was not developing one and that it was increasingly 
difficult to know with certainty whether Pakistan possessed one or not.169 
 
As the Soviet forces were withdrawing from Afghanistan, New Delhi tried again in 
vain to persuade the US to cut aid to Pakistan, referring to the Pakistani nuclear 
activities. R. Gandhi hoped that a cut-off of the US aid would press Pakistan to 
slow down its nuclear program. At the same time, however, the Indo-Pakistani 
relations showed some temporary improvement. At end of 1988, B. Bhutto and R. 
Gandhi signed an agreement that the two countries would not attack each other’s 
nuclear installations, an agreement that the leaders of the two countries had made 
orally in 1985. Later on, increasing tensions between the two countries postponed 
the agreement’s entry into force until January 1991. Thereafter, the two countries 
started regularly changing lists of plants covered by the agreement. In July 1989, R. 
Gandhi also made the first state visit by an Indian Prime Minister to Islamabad in 
several decades. Confidence-building measures continued to be introduced between 
the two countries, for example, in 1992 they agreed to give advance notifications of 
military exercises and to avoid flying over each other’s territories with military 
aircraft.170  
 
In the spring of 1989, B. Bhutto faced strong pressure from the US to curb the 
nuclear program, especially as it did not seem sure that the US Congress would 
show green light for as extensive amounts of military aid to Pakistan as before. 
Pakistan was especially interested in acquiring 60 F-16 bombers from the US, 
similar to the 40 bombers that the US had supplied Pakistan with in 1981-1987. 
The Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan was completed, which made it obvious 
that the aid that the US would give Pakistan would only be used against the Indian 
threat. The US had never admitted that helping Pakistan to counter India would be 
a basis for its support for Islamabad. 
 
B. Bhutto’s room for action was, however, quite restricted because her government 
faced severe domestic difficulties. Indeed, he fragile position of Bhutto’s 
democratically elected government gave the US a new reason to support 
Islamabad. The US support was expected to strengthen Bhutto’s domestic standing 
and Pakistani democracy. This view was relatively popular in Washington 
especially because B. Bhutto enjoyed relatively wide popularity there. Continuing 
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aid from the US to Pakistan became even more likely as the Pakistani support for 
anti-Communist Afghan guerillas was still considered as necessary. At the same 
time, Pakistan showed no signs of destroying its stockpiles of nuclear weapons 
material and continued to enrich uranium.171 
 
During the summer of 1989, press reports based on German and US government 
sources stated that Pakistan was testing nuclear delivery systems, thereby possibly 
violating the US conditions for the use of the F-16’s, and was continuing 
clandestine transfers. At the same time, in the face of growing Indian capabilities, 
the pressure increased in Islamabad towards more overt nuclear weaponization: 
even B. Bhutto stated that if India further advanced on the weapons’ track, Pakistan 
would reply in a similar manner.172 
 
Despite all this, the Congress accepted the sale of further F-16’s in the summer of 
1989. The Bush Administration assured the Congress that none of the previously 
delivered F-16’s had been made suitable for delivering nuclear explosives and that 
this was not allowed under the conditions of the new contract, either. Furthermore, 
it was stated that the sale would be cancelled if it was found out that Pakistan 
possessed a nuclear explosive device.173 In October 1989, President Bush again 
certified that Pakistan did not possess nuclear weapons, although he noted that it 
was increasingly difficult to know this for sure as the Pakistani unsafeguarded 
nuclear program was continuing. In November, the Congress in its turn suspended 
the Glenn-Symington Amendment with respect to Pakistan until April 1991. Unlike 
in 1987 when the Amendment was also suspended, no debate took place. However, 
the suspension was only for one year, indicating that the Congress wanted to follow 
the developments in Pakistan closely.174 
 
Although the situation in Kashmir had been relatively peaceful since the end of the 
197i war175, in 1990, another serious crises developed between India and Pakistan 
about the region. In the end of 1989, a full-scale uprising begun in the Indian 
Kashmir, and India blamed Pakistan for agitation. As the crises went on and India 
tried to suppress the uprising harshly, Pakistan got more involved.176 India also 
planned to strike at the Kashmiri training camps located in Pakistan. As Pakistan 
picked up signals that it interpreted to mean an Indian attack, it started making 
preparations for a war, too. The heated statements of the both sides even gave 
grounds for a fear that the two countries were at the brink of a nuclear war. This 
time, Pakistan presumably produced cores for several nuclear weapons, something 
it had been able to do since 1986 but had not done before177. According to US 
intelligence, Pakistan had also installed a nuclear weapon in an F-16 during the 
crises. Though neither the talks between the two Foreign Ministers nor US Deputy 
National Security Advisor R. Gates’ visit to South Asia seemed to help, India 
eventually withdraw and war was avoided. It can be argued that the threat of 
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nuclear weapons might again have helped to stop the crises from escalating 
further.178 
 
 
5.4 After the end of the Cold War  
 
5.4.1 US sanctions on Pakistan 
 
As discussed above, although the end of the Cold War diminished Pakistan’s 
strategic importance for the US, the US did not immediately act decisively against 
the Pakistani nuclear program in the fear of possible consequences of sanctions on 
the fragile Pakistani democracy.179 However, Pakistan’s reckless attitude and 
especially the escalation of tensions in Kashmir in the spring of 1990 changed the 
US attitude. In October 1990, President Bush did not renew the certification 
required by the Pressler Amendment because it seemed that Pakistan had fabricated 
the core for nuclear weapons during the crises with India in the previous winter. In 
the previous few years, the technically undefined formulations of the Pressler 
Amendment had given Presidents Reagan and Bush the possibility to certify aid 
despite advances in the Pakistani nuclear capabilities, but at this point such a 
certification was impossible.180 Therefore, sanctions were imposed that halted all 
US military and economic assistance to Pakistan. Also the delivery of 28 F-16’s 
that Pakistan had already in part paid for was stopped. Washington also made 
Islamabad aware of that it might impose other sanctions on Pakistan and even label 
it a “rogue state”. The Bush Administration, however, still accepted cash sales of 
military munitions and spare parts to Pakistan case-by-case, using a controversial 
loophole in the Pressler Amendment, which the Congress probably had not 
planned. The US sanctions did also not affect financing from the international 
financial institutions, and as an international consensus on proliferation policies for 
South Asia was lacking, other industrialized countries remained a source of finance 
and weapons systems for Pakistan.181 
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At the end of 1991, Pakistan stated that it had frozen the production of highly 
enriched uranium. Thereafter, it apparently stuck to the freeze as far as weapons-
grade uranium was concerned, but not with respect to low-enriched uranium, which 
could later on be further enriched.182 Although the US was in principle pleased 
with the cap, it had differences of opinion about verification with Pakistan183. 
 
Within the US Administration there was also criticism towards the ending of the 
aid to Pakistan because its possible consequences were feared. Both the Pakistani 
democracy and the economy were fragile and could possibly not stand under the 
sanctions and anti-Westernism and Islamic fundamentalism could rise. Rising 
Islamic fundamentalism in Central Asia was also in general a cause of concern in 
Washington184. Also the view propagated by Pakistan that the US sanctions only 
reduced the influence the US could have on Pakistan started to gain support in 
Washington especially within the Clinton Administration. In 1995, the 
Administration stated that “while the Administration strongly supports the 
(Pressler) amendment’s goals of curbing Pakistan’s nuclear weapons program, the 
legislation needs to be revised to fit current global realities and to better achieve 
our non-proliferation objectives” and that “given its troubled neighborhood, 
Pakistan stands in danger, over time, of drifting in directions contrary to our 
fundamental interest and its own”185. On the other hand, the earlier US policy of 
trying to take Pakistan’s security needs into account by supplying it with 
conventional armaments had not led to the wished results i.e. removed incentives 
for nuclear weapons. In any case, Washington tried to emphasize positive 
engagement in its dealings with Islamabad.186 The possible consequences of the 
ending of the aid created some worry also in the US Congress. In September 1992, 
the Congress thus eased the prohibition of development aid to Pakistan a little.187 
 
Also the F-16 question had to be resolved in some way. Assuming that it would 
receive the F-16’s later on when the sale would again be allowed, Pakistan did not 
stop making payments188. As the US neither agreed to deliver the bombers nor give 
back the almost US $ 1.3 billion that Pakistan had paid for them, by early 1995 the 
F-16’s led to quarrel between the US and Pakistan. Some parts of the Pakistani 
military wanted to give up the freeze on the production of highly enriched uranium 
if the bomber question would not get a proper solution. As the US wanted Pakistan 
to stick to this and to its other voluntary restraints on its nuclear program (to refrain 
from making nuclear tests, from deploying nuclear weapons or ballistic missiles, 
and from exporting related technologies), it started looking for ways to solve the 
issue and to modify the Pressler Amendment. After a long process beginning 
already in 1993, this happened finally in 1996 through the Brown Amendment, 
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which made it possible for the US to start compensating Pakistan its payments in 
other ways, although the F-16’s were not delivered. Also economic and certain 
kinds of military assistance to Pakistan was allowed again.189 The continuing 
supply of arms from Russia to India was also considered by the Administration as a 
fact that made the delivery of military equipment to Pakistan more acceptable190. 
 
The Brown Amendment was based on the expectation that Pakistan would continue 
the freezes on its nuclear program. Although Pakistan did not give up these 
restraints, it at the same time proceeded in its nuclear program in other ways. The 
plutonium program proceeded especially as a reactor where plutonium could 
apparently be produced was built with Chinese support. Pakistan also upgraded its 
uranium program and seemed to be enhancing its uranium enrichment 
capabilities.191 In early 1992, Pakistan stated for the US that it had the ability to 
assemble a nuclear weapon, although this was meant to show the US that the ability 
notwithstanding, Pakistan could resist the temptation to became a nuclear state.192  
 
Despite the contrary will of its Chief of Army Staff and a part of its public, 
Pakistan supported the US during the Gulf War, where the US-led, UN-mandated 
troops attacked Iraq that had marched on Kuwait’s oil fields. The war, however, led 
to the physical presence of the US in the Gulf, which further diminished Pakistan’s 
importance. Yet, because Pakistan was still considered as useful in the case of 
possible further military operations in the Gulf region, the US sought to maintain 
ties with the Pakistani military, the ending of the aid notwithstanding. Another 
reason why the US wanted to maintain relations with the Pakistani military was 
because of the military’s influence over the country’s nuclear program.193 
 
 
5.4.2 Improvement in the US-Indian relations 
 
For India, the end of the Cold War meant an end to the favorable relationship with 
the Soviet Union and to the Soviet security guarantee. The supply of arms and 
spare parts from the former Soviet states became more unreliable, and the terms of 
the trade worsened for India. The Soviet Union had also backed India politically on 
the Kashmir question, but Russia did not want to take the same kind of a clear 
stance.194 
 
Although trade with Russia continued, India started turning a little to the US. The 
two countries increased security cooperation; for example, in 1992, they arranged 
joint military exercises. At the same time, the US also started to turn from 
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supporting Pakistan to giving more attention to India: while it was less flexible 
towards the Pakistani nuclear program, it became a little more tolerable towards 
India in general. In 1992, the US seemed to give up trying to persuade India to sign 
the NPT and instead focused on trying to freeze the nuclear status quo in South 
Asia. The US suggested a regional conference on the South Asian nuclear situation 
but India refused to take part of it, stating that it preferred bilateral efforts with 
Pakistan.195 After the restructuring of the Indian economy was started in 1991 
because India struggled under grave liquidity problems, India also became 
economically more interesting for the US, and by 1995 the US was the main 
trading partner and investor to India196. It also seemed that India could be accepted 
as a major international player. The US stated for example that “India has the 
potential to be among the great world powers of the 21st century” if it would act 
responsibly197. In the early 1990’s, India and its supporters in the Western countries 
also started an international negative-image campaign against Pakistan.198 
 
 
5.4.3 Reforms of the US non-proliferation policies 
 
In the early 1990’s, actions of both the US Congress and the Administration 
implied that they had accepted that the US would in the near future not succeed in 
getting India and Pakistan to give up their nuclear weapons. Instead, the US 
seemed to concentrate on trying to halt further progress in the nuclear programs 
and in the stockpiling of fissile material and also on ensuring that the weapons 
would not be deployed. Special attention was also given to trying to ensure that 
India and Pakistan would not develop and deploy nuclear-capable ballistic 
missiles.199 Thus, in 1994 in a report to the US Congress it was stated that “…our 
objective is first to cap, then reduce, and finally eliminate the possession of 
weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and their means of delivery. We seek also to 
help reduce tensions and avoid conflicts which could possibly escalate to the use of 
WMD or ballistic missiles. Therefore, we are attempting to help create a climate in 
which each country’s sense of security is enhanced through tension reduction and 
confidence-building measures”200. Unfortunately, the confidence-building 
measures did not work too well, as it was noted in 1997 that they had been used 
ineffectively, if at all.201  
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In the 1990’s, the US non-proliferation legislation was again reformed. In 1992, the 
US Congress completed the Foreign Assistance Act so that the President was 
required to promote regional non-proliferation in South Asia and to report the 
Congress twice a year on the developments in the Indian, the Pakistani, and the 
Chinese nuclear weapons and ballistic missile programs and especially on whether 
India and Pakistan possessed complete nuclear weapons.202 
 
From 1993, onwards the Clinton Administration reformed the US export control 
policies by easing export controls somewhat. The reforms aimed at improving the 
competitiveness and the export opportunities of the American industries that had so 
far suffered from the relatively strict US policies. Lighter controls were justified by 
the view that many products under US export controls were easily available from 
other countries.203 The US export policies were reformed to a somewhat opposite 
direction than the international regulations (see below). However, US export 
controls with respect to several countries’ missile projects were tightened in 
1992.204 
 
In 1994, the Nuclear Proliferation Prevention Act (NPPA) was passed by the 
Congress. The Act introduced financial sanctions that would automatically take 
place in case of acts of nuclear proliferation from a non-nuclear state, for example 
if it would conduct nuclear tests. The new sanctions included a halting of all US 
economic and military aid, credits, bank loans, and export licenses as well as a 
requirement for the US to veto loans in international financial institutions. For the 
first time, the US now had legislation also with respect to India about sanctions that 
affected its relations with the US also on other issues than those directly related to 
the nuclear program. For the sanctions to be waived, a joint resolution by the both 
houses of the US Congress was necessary. At the same time, also the US Export-
Import Bank Act was completed so that all financing from this US bank would be 
halted if a country intentionally supported a non-nuclear state in acquiring 
unsafeguarded plutonium or enriched uranium. In the NNPA, the President was 
also granted the right to waive the sanctions arisen from the 1976 Glenn-
Symington Amendment (see Chapter 5.2.6) that were related to Pakistani actions 
prior to June 29, 1994, if this was in national interest. On the other hand, the Act 
ended the being in force of the 1982 Reagan waiver of the Glenn-Symington 
reprocessing-provisions. Thus, if Pakistan would after this time import such 
technologies, a new waiver would be necessary before US assistance could be 
given to Pakistan.205 
 
As new Pakistani violations (see the discussion on the ring magnet case below) to 
the US legislation made it impossible for aid to be resumed, the US continued to 
supplement its legislation to be able to have some cooperation with Pakistan and 
thus also to exert influence on Islamabad. The July 1997 Harkin Amendment made 
it possible for certain US instances to support export and investment activities of 
US companies in Pakistan.206 
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Also the idea of counter-proliferation appeared in the US policies. In 1994, 
Washington launched the Defense Counterproliferation Initiative that meant 
reassessing the threat of WMD’s and making the necessary adjustments in the US 
defense system. The US stated that it could consider the possibility of first-use of 
nuclear weapons to deter the use of biological or chemical weapons. It was thus 
suggested that the US could possibly militarily prevent other states from acquiring 
WMD’s as well as that the US could even consider its using its own WMD’s for 
this purpose, a stance that has deterrence effect as such. The reasons for the 
Initiative were the Gulf War and the experiences with the Iraqi WMD programs as 
well as the US Bottom Up Review, which led to a reorientation of conventional US 
forces.207 A consequence of the US counter-proliferation stance can be seen in the 
current US plan to attack Iraq, which is suspected to be close of acquiring a nuclear 
weapon. In the case of India and Pakistan, the new policy hardly had a very big 
impact, as the two programs do not pose a direct threat to any other state than they 
themselves. 
 
 
5.4.4 Efforts for new international non-proliferation treaties 
 
In the 1990’s, despite tighter nonproliferation measures, the spread of advanced 
technologies became increasingly difficult to control because new suppliers entered 
the market, indigenous production capabilities increased, and the Soviet Union had 
collapsed.208 The early 1990’s witnessed tightening in the international export 
controls, and a change in the nature of the NPT regime in that that the role of the 
UN was strengthened. After the extent of the Iraqi nuclear program became 
revealed in the Gulf War, the program was considered in the Security Council and 
the rights and tasks of the IAEA were widened. The shock caused by the Iraqi 
program made the supplier countries also acutely aware of the varying export 
control standards and of the problems in the export control regime. This led them to 
agree in 1992 on new, stricter international export restrictions and controls.209 
 
After the Cold War, different nuclear arms regulation efforts, e.g., the Strategic 
Arms Reduction Treaties (START) between the US and Soviet Union/ Russia, 
regional NWFZ intentions, and efforts for the Complete Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) 
and the Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty (FMCT), made of halting nuclear 
proliferation and of nuclear disarmament topical themes. This rendered the Indian 
argument that the nuclear powers did not care about their commitment to nuclear 
disarmament less powerful. These efforts also put pressure on India and Pakistan to 
accept non-proliferation measures.210  
 
In the Article 6 of the NPT, the nuclear powers commit themselves to nuclear 
disarmament, although without any binding time schedules. During the Bush 
(Senior) and Clinton terms, the US started using nuclear disarmament efforts as a 
non-proliferation measure. Especially an indefinite extension of the NPT, a 
complete ban on nuclear testing, and a universal cut-off of the production of fissile 
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materials were targets of the Clinton Administration.211 Such agreements can work 
for non-proliferation in various ways. First, they restrict the availability of nuclear 
materials. Second, they demonstrate the non-nuclear countries that the nuclear 
powers take their commitment to nuclear disarmament seriously and thereby rip 
them of an argument for opposing the NPT regime. Third, they can also have 
impact on the public’s opinions about nuclear weapons. Preventing proliferation 
was also named as one of six priorities of the US foreign policy and an obligation 
by the Clinton Administration212.  
 
In 1995, the NPT was extended unconditionally and indefinitely, with only India, 
Pakistan, and Israel remaining outside the treaty. Also a treaty on a complete ban 
on nuclear tests was a goal of the Clinton Administration. After the Comprehensive 
Test Ban Treaty, which prohibits all kinds of nuclear tests, was negotiated, 
however, India refused to sign it in August 1996. That alone made it impossible for 
the treaty to come into force at all, because it is necessary that all the 44 states that 
use atomic energy ratify it first. From the Indian point of view, this clause violates 
the Vienna agreement on treaties, according to which a state that is not a party to a 
treaty cannot have obligations on a treaty imposed on it. India has also criticized 
the treaty for being aimed at strengthening the status quo favorable to the 
recognized nuclear states instead of at comprehensiveness and disarmament. The 
nuclear powers can namely continue making computer-aided tests in laboratories, 
but these kinds of tests are only possible after a state has already conducted nuclear 
tests. The French and the Chinese nuclear tests during the negotiations were also 
considered by some Indians as evidence of both that that the nuclear states were not 
going to give up their weapons and also of the unreliability of China213. After India 
had refused to sign the treaty it was suspected that India was maybe going to 
conduct further nuclear tests because if it did not, it would have rejected the treaty 
for nothing. At the same time, internal pressure also rose in India to conduct further 
tests.214 In part, the efforts for the CTBT may have pushed India towards testing. 
Although Pakistan in principle supported the CTBT, it required that the treaty’s 
entry into force would be conditional on the Indian ratification and also later made 
its signatory dependent on India doing the same215. 
 
However, not all other states that use nuclear power have ratified the CTBT, either. 
Even the US has not done this: the ratification did not pass through the legislative 
during the Clinton term, and later on President Bush has not been willing to ratify 
the treaty. 
 
Several factors contributed to India rejecting the CTBT. One was that after only 
India, Pakistan, and Israel, the latter enjoying its special relationship with the US, 
remained outside the indefinitely extended NPT, the South Asian states were bound 
to become the main targets of US pressure on non-proliferation issues. This 
strengthened the Indian domestic opposition to bending under foreign pressure. 
Second, the Brown Amendment had caused worries in India that the US wanted to 
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have Pakistan as an ally again. Third, the upcoming elections in India and the 
pressure from the BJP pushed the government to take a hard stance towards the 
treaty.216 
 
In September 1993, President Clinton announced that the US also wanted to bring 
about an international agreement that would prohibit the non-safeguarded or 
weapons-related production of fissile materials. India and Pakistan turned out to be 
stumbling blocks also on the way of the Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty, although 
they originally in 1995 supported the beginning of the negotiations in the UN. They 
made the treaty conditional on progress on nuclear disarmament. Pakistan, which 
demanded that existing stockpiles of fissile material would also be taken into 
consideration, apparently wanted to delay the treaty because it would have left 
India with a larger existing stockpile. However, India was constantly able of 
producing more fissile material than Pakistan and therefore it has been claimed that 
a rapid negotiation of the treaty would in fact have been favorable to Pakistan. 
Some Indian analysts likewise complained that the treaty would leave China with a 
larger stockpile than India.217 
 
The FMCT would be important for South Asia not only in that it would lead to a 
cut-off in the production of material for nuclear weapons but also because it would 
open a way to deal with the states that are outside the NPT. Also new verification 
and control systems could be introduced with the treaty that could also be 
acceptable to such states.218 But like the CTBT, the FMCT has also not come into 
force. 
 
 
5.5 The overt nuclearization of South Asia 
 
5.5.1 The missile race 
 
Since the 1980’s, at the same time as India and Pakistan were developing nuclear 
weapons, they were also trying to achieve capabilities to deliver the weapons. India 
had bombers that were tested in the early 1980’s and were suitable for dropping 
nuclear explosives to Pakistan. To be especially able to counter-threat China over 
the Himalayas, however, missiles were needed. India also started a space program 
early on and had first in the 1960’s wide cooperation with the US National 
Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) and later also with the UK, France, 
West Germany, and the Soviet Union. The Indian space program started to be a 
target of considerable investments after the 1971 war. The efforts were 
strengthened in 1983 when the program was reorganized. In 1980, India succeeded 
in launching a space satellite, the delivery rocket of which could carry its load over 
800 km’s on the earth.219 
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To also ensure a capability to deliver the nuclear weapons it was developing, 
Pakistan started putting special effort on acquiring ballistic missiles from the mid-
1980’s onwards. That time it started developing short-range ballistic missiles 
(SRBM) with support from China, which has greatly helped Pakistan also on the 
realm of ballistic missiles.220 
 
The Indian 1980 launch, in addition to other missile programs around the world in 
the 1980’s, led the US to seek an export control regime for missile technologies as 
another step in its non-proliferation efforts. Such a system was eventually created 
in 1987 in the form of the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR).221 
Especially ballistic missiles can namely be a major source of instability because 
they are very fast and able to pass through defense systems.222 
 
The Indian ballistic missiles include the 250 km –range Prithvi and the allegedly 
2500km –range Agni. The Prithvi was first tested in 1988. Its range was enough to 
reach major targets in Pakistan but not in China. The Agni that was tested for the 
first time in May 1989, was able of reaching important targets in China. Its range 
was, however, in practice probably shorter than 2500 km, and the weapon was still 
far from operationally reliable.223 
 
The reasons for the development of the Agni were both symbolic, demonstrating 
the country’s status as a technologically advanced major power, and strategic, 
aimed presumably mainly at countering China’s nuclear forces. It is unlikely, 
however, that China would in the 1980’s have targeted its nuclear weapons against 
India. China had instead probably concentrated its limited forces against the Soviet 
Union. Furthermore, by 1990 India itself had never targeted any of its nuclear 
arsenal towards China. The Agni, however, caused concerns in Beijing. Because 
the US tried to pressure India to give up the development of the Agni, India tried to 
present the missile as a mere demonstration of India’s technological capability and 
claimed that it had not been decided that the missiles would be deployed. These 
kinds of claims were, however, not credible: because of the immense costs 
associated with the development of intermediate-range missiles, they have only 
been developed to carry nuclear warheads.224  
 
India has also claimed to be developing submarine-launched ballistic missiles 
(SLBM), intercontinental-range ballistic missiles (ICBM) called Surya, and cruise 
missiles. The development of the Surya is dependent on the development and 
testing of the Agni. Furthermore, India has been trying to acquire integrated air 
defense and anti-tactical ballistic missile (ATBM) systems. Long-range capabilities 
might be seen as prerequisites for the status of a major international power, and the 
ICBM project also implies that India wants to have a counter-deterrent against the 
US, too.225 The US has naturally not been very pleased especially about the latter 
project. The general US opposition to the Indian ballistic missiles can probably be 
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explained in part by the fact that the development of the Surya is dependent on the 
development of both the Agni and the Prithvi. 
 
In May 1992, the US punished both Russia and India with two-year technology 
transfer sanctions for a sale of rocket engines to India that the US insisted were of a 
dual-use nature and could be diverted to military uses. The punished countries 
claimed that the US reaction stemmed from the fact that the Russian space agency 
had outbid a US company on the sale. As Russia and India made preparations to 
launch an Indian satellite by a Russian booster rocket in 1993, Washington 
threatened to make the two-year sanctions permanent. As Russia agreed to make 
changes to the agreement with India that made it more acceptable for the US, the 
US removed the sanctions with respect to Russia. In the case of India, the sanctions 
were in place for the two years.226 
 
In 1993, the US launched the South Asian Ballistic Missile Initiative within which 
it was supposed to ensure that critical missiles would not be deployed and to 
consider other missile-related questions, too. Pakistan showed interest in the 
suggestion but the suggestion did not lead anywhere because of Indian 
disinterest.227 
 
Although China promised in 1991 to comply with the export controls of the 
MTCR, in 1991-93 it sold Pakistan tactical M-11 –missiles and components. These 
missiles have a range of 280-300 km. The US sanctioned both China and Pakistan 
for their trade with an export embargo for certain high-tech products first 1991-
1992 and then again 1993-1994 but raised them when China had again promised to 
stick to the rules of the MTCR.228 The latter M-11 –transfer was probably in part a 
response to the US sale of F-16’s to Taiwan, which was according to China also 
against an existing Sino-US understanding. The M-11 –issue emerged again in 
1995 and 1996 when new US reports on transfers became public that stated even 
that Pakistan was constructing a production site for M-11’s with Chinese support. 
No sanctions were, however, placed on either country, as the Clinton 
Administration considered the evidence too weak. 229 Another possible reason why 
sanctions were not imposed was because they would also have harmed US 
businesses in China. 
 
Indian tests of the Agni continued until early 1994. Under Western pressure, India 
halted the development of the missile before the next test scheduled for late 1994. 
In 1995-97, India again increased its efforts to develop ballistic missiles, which led 
to worries of an arms race in South Asia. In 1996, India planned to continue the 
Agni program, but in the end of the year these plans were again cancelled as US 
pressure was mounting. The Prithvi was tested again in 1996 and 1997 and also put 
into small-scale production. The decision on the production of the Prithvis was 
probably in part a response to the US Brown Amendment. India even reportedly 
possibly deployed these missiles in the spring of 1997 near the Pakistani border, 
although they were equipped with conventional warheads only. India did not admit 
that it had technically deployed the missiles but that did not change the issue so 
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much because the missiles could have anyway been used within a very small time. 
The strong criticism of the US towards the ballistic missile programs probably 
convinced India not to openly deploy the Prithvi. In the summer of 1997, the Agni 
program was, however, started again,230 but the missile was tested for the first time 
in five years only in April 1999231. 
 
In the latter half of 1990’s, the development of the ballistic missile program also 
pushed India towards new nuclear tests, because it started getting to the stage after 
which reliable nuclear warheads were needed for the missile systems to be further 
developed.232 
 
The Indian (near-) deployment of the Prithvis in the spring of 1997 pushed Pakistan 
towards deploying the M-11’s. This would have made US sanctions necessary on 
both Pakistan and China, the source of the missiles. The US Deputy National 
Security Adviser S. Berger traveled to Pakistan to try to calm Islamabad down233. 
Instead of deploying missiles, Pakistan then announced ballistic missile tests for its 
Hatf-3 for July 1997, which was claimed to have a range of 600 km, enough to 
reach New Delhi. China has probably helped Pakistan with this missile, too. 
Furthermore, Pakistan stated it was also developing the Ghauri missile, which 
allegedly had a range of over 1500 km. Pakistan reported testing the Ghauri in 
April 1997, in the spring of 1998, and in April 1999.234 In mid-1999, tests were 
conducted with the M-11’s. The Chinese M-9 and DF-15 -missiles have been 
suspected to be models for the longer-range Shaheen-I and –II –missiles, which 
Pakistan has also been developing, but no transfers of these Chinese missiles to 
Pakistan have been proved.235 
 
 
5.5.2 Continuing Sino-Pakistani cooperation 
 
China remained an important source of help for Pakistan in the realm of the nuclear 
program throughout the early 1990’s. In November 1989, China announced that it 
would sell a new 300-megawatt nuclear reactor to Pakistan. China did not demand 
that all Pakistani nuclear installations would be placed under IAEA safeguards but 
that only the new plant and its fuels would be safeguarded. Pakistan had not been 
able to make major nuclear acquisitions under such terms since the 1970’s. The 
similar Soviet sale of two nuclear power reactors to India that had been planned in 
1987 made the sale easier for China. Although China signed the NPT in 1992, it 
helped Pakistan to construct the reactor and also a purifying plant for tritium gas in 
1994-96The US protests notwithstanding, France announced a power plant sale to 
Pakistan under similar conditions in February 1990.236 
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The Soviet sale to India did eventually not to take place because the Soviet Union 
fell apart but India started negotiations about a similar deal with Russia in the early 
1990’s. The negotiations continued throughout the 1990’s and even soon after the 
1998 nuclear tests (see below) Russia continued to plan the deal. The US opposed 
the deal, especially because Russia had in 1992 agreed to demand full-scope 
safeguards if it was to export nuclear technology. Russia, however, claimed that it 
was allowed to sell the reactor because its predecessor, the Soviet Union, had 
committed itself to the deal already before 1992.237 
 
In 1994-95, a Chinese company sold ring magnets that are used in the production 
of weapons-grade uranium for a Pakistani nuclear research center. This could have 
led to US sanctions towards China under the 1994 addition to the US Export-
Import Bank Act (see above) after it became public in the spring of 1996. Credits 
from this US bank to China and the delivery of military equipment to Pakistan that 
had been enabled by the Brown Amendment, were halted temporarily. However, as 
the sanctions would have hit most hardly unrelated US businesses in China, the US 
decided not to impose them after the Chinese government stated that it had not 
been aware of the sale and did thus not on purpose support the Pakistani uranium 
enrichment efforts. At the same time, China also stated that it would not give 
support for any unsafeguarded nuclear installations in general.238 Thus in the 
1990’s, as China was seeking a better international imago and better relations with 
the US, its attitude towards Pakistan and especially towards its nuclear program 
had to get less supportive than before. China also suggested that Pakistan would 
pursue peaceful relations with India.239 
 
For Pakistan, the ring magnet affair had quite grave consequences. Although the 
Brown Amendment had made aid to Pakistan possible again, Pakistan could not 
receive any US economic and military aid because of the 1976 Glenn-Symington 
Amendment. The 1994 NPPA had given the President the right to waive the Glenn-
Symington sanctions as far as Pakistani actions before the mid-1994 were 
concerned. The ring magnet transfer, however, took place after that. This 
consequence seems to have been unexpected at least to some US Administration 
officials. It was namely stated in a US Department of State briefing on the solution 
of the ring magnet affair that “in the case of Pakistan…there will be no change in 
the implementation of Brown (Amendment)”240. The Glenn-Symington sanctions 
could not be waived because the Amendment originally allowed this to happen 
only if Pakistan was not trying to acquire nuclear weapons.241  
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5.5.3 Near-testing 
 
In December 1995, India made preparations for nuclear tests. The governing 
coalition242 was officially committed to not to manufacture nuclear weapons, but 
domestic pressure from the Hindu-nationalist, pro-nuclear Bharatiya Janata Party 
(BJP) especially at the time of the election campaigns pushed the government 
towards testing. Also the improving US-Pakistani relations had a similar effect. 
After US intelligence revealed the Indian intentions, the US Ambassador to India, 
F. Wisner, pressured India to cancel the testing.243 It is in principle also possible 
that the Indian government was at the time not actually planning to really conduct a 
test but that it made preparations only to test international responses and to reply to 
the pressure from the BJP. It was also claimed that India was actually preparing a 
test for the Prithvi missile, not for nuclear weapons.244 The Indian preparations led 
to similar action in Pakistan, too, which was revealed by satellite pictures in March 
1996. However, Pakistan did not admit it was preparing a test, although it stated 
that it had the capability to reply to a possible Indian nuclear test in the same 
manner.245 
  
The BJP was committed to deploying both nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles 
as well as to not signing any international non-proliferation agreements. After the 
BJP rose shortly to power in the Indian elections in May 1995, A. B. Vajpayee, 
who was trying to form the government, wanted to conduct nuclear tests. The 
preparations did not, however, lead to action because the BJP government could 
not get the confidence of the Parliament. The following fragile coalition 
government stated that India would stick to its option strategy of preserving a 
possibility to manufacture nuclear weapons.246 In 1997, further Indian nuclear tests 
were not considered as probable247. 
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5.5.4 The 1998 Indian and Pakistani nuclear tests 
 
In Pakistan, Sharif rose to power again in 1997248. The original strong domestic 
support-base of the government gave grounds to hopes that it could meaningfully 
participate on negotiations with India. In 1997, several high-level Indo-Pakistani 
meetings took place, and a hot line was set up between the Prime Ministers’ 
offices. However, little concrete progress was made.249 The chances of an 
improvement in the Indo-Pakistani relations decreased again as the BJP rose to 
power in India. 
 
Right after the BJP formed the government, India proceeded to make its second 
series of nuclear tests on May 11th and 13th, 1998. Pakistan had tested the Ghauri 
missile two days before Indian Prime Minister Vajpayee had showed green light to 
testing so that the exact timing of the test might have been in part response to the 
Pakistani test. As the international reactions to the tests were not very harsh, the US 
offers of economic and military incentives, including a repeal of the Pressler 
Amendment, did not suffice to get Pakistan to refrain from testing. With the 
reluctant lead of Sharif, whom President Clinton had desperately tried to persuade 
not to test, Pakistan conducted its first nuclear tests on May 28th and 30th. Both 
India and Pakistan proclaimed that they are nuclear states and admitted that the 
tests were made for military purposes. India tested thermonuclear and fission 
explosives as well as tactical nuclear weapons.250 In addition to uranium, Pakistan 
apparently also used plutonium in one of the tests, indicating that it had succeeded 
in either producing it or importing it secretly251. 
 
After the Indian tests, the US immediately imposed economic sanctions over India 
under the Glenn-Symington Amendment and the 1994 NNPA. The wide sanctions 
halted aid, credits, and the export of certain technologies to India. The same 
sanctions were later imposed on Pakistan, too, but all US economic and military aid 
to Pakistan had been halted already in 1990 under the Pressler Amendment. India 
tried to avoid sanctions by showing interest on signing the CTBT, but once the 
sanctions were in place, they could not be easily removed.252  
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First, the US did not succeed in creating a consensus within the G-8 –countries on 
common sanctions on India, because some countries found the strict US sanction 
policies somewhat questionable as the US itself has not been committed to nuclear 
disarmament. However, as fears of an Indo-Pakistani arms race rose after the 
Pakistani tests, the industrialized nations reached a consensus on their policies and 
imposed severe sanctions on both countries, including a decision by the G-8 
countries not to approve non-humanitarian credits from international financial 
institutions to either country.253  
 
In the fear that if the preparations were revealed, the international and especially 
the US pressure would again lead to a cancellation of the tests like presumably 
happened in 1995, India put effort on keeping the preparations secret and making 
them fast. The Indian statements for the US shortly before the tests also gave the 
impression that no tests would be conducted at least in the near future. As a result, 
the tests surprised the US, which had despite the change of the Indian government 
not believed that India would really conduct tests right away. It has also been 
claimed that counterproductive to the US efforts to persuade India not to test was 
the export from the US of certain sensitive technologies to India in the previous 
years that, allowed by the Clinton Administration.254  
 
After the tests, India and Pakistan were strongly pressurized into signing the 
CTBT. President Clinton originally made the removal of the sanctions conditional 
on their joining the CTBT. India found it very difficult to accept the CTBT, 
however, because it had opposed it so strictly in 1996 and because almost the 
whole Indian political spectrum supported the opposition to the treaty. After the 
1998 tests India announced, however, that it will not conduct further tests because 
its tests had provided it with a capability to make computer-based nuclear test 
simulations. In practice, India therefore acts according to the treaty. Both India and 
Pakistan have been willing to accept the CTBT under certain conditions, but it has 
been impossible for other states, especially the US, to accept any conditions. 
Conditions would also be contradictory to the goals and spirit of the treaty. 
Pakistan first made its joining of the treaty conditional on India signing it, too, but 
later gave up this condition. As another condition, Pakistan has demanded the US 
to act as an intermediary in the Kashmir conflict, but this has not been possible 
because of Indian opposition. Furthermore, Pakistan has demanded that its debts 
would be forgiven. The most problematic Pakistani condition has been its demand 
on security guarantees.255 
 
Although President Clinton originally demanded that would India and Pakistan 
sign the CTBT and halt their nuclear weapons programs before the sanctions could 
be lifted, gradually the US attitude became more flexible again and Washington 
started offering partial removals of sanctions in return for smaller nonproliferation 
efforts. A reason behind this was in part simply that the sanctions did not bring the 
desired results: the two nuclear programs continued and the CTBT was not signed. 
Already in November 1998, President Clinton waived a part of the sanctions on 
both countries for one year under the India-Pakistan Relief Act. This was a 
response and an incentive for the non-proliferation steps (including a moratorium 
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for testing) the two countries were taking. Also Pakistan severe economic 
difficulties caused concern in Washington.256 A further part of the sanctions was 
waived in October 1999257. 
 
Soon after the tests, Indian Minister of Interior L. K. Advani threatened that India 
could use its nuclear weapons to solve the Kashmir question. Advani told that India 
was going to act in a determined way about Kashmir but would adhere to the 
principle of no-first-strike. Pakistan replied in an even more straightforward way 
when the Foreign Secretary S. Ahmed told that a basic reason for the Pakistani 
nuclear program was to find lasting solutions, especially in Kashmir.258 
 
By undertaking the tests, the Indian government decided to abandon its relatively 
successful policy of nuclear ambiguity, despite the international criticism and 
sanctions India was bound to face. It was obvious that a Pakistani test would 
follow, and thus the Indian tests created a new shock in its dangerously delicate 
relationship with Pakistan. By conducting the tests, India also caused a new crack 
in its relationship with China. 
 
For this change of the Indian policy, several explanations have been offered. The 
the government wanted to boost its own domestic popularity and its parliamentary 
position and to enhance India’s position on international arenas. Indian scientists 
have also been claimed to have given nuclear weapons a mythical status. S. 
Ganguly has argued that after the end of the Cold War, there was a perception of 
increased Pakistani and Chinese threat in India. The decision was also for a large 
part simply the result of a long process and of the decisions made over the decades 
to build a nuclear program.259 
 
India has had close relations to Israel in the realm of nuclear programs. After the 
1998 tests, some Arab newspapers even claimed that a part of the Indian tests were 
made with the help of Israeli equipment.260 
 
Another source of concern is the pressure on Pakistan to place its nuclear forces 
under high alert in the fear of Indian pre-emptive attacks. The Pakistani Air Force 
is namely vulnerable for such an attack because all its air bases are within the range 
of Indian Air Forces, especially after the US supplied India with technology that 
improves the capability to destroy aircraft on the ground.261 
 
The Indian and Pakistani nuclear tests threatened to solve the NPT regime 
altogether, forcing the US to punish the two states. The punishments did prove 
somewhat inefficient as the two states have remained nuclear states and 
concentrated on developing delivery systems. The sanctions could also not be made 
too harsh because it was feared what would happen when the economically weak 
Pakistan could no longer stand them. The first Muslim country to have a nuclear 
weapon could be tempted to export its nuclear technology to Iran, Iraq, or Saudi-
                                                          
256 Ahmed 1999, p. 201; Spector 1990, p. 11; Economist 25.8.2001; The White House 1998. 
257 The White House 1999. 
258 Chanda et al. 1998b; Chanda et al. 1998a. 
259 Ganguly 1999, pp. 148-149. 
260 Rashid & Sidhva 1998, p. 28. 
261 Jones & McDonough 1998, p. 137. 
 67
Arabia, if they offered economic aid. This would cause a significant threat to Israel 
and could import the nuclear arms race to the Middle East. 
 
Also after the 1998 tests, India has repeatedly stated its willingness to participate in 
total global nuclear disarmament. Actually India and Pakistan did not violated the 
NPT with their tests, because neither state had signed the treaty in the first place. 
They have been under great pressure to sign it, though, for the treaty is based on its 
universality. If the goals of the treaty can be violated without grave consequences 
by ignoring the treaty, other countries may not be willing to adhere to the treaty 
either. However, India and Pakistan cannot be accepted into the treaty as nuclear 
states because of the treaty’s definition of a nuclear state. It is considered too risky 
and actually impossible to reformulate the treaty in a way that would allow India 
and Pakistan to join it. The treaty would be in danger of losing its credibility as a 
means of ensuring non-proliferation, and huge re-negotiation efforts would be 
necessary. On the other hand, it could be possible to attain reassurances from India 
and Pakistan that they will act according to the NPT in the future even if they are 
not members to it. In this way the two states would at least recognize the NPT. 
France acted likewise in 1968, when it committed itself to act according to the 
treaty although it did not join it.262 
 
In both India and Pakistan, the domestic enthusiasm caused by the tests improved 
the government’s standing. However, the government’s popularity decreased soon 
in both countries. In India, it took less than a year after the tests until the 
government fell, and in Pakistan, Sharif was removed from power by a military 
coup in October 1999.263 
 
 
5.5.5 The US sympathy shifting from Pakistan to India 
 
In early 1999, there was hope of improving Indo-Pakistani relations, and Vajpayee 
even made a goodwill-visit to Pakistan. At the same time, however, Pakistani-
backed forces crossed the line of control in Kashmir and captured some 
strategically important sites in the Kargil region on the Indian side. India found this 
out in May and responded in a forceful way, and making the situation to seem very 
dangerous. The Indian response together with US pressure especially during the 
Sharif-Clinton meeting in Washington in July 1999, convinced Pakistan to order 
the intruding forces to return to Pakistan. In part, the reason why Pakistan provoked 
unrest in Kashmir was to attract US attention, because Pakistan is likely to get 
territorial concessions from India only through US involvement. The Kargil affair 
was extremely humiliating for the Pakistani military and contributed to a military 
coup in October 1999, when General P. Musharraf resumed power from Sharif. 
The military coup led again to the imposition of sanctions over Pakistan under the 
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Section 508 of the US Foreign Assistance Act, though these sanction were largely 
overlapping with the sanctions already in place.264 
 
After the military coup, the US attitude towards Pakistan became increasingly 
critical, especially as Musharraf’s stance on Kashmir was very inflexible. At the 
same time, the US-Indian relations started to improve. India seemed to start 
achieving what it had sought with its nuclear tests: the recognition of its status as a 
major international player. The US also started criticizing the Pakistani actions in 
Kashmir more clearly than before and calling Pakistan to withdraw its support for 
the guerillas. Such gestures were able to make attitudes in India more positive 
towards the US. When he was in New York in the fall of 1999, Vajpayee even 
called India and the US natural allies. In the spring of 2000, President Clinton 
visited South Asia, being the first US President to do this in 22 years. The main site 
of the visit was India, where Clinton spent several days, whereas he stopped over in 
Pakistan only for a couple of hours. This was a clear sign of the growing 
importance of India for the US and of Pakistan’s inferior position in the region.265 
As a result of the visit, the US and India released a joint statement where they 
stated that they were “partners in peace, with a common interest in and 
complementary responsibility for ensuring regional and international security”. 
Despite their differing view on how to approach non-proliferation, they were 
“prepared to work together to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons and 
their means of delivery”. The two states also repeated their promises not to commit 
further nuclear tests.266 
 
Clinton, however, emphasized the importance of a peaceful settlement of the 
Kashmir issue. This stance might have encouraged destabilizing Pakistani actions 
because this view makes Pakistan equal with the major regional power, India. The 
Clinton Administration was also careful not to be too hostile towards President 
Musharraf as it worried that if his government was to fall from power, its position 
might be taken by radical Islamists.267  
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Around the turn of the century, it was generally believed that India has around 60 
nuclear weapons and Pakistan less than half of that amount. In the summer of 2000, 
US intelligence reports were published that stated that the scale of the Pakistani 
program had been previously underestimated and that Pakistan seemed to have 
manufactured even clearly more nuclear warheads and had better delivery systems 
than India. India did allegedly not have any nuclear-capable missiles, as the Agni 
still needed about a decade’s development before it would be reliably usable with 
nuclear warheads. Pakistan denied these claims, but the Indian view was that they 
confirmed the Indian perception of the Pakistani threat and justified the Indian 
nuclear weapons. Specialists have, however, noted that such reports had to be 
considered with reservations; during the Cold War, the superpowers also used 
“reports” on each other’s great capabilities to justify the arms race.268 It is ironic 
that information on the success of a weapons program can turn against oneself in 
that that the adversary uses it to further own purposes, because for the deterrent to 
be credible, a nuclear state has to show that its nuclear program is successful. 
Furthermore, as Waltz has pointed out, an arms race need not be the result of 
nuclear proliferation by two adversaries because they do not need to match each 
other’s capabilities but just to have sufficient second-strike capabilities to cause 
unacceptable damage on the other269. 
 
In November 2000, Prime Minister Vajpayee called a unilateral cease-fire in 
Kashmir. Pakistan responded by pulling troops back from the line of control. 
Vajpayee tried to negotiate directly with the Kashmiris but these talks did not lead 
to results, mostly because Pakistan did not want them to. During the summer of 
2001, General Musharraf accepted Vajpayee’s invitation to bilateral negotiations in 
India.270 The negotiations failed to reach anything else than a consensus on the 
need to continue talks. The reason for failure was, of course, Kashmir. As long as 
the Kashmir dispute remains unsolved, all other issues the countries should decide 
upon remain unsolved. These include nuclear weapons, troop levels, cross-border 
trade, water supplies, and pipelines that could transport cheap gas from Iran 
through Pakistan to India.271 Vajpayee and Musharraf have been considered as 
capable if anyone of reaching a settlement on Kashmir that would be accepted in 
both countries because they represent the most hawkish elements in their 
countries272. An important hurdle to real peace negotiations about Kashmir has 
been Pakistan’s insistence on tripartite talks involving the Kashmiris as equal 
partners, a demand India has not been willing to accept273. 
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5.6 The war on terrorism: Pakistan regains strategic importance  
 
After coming into office, President Bush Jr. worked for a withdrawal of the 
sanctions imposed on India and Pakistan after the 1998 tests. Speaking about 
Pakistan, a Bush Administration official stated that they were “looking at the entire 
sanctions regime with a fresh eye”. However, in Pakistan, “a return to democratic 
government before US assistance in most areas can resume” was necessary.274 
Bush has not continued putting pressure on India to sign the CTBT275 because he 
has himself also not been willing to ratify the treaty. 
 
After the terrorist attacks of September the 11th, 2001, Pakistan’s strategic 
importance to the US rose again. The US offered Pakistan economic and military 
incentives to persuade it to join the anti-Taliban alliance. This was not necessarily 
to be an easy task, because Pakistan itself had been Taliban’s main supporter. To 
ensure both countries’ support for the US war on terrorism, within two weeks after 
the attacks, the US announced a withdrawal of the sanctions laid on Pakistan and 
India after their nuclear tests, including Glenn-Symington sanctions and also 
Pressler and Export-Import Bank Act sanctions in the case of Pakistan (the latter 
had already previously been waived in the case of India). On the other hand, the US 
had agreed on significant concessions on both countries’ sanctions already before 
the attacks. In Pakistan’s case, however, the sanctions imposed because of the 
military coup remained in place.276 The US rescheduled $379 million of Pakistan’s 
bilateral debt and secured a new IMF loan. Also write-offs of debt were discussed 
with the Paris Club creditors.277 
 
Musharraf’s decision to withdraw Pakistan’s support for Taliban, and instead to 
support the US and its allies, put his government in an extremely difficult position 
as Pakistani fundamentalist groups started immediately to oppose the government’s 
actions. However, the Pakistani government did not have much of a choice. It 
chose the path of least destruction for Pakistan – otherwise it could have been 
possible (although unlikely) that also Pakistan would have been bombed, and 
Pakistan could have ended up on the US list of rogue states. Support for the US 
also led to a withdrawal of the financial sanctions imposed on Pakistan after its 
nuclear tests. The government, whose legitimacy had been called into a question by 
foreign governments, maybe also wanted to gain respect in the international arena. 
Furthermore, it was clear that Pakistan would have to face thousands of Afghani 
refugees and cooperation with the West ensured more support in dealing with the 
problems caused by the refugees. 
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6 CONCLUSIONS: THE GOAL OF OPPOSING NUCLEAR 
PROLIFERATION SOMETIMES SUBORDINATED TO OTHER US 
INTERESTS 
 
The US attempts to halt nuclear proliferation in South Asia failed in that that India 
and Pakistan did acquire nuclear weapons and finally did proclaim that they are 
nuclear powers in May 1998. The US opposition to the nuclear weapons programs 
has, however, probably slowed them down. And in practice, ensuring that nuclear 
weapons will not be used remains naturally of greatest importance, and for this 
goal the US has worked and concentrated its policies on. 
 
This concluding chapter is organized according to the questions posed in Chapter 2, 
as I now especially try to provide answers for them, taking into account the 
hypothesis presented in Chapter 4. I start this chapter by discussing the reasons 
behind the Indian and the Pakistani nuclear weapons. Then I discuss and evaluate 
the US actions and policies and look for reasons for why the US did not succeed in 
halting nuclear proliferation in South Asia. After that I consider the US goals and 
interests in South Asia. Finally, in the concluding section 6.4, I discuss prospects 
for the future of US non-proliferation policies in South Asia. 
 
 
6.1 The South Asian nuclear weapons programs 
 
What have been the reasons for the programs? What has been the effect of the 
programs on Indo-Pakistani relations? (Research question no. 1) 
 
The US policies could only have been successful had they addressed the reasons 
behind the Indian and the Pakistan nuclear weapons. The US view on the reasons 
for Indian and Pakistani nuclear weapons has also framed the US attitudes and 
policy choices in that that certain reasons to acquire nuclear weapons can seem to 
the US more justified than others. The acquisition of nuclear weapons as an attempt 
to improve the otherwise unsatisfactory national security can seem to be a more 
acceptable reason than for example the hope to become a great power. 
 
The nuclear weapons programs can be seen as primarily either active or reactive. 
They are mostly active for example if the primary reasons are in the country’s 
aspirations to become a great power, a leading Muslim state, or a regional power. If 
they are in the first place reactive, they are responses to other states’ actions, to 
changes in power relations in the world or to events in the region. In reality, the 
programs can be actions to improve the countries’ international status, but they 
have often been presented as reactions - India developed nuclear weapons because 
of China and Pakistan because of India - because reactions can seem more justified 
than actions. Reactions can be presented so as if other states would have pushed a 
state into acquiring weapons, maybe even against its will, whereas in the case of 
actions, a state is acquiring weapons, something generally considered as bad, just 
for its own benefit. 
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In Chapter 3.3.1, different kinds of explanations were presented for why states 
acquire nuclear weapons. As my starting hypothesis, I expected in Chapter 4 the 
South Asian nuclear weapons to be for a large part responses to the security threats 
the two countries face. However, from the examination of the nuclear programs it 
seems that although this certainly was one of the reasons, different kinds of 
explanations for nuclear proliferation actually have to be combined. 
 
National security has been the most commonly used justification for the two 
nuclear weapons programs. Both India and Pakistan have indeed had security 
threats that they have tried to counter with their weapons programs, and these 
threats give them some kind of an understandable claim to nuclear weapons or 
other kind of strong defense forces. Pakistan and India have had border disputes 
throughout their history, and if one of the countries has a nuclear weapon or is even 
possibly developing one, the other cannot afford not to develop one, too. China’s 
nuclear weapon was among the biggest reasons why India developed a nuclear 
weapon, and because of its enmities with India, China has been willing to help 
Pakistan in its nuclear program. The Indo-Pakistani nuclear race can also be 
interpreted with a Cold War logic, according to which by building up a nuclear 
arsenal, India has tried to provoke Pakistan into an arms race that the Pakistani 
economy would not cope with.278 
 
The Indian nuclear weapons program developed gradually as a response to the 
Chinese program and to the development of Sino-Indian relations. Later on, the 
Pakistani threat played a major role for the Indian program, but the Pakistani 
program developed clearly as a response to the Indian program, not the other way 
round: the Indo-Pakistani nuclear arms race developed gradually only after an 
Indian initiation. 
 
India still cites the threat of China as a reason for not accepting bilateral non-
proliferation arrangements with Pakistan. Of course, the Chinese nuclear weapons 
do in principle pose a threat for India. In practice, however, there has long been no 
kind of threat of war between India and China. In 1989, also R. Gandhi publicly 
shared this view. Neither state has also directed its nuclear forces against the 
other.279 The Indian demand that also China should be involved in regional non-
proliferation arrangements makes it impossible for bilateral Indo-Pakistani nuclear 
disarmament to take place. By referring to China, India makes of its nuclear 
weapons an international issue because the Chinese nuclear weapons have in turn 
been developed as a response to those of the US and the Soviet Union. India is thus 
unwilling to give up its nuclear weapons except for in the extremely unlikely case 
that universal nuclear disarmament would take place. 
 
Although India might have launched its program originally largely because of 
security threats, the security threats argument is at present not very convincing in 
India’s case. If India’s two adversaries, Pakistan is willing to give up its nuclear 
weapons if India does, and China is not really a threat for India at all. The quest for 
an acknowledged international status remains therefore a more plausible reason for 
the Indian weapons. As Huntington leads one to expect in a case of a regionally 
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predominant state, India thinks that a multipolar world system is developing where 
it can be one of the major powers280. India has demanded to be acknowledged as a 
major international player with a permanent seat in the UN Security Council. As 
this has not happened without India having nuclear weapons, India has tried to get 
such a status by acquiring them. 
 
India claims there are no just grounds for denying a nation of a billion from having 
an equal right to nuclear weapons as other nuclear powers have. The mere size of 
the population was a justification for nuclear weapons in China’s case, too. Henry 
Kissinger noted in 1971 that no one can ignore a state with a billion inhabitants and 
a nuclear capability; after China had become a nuclear power, the US started 
treating it as a major international power281. India wants to be treated as an equal of 
China. Because this has not happened, India has considered the NPT and especially 
its indefinite extension in 1995 as discriminating: some states a granted an eternal 
right to posses nuclear weapons while others are forever denied the same right. 
Some Indians have even used the term nuclear apartheid282: when the five 
permanent members of the Security Council are allowed to enhance their security 
with nuclear weapons and use these weapons as means of power and prestige, why 
would India not have the same right? NPT did also not stop vertical proliferation: 
although most states did not have the right to have any nuclear weapons, the 
nuclear powers were allowed to continue building their nuclear arsenals. 
 
Some Indian observers have also blamed the MTCR and the NSC of being 
originally secretly set up cartels of the major industrial states through which they 
try to “retain market dominance and strengthen their long-term security and 
economic interests” and which undermine Third World civilian space and nuclear 
programs. It has been further claimed that the industrialized countries try to restrict 
the spread of missile technologies because missiles could restrict the major powers’ 
capabilities to “intervene in regional conflicts without incurring significant political 
or military costs”. The end effect of the controls on India has been an emphasis of 
indigenous production.283 
 
India has not been satisfied with nuclear powers’ nuclear disarmament actions. 
Universal nuclear disarmament is included as an eventual goal in the NPT and 
India has required that as a condition for its acceptance of arms control measures. 
By lobbying for universal nuclear disarmament, India has in some way also tried to 
reduce the Chinese threat diplomatically, although because of the unlikelihood of 
nuclear disarmament, the lobbying can seem as mere rhetoric. On the other hand, if 
total nuclear disarmament is not a realistic goal or as discussed in Chapter 3.3.3, 
maybe not even desirable, it is hard to find good justifications for that that the 
states that first managed to acquire nuclear weapons are more justified to have 
them than others. The Indian anti-nuclear ambitions and its claim for a permanent 
seat in the UN Security Council have legitimate grounds as the country is home to 
one sixth of the humankind. But because India has used these arguments as 
rhetorical weapons and eventually acquired nuclear weapons, the moral superiority 
India has sought with its rhetoric has been seriously injured. 
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Because India’s aspirations to become a great power and at least a regional major 
power is not an argument likely to gain sympathy or acceptance from other states, 
India has stuck to its alleged security threats to legitimize its nuclear weapons. 
Great power aspirations have, however, been a relatively efficient reason to raise 
domestic support for the nuclear program. Some political leaders, including I. 
Gandhi and those of the BJP, have tried to improve their domestic position by 
taking advantage of the nuclear card and the popularity of the efforts to make India 
a great power. Such domestic factors have especially played a role in the timing of 
the nuclear weapons program. 
 
Both the Indian and the Pakistani programs have enjoyed wide domestic support. 
Thus although acquiring nuclear weapons is generally at least in the industrialized 
world seen today as less acceptable than it was some decades ago, this is not the 
case in India and Pakistan where the 1998 nuclear tests were greatly celebrated by 
the population. For example, a poll in 1996 indicated that clearly most Indians were 
in favor of further nuclear tests284. The Indian supporters of nuclear weapons have 
blamed the opponents of selling their country to foreigners like the maharajas did 
in the 1800th century: they claim that the opponents try to sabotage India’s quest for 
self-sustainability and prevent India’s rise to the status of a regional great power.285 
Also the Pakistani nuclear weapons program has had a strong domestic supporter 
base, as polls since the early 1980’s have shown. In Pakistan, nuclear weapons 
have become a symbol for the nation and, because of the popularity of the weapons 
program, a means for the country’s leaders to enhance their domestic position,286 
especially for the military, whose continuing importance the development of 
nuclear weapons and the continuation of the Kashmir conflict have helped to 
ensure. 
 
Certain individuals, like BJP politicians in India or Z. A. Bhutto and A. Q. Khan in 
Pakistan, seem to have had considerable impact on the development of the nuclear 
programs. Other political leaders might have preferred different kinds of security 
solutions. On the other hand, at least in the case of the democratic India, the public 
had chosen exactly these leaders. And as noted above, in both countries quite 
positive attitudes towards the nuclear weapons programs reign. 
 
Also Islamabad has probably expected nuclear weapons to enhance Pakistan’s 
international status, especially its standing among the Muslim states, as nuclear 
weapons make Pakistan technologically the most advanced one of them and 
strengthen its relations to the Persian Gulf states. Demand for nuclear technology in 
Muslim countries in general has also contributed to the Pakistani weapons program 
at least by making financing available.287 
 
Pakistan has not accepted India’s leading role on the subcontinent and nuclear 
weapons are a way for it to balance the Indian power, something it could not do by 
conventional forces. The nuclear weapon has made it possible for Pakistan to keep 
the Kashmir issue open. Without the Pakistani nuclear weapon, India would 
probably have prevailed in the conflict already long ago. 
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Among the reasons for the nuclear weapons must have been that they have been 
considered as a politically and militarily viable way to improve the security of a 
state — although one must wonder whether nuclear weapons are ever a really 
viable way to defend oneself or to attack an adversary, as nuclear war would hardly 
be for anyone’s benefit. The economic cost-effectiveness of nuclear weapons is 
also questionable. But if one state acquires nuclear weapons, it can seem to its 
adversary that acquiring nuclear weapons and getting the shelter of their deterrent 
power is the only effective way to protect itself. Pakistan could also hardly ever 
have had conventional military forces equal to those of the much bigger India. 
Nuclear weapons were a way to create some kind of a balance-of-power. 
 
Although Waltz has argumented that nuclear weapons could make conventional 
arms races unnecessary, this has, however, not happened in South Asia: despite the 
nuclear weapons, the two countries continue to have large conventional military 
spending and an ongoing conventional conflict with each other. This can imply that 
India and Pakistan do not consider nuclear weapons as a strong enough deterrent 
against each other and think that conventional war is still possible, the nuclear 
capabilities notwithstanding. 
 
In Chapter 3.3.3, the possibility was discussed that nuclear weapons would not be 
totally undesirable if because of them, major wars between India and Pakistan 
would be avoided, as large-scale fighting could not be risked in the fear of 
escalation. Strategists in both India and Pakistan have indeed argued that nuclear 
weapons have brought stability and the situation should not be changed288. S. 
Ganguly has argued that after the nuclearization of South Asia, both India and 
Pakistan have seemed to avoid full-scale conflict with each other because it could 
escalate too far. He claims that the two states have instead tried to exploit the 
internal conflicts of each other. This he sees as a variant of G. Snyder’s stability/ 
instability paradox, which means that although stability is achieved between 
nuclear arsenals, nuclear adversaries act destabilizingly at other levels of their 
mutual relations.289 
 
India and Pakistan have not had a full-scale war since they both have nuclear 
weapons, but they have been at least on the very brink of a conflict several times. 
The Kargil conflict in 1999 was so grave that many have considered it as the fourth 
Indo-Pakistani war. In principle, the evidence can be interpreted in both ways, 
either that the nuclear weapons have contributed to the two states not having a full-
scale war against each other, or that the weapons have not been able to calm down 
their possessors. 
 
The periodic rising of tensions between India and Pakistan seems, however, to 
indicate that although nuclear weapons made direct conventional war between the 
Cold War superpowers impossible, the same does not hold for South Asia. One 
reason for this is that unlike the US and the Soviet Union, India and Pakistan are 
neighbors. Because of this and because of the preponderance of the Kashmir 
conflict in the relations between the two countries and also in their domestic 
politics, the two countries have not been able to “import” their mutual conflict 
elsewhere like the superpowers did. The Kashmir conflict is acute and concrete, 
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unlike the Soviet-US quest for world hegemony was. Waltz has claimed that 
nuclear states would not in any case fight for issues of great importance. This does 
not hold in South Asia: both India and Pakistan seem to consider Kashmir vital 
issue. Waltz has also stated that “where much is at stake for one side, the other side 
moves with care”290. However, neither India nor Pakistan has always shown care 
on its moves and statements about Kashmir. Thus the Indian and the Pakistani 
nuclear arsenals seem to be deterrents just against each other, but not against the 
conventional forces of the other state. 
 
 
6.2 The US policies towards the nuclear programs  
 
Have the US non-proliferation policies in South Asia been successful or not 
and why? (Research question no. 2) 
 
As both India and Pakistan have acquired nuclear weapons, the US non-
proliferation policies have at least in the end not been totally successful in South 
Asia. However, by making the acquisitions of nuclear weapons more difficult, the 
US opposition can have postponed it. The US interventions have also helped in 
ensuring that India and Pakistan have not started a full-scale war against each other 
since they have acquired nuclear weapons. The US seems to have been in principle 
consistently against nuclear proliferation in South Asia, but it just has not 
succeeded in halting it. Thus it has to be asked what went wrong with the US 
policies. 
 
In Chapter 4, I assumed that the US policies have not had the wished consequences 
because they have not addressed the real reasons for proliferation. The US has 
concentrated quite much on trying to deny access to nuclear technology and 
materials. Also the multilateral international non-proliferation arrangements are 
mostly supply-side measures while the demand for nuclear weapons has not been 
internationally systematically addressed. Although access to technology is 
necessary for a country to acquire nuclear weapons, it does not alone lead a state to 
acquire nuclear weapons. At least in the case of India and Pakistan, the technology 
has existed if a country has been eager enough to do what ever it takes to acquire it. 
Thus supply-side policies to countering proliferation are not enough alone. Such 
US policies have ultimately not been totally effective because not all other 
countries have supported them (see below), because of loopholes in regulations, or 
because of a lack of control. However, export controls are good because they make 
the acquisition of nuclear technologies and materials so complicated and expensive, 
at least for less developed countries like India and Pakistan, that a nuclear weapons 
program is launched only if high political motivation to do so exists. Export 
controls are not bad policies but have to be combined with policies that affect the 
demand for nuclear weapons. As noted in Chapter 3.3.2, the purpose of export 
policies is also mainly to postpone the acquisition of nuclear weapons so that there 
is time for other kind of policies to be used. 
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In practice, the US actions to halt nuclear and missile proliferation in South Asia 
were for several decades directed more towards Pakistan than towards India. Many 
of the US policies and regulations have to do with importing nuclear or missile 
technologies and materials, and the Indian program has often escaped these 
measures because it is for a great degree indigenous. After the early 1970’s, the 
Indian nuclear weapon did in principle already exist but the Pakistani effort could 
possibly still have been halted so that a South Asian nuclear arms race would have 
been avoided. A further reason has been the concern that Pakistan could possibly 
share nuclear technology with radical Middle Eastern states.291 
 
The US has also tried to decrease the demand for nuclear weapons in South Asia. 
Especially, it has tried to improve the Pakistani sense of security. The military and 
economic assistance the US gave Pakistan to strengthen it against the Soviet Union 
was also expected to diminish the Pakistani demand of nuclear weapons by 
strengthening Pakistan’s conventional forces. The assistance has, however, not 
been wide and strong enough to remove the Indian threat. The US has not been 
willing to give Pakistan binding security guarantees against India, and anything 
less than that has not been enough for Pakistan. The acquisition of nuclear weapons 
has become unnecessary for states like Germany and Japan because of the explicit 
US security guarantees292. Yet the US or the other nuclear powers have not been 
willing to give Pakistan or India such guarantees. A binding security guarantee 
could be dangerous for the US because then the US might get directly involved in 
the Kashmir crisis. Like Pakistan has experienced several times when the US 
assistance has been withdrawn, the assistance has also been a somewhat unreliable 
source of security. Instead of removing the motivation for nuclear weapons, the 
assistance indirectly contributed to Pakistan acquiring them by making resources 
available. 
 
The problem with the US policies seems to be that they have lacked conviction as 
the US has not been prepared to put very much at stake to halt the two programs. 
Because neither India nor Pakistan has been openly hostile towards the US, the US 
has been able to be a little soft towards them. 
 
The US has also not been willing to do much about for example the Indian desire 
for the status of a major power. It is easy for the US to say that India deserves 
special attention and is the major regional power but that is not enough for India. 
To really accept India as a major international power would mean that India would 
have an equal position with the other major (nuclear) powers. That would mean 
that India would have a chance to have more to say about global issues, and that is 
difficult for the US to accept.  
 
Neither has the US done much to remove the domestic political reasons behind the 
programs, but this would anyway probably have been extremely difficult. The US 
has supported certain individuals, for example B. Bhutto, as the US wished that she 
might curb the nuclear program down. However, if the reasons for nuclear weapons 
that are related to security threats and the desire to gain a better international status 
would be removed, the domestic popularity of the weapons would also diminish. 
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As the examination of the US sanction legislation and policies reveals, another 
problem with the US policies has been that the US views on non-proliferation have 
often not been consistent themselves. Although the US Congress and the President 
have agreed on the importance of opposing nuclear proliferation, especially since 
the Indian 1974 test explosion, they have often disagreed on the means to achieve 
this goal. This has led to clashes over the authorities of the legislative, which has 
often stuck to strict approaches and sanctioning, and the executive, which has 
wanted to have independent room for action to ensure that general US interests are 
taken into account. As a consequence, ”...most US non-proliferation legislation 
applicable to South Asia has been imposed on the executive branch over the 
President’s objection that the goals could be promoted better, and with less damage 
to bilateral relations, through behind-the-scenes diplomacy and pressure”.293 It is 
interesting that there have been differences between the executive and the 
legislative in general, although there have been different holders of the offices from 
different parties and different political lines. However, this is probably because in 
general, both branches of the government have wanted to have maximal powers in 
relation to the other and maybe not so much because of constantly differing views 
on how to tackle nuclear proliferation. 
 
In Chapter 3, the claim was discussed that the US capability to impose its will is 
decreasing and its sanctions do not work as planned when other states do not 
support them, leading to the expectation in Chapter 4 that the US policies might not 
succeed if other states do not support them when they do not agree with the US 
views on goals or on means to reach the goals. This has also been in part the case 
with respect to the Indian and the Pakistani nuclear programs. Despite the US 
sanctions, the two countries were able to make acquisitions from other countries, 
including from Western Europe, when other countries did not see as stringent 
export controls as the US as necessary. The Pressler Amendment sanctions would 
have had still graver consequences for Pakistan if Islamabad could not have turned 
to other sources of finance. After the Indian 1998 tests, the US could first not create 
a consensus on sanctions among the G-8-countries. This was possible only after the 
Pakistani tests had caused fears of the escalation of the situation. Thus without 
other countries’ support, the US policies indeed are less powerful. 
 
Especially in the 1990’s after the Pressler Amendment sanctions were in place, the 
US tried to use a strategy of promising Pakistan that it would forgive the former 
Pakistani violations of US regulations if Pakistan would in the future obey the 
regulations. This way, the US wanted to regain the possibility to lay pressure on 
Pakistan with potential sanctions. This hope led to several amendments of the US 
legislation, but did not prove to be a very efficient way to deal with Islamabad 
because the threat of sanctions was not enough to convince Pakistan to curb down 
its nuclear activities. Islamabad seemed to consider nuclear weapons as so 
important that it was rather willing to face severe economic difficulties than to give 
up the weapons. 
 
As it has become obvious that the efforts to halt India and Pakistan from continuing 
their nuclear weapons programs have been in vain, the US has put emphasis on 
trying to make sure that the weapons will not be used. The US has also tried to 
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persuade India and Pakistan to join the treaties of the non-proliferation regime and 
to launch confidence-building measures, for example prior notifications of military 
activities and discussion groups between the two countries. Diplomatic efforts 
targeted at enhancing dialogue and transparency are a safe and low-cost way for the 
US to try to work against proliferation,294 but as noted in Chapter 5.4.3, 
unfortunately they have often not worked as well as hoped. 
 
 
6.3 The US interests and goals 
 
Why has the US acted the way it has? What kind of interests and goals does 
the US have in South Asia? How important has ensuring nuclear non-
proliferation been with respect to other US goals? (Research question no. 3) 
 
In Chapter 4, I discussed the possibility that if nuclear weapons seem to improve 
stability, the US might not be against them but in fact consider them as even 
desirable or at least not see it as absolutely necessary to halt the programs. 
Although this could in principle be possible, there is no evidence that the US would 
have seen nuclear weapons as desirable in South Asia, or furthermore promoted 
them. But it is possible that the certain indecisiveness in the US policies has been 
caused by a view that nuclear weapons in South Asia are not so much against US 
interests that it would have been absolutely necessary to halt the weapons 
programs. It can also be that although the possibility of nuclear weapons having 
stabilizing effects would be acknowledged, it would still be seen as necessary to 
oppose nuclear proliferation. Otherwise some other states, where proliferation 
would clearly be against US interests, could also become more interested in 
acquiring nuclear weapons. If the US opposition to nuclear weapons would seem 
selective, it would be more difficult for the US to get other states’ support for its 
policies. Waltz argued that the measured spread of nuclear weapons could be 
desirable295. Thus it can also be that the US has thought that although nuclear 
weapons could bring stability to South Asia, slowing the programs down would 
still be necessary so that the two countries would slowly learn to live with the 
weapons. It is thus also possible that the US policies have been aimed at slowing 
the programs down rather than halting them. 
 
Although the US seems to have in principle been against nuclear proliferation in 
South Asia, a certain inconsistency of its policies notwithstanding, it seems from 
Chapter 5 that the US has not given this goal the primary importance. As expected, 
the goal of balancing and overcoming the power of the Soviet Union was more 
important for the US regionally during the Cold War.  
 
This is made evident especially by the massive assistance the US gave for Pakistan 
throughout the 1980’s during the war in Afghanistan. All the time, the Pakistani 
nuclear program was proceeding and this was something the US actually wanted to 
sanction. On the other hand, Washington hoped that its aid could help restrain 
Pakistani nuclear weapons program as Pakistan was provided with advanced 
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conventional weapons that enhanced its national security. Thus it was hoped that 
the two goals, countering the Soviet Union and halting nuclear proliferation, could 
be served with the same policy. However, this did not work but was instead 
possibly even counterproductive as far as non-proliferation was considered as 
because of the aid, Pakistan could have more resources available for its program. 
Still, the US hope that aid might halt proliferation cannot be considered as just a 
cheap justification for why the US gave Pakistan assistance its nuclear program 
notwithstanding. Improving a threshold country’s security is not in general a bad 
non-proliferation policy, but the US aid was just not enough to secure Pakistan 
against India. Possibly also the timing of this policy was not right because in the 
1980’s, the Pakistani nuclear program was already clearly proceeding and had 
developed its own force that pushed it forward. Thus it seems that the US has not 
aimed at supporting Pakistan’s nuclear program but has done it somewhat 
accidentally when trying to keep Pakistan in its sphere of influence. 
 
I expected that after the Cold War the foremost goal for the US would have been to 
try to ensure that the superior US position cannot be challenged even regionally. 
Although this hypothesis has not been refuted, the South Asian nuclear programs 
do not provide so clear evidence for this. As expected in Chapter 4, cooperation has 
existed between the US and Pakistan, the secondary regional power. But it does not 
seem that the primary US aim has been to be directly against India, the major 
regional power. The US has not been overly interested in South Asia and does not 
seem to be against Indian regional hegemony as such. Especially during the Carter 
and Clinton terms, the US considered India’s regionally predominant position as 
convenient or natural. The US can allow India to be a regional hegemon in South 
Asia because China checks India in a wider Asian context. During the Cold War, 
when India’s relations with the Soviet Union were close, Indian hegemony on the 
subcontinent was less desirable from the US point of view. This was, however, 
probably not so much because of India itself but because of the fear that the Soviet 
Union could exert power on the subcontinent through India. By supporting 
Pakistan, the US has indirectly acted against India, but the assistance the US gave 
Pakistan was directed against the Soviet Union. Another reason for the US to have 
good relations with Pakistan is that the US has wanted to ensure Pakistan is 
oriented towards the West and that Pakistan contributes positively to the oil-related 
interests of the US. Also after the Cold war, the US rather sees Pakistan as its own 
ally than as an unstable, anti-Western Muslim state, which furthermore possesses a 
nuclear weapon. These reasons are not so much related to India. Thus the research 
material provided neither confirmation nor annulment for my hypothesis that the 
US has tried to promote a regional balance-of-power where no state (especially 
India) is powerful enough to be able to prevent the US from ensuring that its 
interests are being served. As the US assistance for Pakistan had also other reasons, 
it could not be proved that it was targeted at balancing India and Pakistan. 
 
The US has wanted to have a secured presence in the region, either directly or 
through a close ally. As South Asia itself does not seem that important for the US, 
the reason for the need for presence is more in the energy resources of the Gulf 
region and of Central Asia. Pakistan served this purpose well enough during the 
Cold War. When the US itself has been present in the region, like during and after 
the Gulf War, Pakistan has not necessarily been needed. Because of its instability 
and its suspicious actions, including its nuclear program and its support for the 
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Kashmir guerillas, Pakistan is not an optimal ally for the US: it is uncomfortable 
for the US if its ally is criticized by the most of the rest of the world. If the US 
could get India to be a relatively reliable ally by giving it the same kind of 
assistance as it has given Pakistan, the US would do maybe that. India, however, is 
not as easily satisfied as Pakistan. India is not primarily seeking security like 
Pakistan, but it also wants to be acknowledged as a major, influential international 
player. On the other hand, Pakistan’s relations with other Muslim countries have 
offered the US a channel through which to have contact with these states, many of 
which are important because of their oil and natural gas resources.  
 
My assumption that the actions of the US reflect the general geopolitical 
worldviews of the US leadership turned out to be a bit problematic. That is because 
both the US executive and the US legislative have powers over the country’s 
foreign policies and, as discussed in Chapter 6.2, even if a consensus has been 
reached on what US interests abroad are, they have often had differing views on 
how to best serve these interests. The actions of the US have therefore not always 
formed a logical whole because the two instances have at the same time tried to 
promote different kinds of policies. Furthermore, the execution of the policies 
formulated by one instance has sometimes been prevented by the other. 
 
Although there is no evidence that the US has considered nuclear weapons as a 
means to promote stability, as expected, the US has otherwise tried to promote 
stability by intervening diplomatically when Indo-Pakistani relations have become 
especially tense. However, if the US really wanted to promote long-term stability 
in the region, it should put more effort on trying to help the two states in finding a 
solution to the Kashmir question because otherwise tensions increase periodically. 
Of course, it is possible that the US simply cannot do much about the issue, as a 
lasting solution cannot be forced. However, it seems that the US has not used all 
the possible carrots and sticks to persuade the two states to reach a solution. 
Furthermore, had the US not intervened in the subcontinent, India would probably 
have become a regionally hegemonic power and prevailed in the conflict with 
Pakistan before the latter developed nuclear weapons. This could have prevented 
the Pakistani nuclear weapons program altogether and in the end have resulted in 
improved stability in the region. 
 
 
6.4 Prospects for the future 
 
After the long efforts to acquire nuclear weapons, it seems highly unlikely that 
India would agree to give them up, especially because it sees them as a means to 
achieve the status of a great power. And when India does not give up its weapons, 
neither does Pakistan. Thus, not trying to persuade the two states to give up their 
nuclear weapons but enhancing the safety of the weapons and ensuring that they 
will not be used is of primary importance. It can be argued that the restrictions on 
export of nuclear material and technology have become useless against India and 
Pakistan now that they both already have nuclear weapons. Neither have sanctions 
really worked as a way to lay pressure on the two countries. 
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Even if it would be extremely difficult to persuade India and Pakistan to give up 
their weapons, they cannot be accepted as legitimate nuclear powers to the NPT. 
The awkward situation could ultimately be solved through more general steps 
towards nuclear disarmament that would also include China, but this kind of 
development does not currently seem very likely. A promise of a permanent seat in 
the UN Security Council could also persuade India to participate in nuclear 
disarmament. 
 
The command and control mechanisms in India and Pakistan are far from the 
quality of the established nuclear states. Originally, also the other nuclear states 
had much weaker control mechanisms, and several near-accidents have been 
reported. Over the decades, the old nuclear powers have been able to improve the 
security of their forces, although the safety of the Soviet nuclear arsenals also 
caused great worries after the Soviet Union fell apart. The threat of accidental or 
unauthorized use of nuclear weapons is currently much greater in India and 
Pakistan. Technical help from the established nuclear powers would be valuable in 
addressing the problem, but this kind of help is officially against the NPT. 
 
In Western eyes, India and Pakistan might also seem to be less reliable possessors 
for nuclear weapons than the US or the UK. In the West, the stability of the society 
and the reigning ideology make it very unlikely that the use of nuclear weapons 
could be considered as justified or that any segments of the society would be 
willing to use them. Especially Islamic fundamentalism, on the other hand, has 
shown its capability to use even the most extreme means.  
 
India and Pakistan have been acting reliably in that sense that neither state exports 
nuclear or ballistic missile materials or technology296. However, as the two 
countries have not been very eager to introduce export controls of international 
standards, it has been feared that they could become suppliers of sensitive 
technologies, especially for example when Indo-Iranian relationship got closer in 
the 1990’s. Also widespread corruption in India is a concern in this respect.297 
 
However, there are examples of states, which have had nuclear weapons or a 
capability to build them but have given up their weapons programs and destroyed 
the weapons they had after their national security has otherwise improved. The 
clearest example of this is South Africa, which declared in 1991 that it had nuclear 
weapons but that it will destroy them and thereafter did so and joined the NPT. So 
it could be that if good enough carrots were offered, also India could agree to give 
up its weapons. States that have nuclear weapons or a near capability to assemble 
them have a great power resource in them as they can be used to blackmail 
economic or military benefits as rewards for giving up the weapons capability. 
Examples of such behavior are Ukraine and North-Korea.298 
 
But an agreement over Kashmir is a necessary precondition to any lasting solution 
to Indo-Pakistani relations. The continuing conflict in Kashmir makes the nuclear 
arms race between the two countries especially worrying. The high lands of 
Kashmir are probably the most probable reason for a nuclear war in the world. 
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Again in the winter of 2002, Indo-Pakistani tensions escalated because of terrorist 
attacks related to the Kashmir question and because of missile tests. So far, India 
and Pakistan have not resorted to the use of nuclear weapons to solve the issue and 
it seems unlikely that they ever would because of the catastrophic consequences of 
a nuclear attack and a following counterattack. However, even the possibility that 
this could happen is very threatening.   
 
Even when the nuclear deterrence holds and the weapons are not used, they have 
very considerable effects on South Asia. The real costs of the programs are kept 
secret but they are estimated to be around US $ 6 billion for each country by 1999 
for a small arsenal of warheads and missiles. In addition to these costs, the two 
countries face immense costs for the deployment, targeting, and command-and-
control of the weapons, for the dismantling of old weapons, and for nuclear 
defenses. The opportunity costs are huge especially for such less developed 
countries like India and Pakistan. And not just that the existing money could be 
used on something else than nuclear weapons; the two countries would have 
altogether more resources if they gave up their weapons programs. For example, 
India and Pakistan, which both have pressing energy needs that hinder their 
economic development, could greatly benefit from the international cooperation on 
the peaceful uses of atomic energy if they were members of the NPT.299  
 
The Kashmir issue is extremely difficult to solve, as it is very much a zero-sum 
situation. The most probable solution is that in time, the current line of control that 
is the de facto border between the two countries becomes a de jure border.300 If the 
Kashmir question could be solved in a way that would leave both sides somehow 
satisfied, there would be hope of nuclear disarmament on the subcontinent. The 
chances of a solution are also very much dependent on both countries’ domestic 
politics, which would have to undergo a profound change for the countries to give 
up the nuclear weapons. 
 
The US stance to solving the conflict continues to be that “ultimately it has to be 
the two sides talking to each other to solve the issue of Kashmir, and not with the 
United States playing the kind of role that is suggested by the term “mediator”” but 
that however, “to the extent that the two parties want us to play some role in that 
dialogue, fine”.301 Pakistan would welcome the US to act as an intermediary but 
India opposes such involvement. And nothing can be done against the will of one 
of the adversaries, as that would not be a way to persuade them to show restraint 
with their nuclear weapons. On the other hand, the conflict may have such 
explosive potential that the US does not want to take the risk of getting more 
involved, as that would require the use of significant amounts of resources. 
 
Since the war on terrorism, the US-Pakistan relations have again been better. 
Combating international terrorism is seen as such a vital issue in the US that as 
long as Pakistan’s support is needed in these efforts, the US cannot be too critical 
                                                          
299 Lavoy 1999. 
300 Different kinds of regional arrangements have been suggested that would make of Kashmir an 
open area with non-restricted passage although parts of it would formally belong to two different 
countries. The solution should be something both sides could portray as a victory. Economist 
14.7.2001. 
301 US Department of State 2002a.  
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of Pakistan. Also in the long term, the US has to make sure that Pakistan remains 
relatively stable and does not become more of a home for various fundamentalist 
terrorist groups. On the other hand, the US can hardly afford lining up with a state, 
which supports Kashmir-related terrorism. And as India is also quite interesting for 
the US, especially economically, the US wants to ensure it has good relations with 
it as well. But the tensions in Kashmir harm the development of the relations of the 
US to both of countries.    
 
After the terrorist attacks on September the 11th, 2001 the US has stressed the 
possibility of counterproliferation. This means that, as a pronounced change to the 
clearly anti-proliferation but much less harsh US policies in the past, the US can in 
extreme cases even use its nuclear weapons against certain states’ alleged WMD 
programs. For example, the US Under Secretary of State J. Bolton stated in January 
2002 on the Conference of Disarmament that “the United States regards the 
proliferation of nuclear weapons technology as a direct threat to international 
security, and will treat it accordingly”. The Bush Administration is formulating “a 
comprehensive strategy to enhance our (the US) security. This strategy must 
include strengthening nonproliferation measures (prevention), more robust counter-
proliferation capabilities (protection), and a new concept of deterrence, relying 
more on missile defense and less on offensive forces.”302 During the Bush Jr. term, 
the development of new kinds of nuclear weapons has also been considered in the 
US, and President Bush has not been willing to sign the CTBT. All this seems to 
indicate a strengthening of the role of nuclear weapons in international relations. 
As it thus seems unlikely that general nuclear disarmament will take place, it also 
makes it more unlikely for that to happen in South Asia. 
 
There are chances that India and Pakistan proceed even significantly in agreeing 
and implementing mechanisms that ensure the safety of the weapons and minimize 
the possibility that they will be used. India could agree to participate in a regional 
NWFZ if the other nuclear powers participated in it as well303. Pakistan is likely to 
accept non-proliferation arrangements if India participates on them. Unfortunately, 
as long as the Indo-Pakistani relations remain strained especially because of 
Kashmir, any positive developments can be fast reversed. A lasting solution to the 
Kashmir question is thus of a great importance for the future of the subcontinent. 
                                                          
302 US Department of State 2002b. 
303 Moshaver 1992. 
 85
REFERENCES 
 
Literature 
 
Agreement on the Prohibition of Attack Against Nuclear Installations and Facilities 
(1988). http://fas.org/nuke/guide/india/doctrine/nucl.htm (visited 14.11.2002). 
 
Ahmed, S. (1999) “Pakistan’s Nuclear Weapons Program: Turning Points and Nuclear 
Choices”. International Security 23(4). 
 
Alasuutari, P. (1994) Laadullinen tutkimus. 2., uudistettu p., 1. p. 1993. Tampere: 
Vastapaino.  
 
Arnett, E. (1997) ”What threat?” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 53(2). 
http://www.thebulletin.org/issues/1997/ma97/ma97arnett.html (visited 22.11.2002). 
 
Ayoob, M. (2001) “South Asia’s Dangers and US Foreign Policy”. Orbis 45(1). 
 
Baldauf, S. (2001) “Kashmir – No Mere Molehill”. Christian Science Monitor 17.7.2001, 
93(163). 
 
Betts, R. (2000) “Is Strategy an Illusion?”. International Security 25(2). 
 
Bidwai, P. & Vanaik, A. (1997) “India’ Intentions”. Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 53(2). 
http://www.thebulletin.org/issues/1997/ma97/ma97bidwai.htm (visited 22.11.2002). 
 
Brown, M., Lynn-Jones, S. & Miller, S. (eds.) (1996) Debating the Democratic Peace. An 
International Security Reader. Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press. 
 
Brzezinski, Z. (1997) The Grand Chessboard: American Primacy and Its Geostrategic 
Imperatives. New York: BasicBooks. 
 
Burchill, S. (1996) “Liberal Internationalism”. In Burchill, S. & Linklater, A. with 
Devetak, R., Paterson, M & True, J. Theories of International Relations. Chippenham, 
Great Britain: Macmillan Press Ltd. 
 
Chellaney, B. (1994) ”An Indian Critique of US Export Controls”. Orbis 38(3). 
 
Chellaney, B. (1999) ”India’s Nuclear Planning, Force Structure, Doctrine and Arms 
Control Posture”. Australian Journal of International Affairs 53(1). 
 
Clausewitz, C. von (1997) On War. Harmondsworth: Penguin. 
 
Dougherty, J. & Pfaltzgraff, R. Jr. (1996) Contending Theories of International Relations. 
A Comprehensive Survey. 4th ed. New York: Longman. 
 
Dunn, L. (1996) “Proliferation Prevention. Beyond Traditionalism”. In Lewis, W. & 
Johnson, S. (eds.) Weapons of Mass Destruction. New Perspectives on 
Counterproliferation. Washington D.C.: National Defense University. 
 
Eskelinen, A. (ed.)(1995) Ydinsulku. Valtapolitiikkaa ja proliferaation hallintaa. Helsinki: 
Helsingin Yliopisto, Yleisen valtio-opin laitos.  
 86
Federation of American Scientists (FAS) (1997) Proliferation: Threat and Response. 
South Asia. http://www.fas.org/irp/threat/prolif97/so_asia.html (visited 20.11.2002). 
 
FAS (2000a) India Nuclear Weapons, updated 28.7.2000. 
http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/india/nuke/index.html (visited 15.11.2002). 
 
FAS (2000b) Pakistan Nuclear Weapons, updated 27.5.2000. 
http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/pakistan/nuke/index.html (visited 18.11.2002). 
 
FAS (2002) Pakistan. http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/pakistan/missile/index.html (visited 
18.11.2002). 
 
Ganguly, Š. (1995) ”Indo-Pakistani Nuclear Issues and the Stability/ Instability Paradox”. 
Studies in Conflict and Terrorism No. 18. 
 
Ganguly, Š. (1997) ”Future Uncertain: Indian Security Policy Approaches the Millenium”. 
Journal of International Affairs 51(1). 
 
Ganguly, Š. (1999) “India’s Pathway to Pokhran II: The Prospects and Sources of New 
Delhi’s Nuclear Weapons Program”. International Security 23(4). 
 
Gentz, F. von (2002) ”The True Concept of a Balance of Power”. In Brown, C., Nardin, T. 
& Rengger, N. (eds.) International Relations in Political Thought. Texts from the Ancient 
Greeks to the First World War. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
 
Glaser, C. (1998) ”The Flawed Case for Nuclear Disarmament”. Survival 40(1). 
 
Heiskanen, J. (1995) “Yhdysvallat ja ydinaseiden leviämisen uhka”. In Eskelinen, A. (ed.) 
Ydinsulku. Valtapolitiikkaa ja proliferaation hallintaa. Helsinki: Helsingin Yliopisto, 
Yleisen valtio-opin laitos.  
 
Hsiung, J. (ed.) (1983) US-Asian Relations. The National Security Paradox. New York: 
Praeger.  
 
Hunt, T. (1998) “Clinton Suffers Bitter Defeat”. Associated Press 28.5.1998.  
http://www.fas.org/news/india/1998/05/v000591-052898-idx.html (visited 15.11.2002). 
 
Huntington, S. (1993) “The Clash of Civilizations? The Next Pattern of Conflict”. Foreign 
Affairs 72(3).  
 
Huntington, S. (1999) “The Lonely Superpower: the New Dimensions of Power”. Foreign 
Affairs 78(2). 
 
Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis (IFPA)(1997). From India to North Africa: Sowing a 
Missile Crop” (Chapter 4). Exploring US Missile Defense Requirements in 2010: What 
are the Policy and Technology Challenges? April 1997. 
http://www.fas.org/spp/starwars/advocate/ifpa/report696_ch4_ind.htm (visited 
20.11.2002). 
 
Inside Asia (1984) “What’s Brewing at Kahuta?” In Worsley, P. & Hadjor, K. B. (eds.) On 
the Brink. Nuclear Proliferation & the 3rd World. London: Third World Communications. 
 
Jones, R. & McDonough, M. with Dalton, T. & Koblentz, G. (1998) Tracking Nuclear 
Proliferation. A Guide in Maps and Charts. Washington D.C.: Carnegie Endowment. 
 
 87
Joseph, R. (1996) “WMD: A Proliferation Overview”. In Lewis, W. & Johnson, S. (eds.) 
Weapons of Mass Destruction. New Perspectives on Counterproliferation. Washington 
D.C.: National Defense University. 
 
Kapur, A. (1995) “Western Biases”. Bulletin of Atomic Scientists 51(1). 
http://www.thebulletin.org/issues/1995/jf95/jf95Kapur.html (visited 22.11.2002). 
 
Karim, A. (2001) “Pakistan: Stalking Armageddon?”. Contemporary South Asia 10(1). 
 
Khan, M. (1995) “Security Implication of Nuclear Proliferation in South Asia”. In Lewis, 
W. & Johnson, S. (eds.) Weapons of Mass Destruction. New Perspectives on 
Counterproliferation. Washington D.C.: National Defense University. 
 
Khanna, R. (2000) “Clinton India Visit”. Voice of America 11.2.2000. 
http://www.fas.org/news/india/2000/000211-india1.htm (visited 15.11.2002). 
 
Lavoy, P. (1999) “The Costs of Nuclear Proliferation in South Asia. U.S. Foreign Policy 
Agenda”. United States Information Agency (USIA), September 1999. 
http://www.fas.org/news/india/1999/pj29lavo.htm (visited 15.11.2002). 
 
Lefever, E. (1979) Nuclear Arms in the Third World. US Policy Dilemma. Washington D. 
C.: Brookings Institution. 
 
Lewis, W. & Johnson, S. (eds.) (1996) Weapons of Mass Destruction. New Perspectives on 
Counterproliferation. Washington D.C.: National Defense University.  
 
Liira, L. (1995) “Ydinalan vientivalvontajärjestely ydinsulkuregiimin dynaamisena osana”. 
In Eskelinen, A. (ed.) Ydinsulku. Valtapolitiikkaa ja proliferaation hallintaa. Helsinki: 
Helsingin yliopisto, Yleisen valtio-opin laitos. 
 
Lok Sabha XI Debates (1996) “Chinese nuclear test and CTBT”. Session II, Budget 
31.7.1996. http://www.fas.org/news/india/1996/2431079601.htm (visited 14.11.2002). 
 
Makhijani, A. (1997) “India’s Options”. Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 53(2). 
http://www.thebulletin.org/issues/1997/ma97/ma97makhijani.html (visited 22.11.2002). 
 
Malik, I. (2001) “Military Coup in Pakistan: Business As Usual Or Democracy On Hold!”. 
The Round Table No. 360/2001. 
 
Martel, W. & Pendley, W. (1996) “Rethinking US Proliferation Policy for the Future”. In 
Lewis, W. & Johnson, S. (eds.) Weapons of Mass Destruction. New Perspectives on 
Counterproliferation. Washington D.C.: National Defense University. 
 
Mearsheimer, J. (2001) “The Future of the American Pacifier”. Foreign Affairs 80(5). 
 
Meyer, S. with a foreword by Nye, J. Jr. (1984) The Dynamics of Nuclear Proliferation. 
Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
 
Moshaver, Z. (1992) “Prospects for the NPT in South Asia”. Contemporary South Asia 
1(3). 
 
Mushtaq, N. (2001) “Khan Forced out”. Bulletin of Atomic Scientists 57(4). 
http://www.thebulletin.org/issues/2001/ja01/ja01mushtaq.html (visited 22.11.2002). 
 
 88
Nye, J., Jr. (1984) “Foreword”. In Meyer, S. with a foreword by Nye, J. Jr. The Dynamics 
of Nuclear Proliferation. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
 
Osiander, A. (2001) ”Sovereignty, International Relations, and the Westphalian Myth”. 
International Organisation 44(2). 
 
Perkovich, G. (1998) Some Points that Need to be Made Now about India's Nuclear Test 
15.5.1998. http://www.fas.org/news/india/1998/05/980515-india22.htm (visited 
15.11.2002). 
 
Quester, G. (1970) Nuclear Diplomacy. The First Twenty-Five Years. New York: Dunellen 
Co. 
 
Rusi, A. (1997) Dangerous Peace. New Rivalry in World Politics. Boulder, California: 
Westview Press. 
 
Sagan, S. (1994) “The Perils of Proliferation: Organization Theory, Deterrence Theory, 
and the Spread of Nuclear Weapons”. International Security 18(4). 
 
Sagan, S. (1996) ”Why Do States Acquire Nuclear Weapons? Three Models in Search of a 
Bomb”. International Security 21(3). 
 
Samad, Y. (1994) ”The Military and Democracy in Pakistan”. Contemporary South Asia 
3(3). 
 
Shah, S. (2001) “Pakistan’s Foreign Policy Dilemmas in the New Millennium.” The Round 
Table No. 360/2001. 
 
Sharma, D. (1987) “India’s Nuclear Policy and the Arms Race in the South-East Asian 
Region”. In Worsley, P. & Hadjor, K. B. (eds.) On the Brink. Nuclear Proliferation & the 
3rd World. London: Third World Communications. 
 
Singh, J. (1993) “The Bomb or Peace”. UNESCO Courier 46(10). 
 
Singh, J. (1998) ”Against Nuclear Apartheid”. Foreign Affairs 77(5). 
 
Spector, L. with Smith, J. (1990) Nuclear Ambitions. The Spread of Nuclear Weapons 
1989-1990. Boulder, the US: Westview Press. 
 
Tamminen, T. & Zenger, M. (1998) Moderni Intia: Ristiriitojen suurvalta. Tampere: 
Vastapaino. 
 
Teeple, J. (1999) “Correspondent Report: Pak Missile/ India React”. Voice of America 
14.4.1999. http://www.fas.org/news/india/1999/990414-india1.htm (visited 15.11.2002). 
 
Thakur, R. (1993) “The Impact of the Soviet Collapse on Military Relations with India”. 
Europe-Asia Studies 45(5). 
 
Toivonen, A. (1995) “Kiinan uudenaikaistumisprosessi ja vahvuuden ongelma”. In 
Eskelinen, A. (ed.) Ydinsulku. Valtapolitiikkaa ja proliferaation hallintaa. Helsinki: 
Helsingin yliopisto, Yleisen valtio-opin laitos. 
 
Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (1968). 1.7.1968. 
http://www.fas.org/nuke/control/npt/text/npt2.htm (visited 20.11.2002). 
 
 89
Tuomi, O. (1996) Uusi geopolitiikka: geopoliittisen perspektiivin soveltuvuus 
kansainvälisen politiikan tulkintaan maailman ja ajattelutapojen muuttuessa. 
Ulkopoliittisen instituutin julkaisuja, nro 4. Helsinki: Gaudeamus. 
 
Vanaik, A. (1987) ”Nuclear Fallacies in India and Pakistan”. In Worsley, P. & Hadjor, K. 
(eds.) On the Brink. Nuclear Proliferation & the 3rd World. London: Third World 
Communications. 
 
Visuri, P. (1997) Turvallisuuspolitiikka ja strategia. Juva: WSOY. 
 
Walker, W. (1998) ”International Nuclear Relations after the Indian and Pakistani Test 
Explosions”. International Affairs 74(3). 
 
Wallerstein, M. (1995) “Concepts to Capabilities: The First Year of Counterproliferation”. 
In Lewis, W. & Johnson, S. (eds.) Weapons of Mass Destruction. New Perspectives on 
Counterproliferation. Washington D.C.: National Defense University. 
 
Waltz, K. (1981) ”The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: More May Be Better”. Adelphi 
Papers No. 171. International Institute for Strategic Studies: London. 
http://www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel/waltz1.htm (visited 27.9.2002). 
 
Waltz, K. (1990) ”Realist Thought and Neo-Realist Theory”. Journal of International 
Affairs 44(1). 
 
Waltz, K. (1997) ”Thoughts about Virtual Nuclear Arsenals”. The Washington Quarterly 
20(3). 
 
Waltz, K. (2000) “Structural Realism after the Cold War”. International Security 25(1). 
 
Wilkinson, D. (1985) “Spykman and Geopolitics”. In Zoppo, C. & Zorgbibe, C. (eds.) On 
Geopolitics: Classical and Nuclear. NATO ASI Series, Series D No. 20. Dordrecht, the 
Netherlands: Nijhoff.  
 
Windrem, R. & Kupperman, T. (2000) “Pakistan Nukes Outstrip India’s, Officials Say. US 
Reverses Assessment of South Asia Nuclear Balance”. NBC News 6.6.2000. 
http://www.fas.org/news/pakistan/2000/000606-indopak-nbc.htm (visited 22.11.2002). 
 
Zoppo, C. (1985) “Classical Geopolitics and Beyond”. In Zoppo, C. & Zorgbibe, C. (eds.) 
On Geopolitics: Classical and Nuclear. NATO ASI Series, Series D No. 20. Dordrecht, 
the Netherlands: Nijhoff. 
 
 
Newspapers 
 
The Asian Age 19.12.1995 “Report on Pokharan Site, Missile Test Preparation”. 
http://www.fas.org/news/india/1995/nes95243.htm (visited 14.11.2002). 
 
Auster, B. & Challaney, B. et al. (1998) ”An Explosion of Indian Pride”. US News & 
World Report 25.5.1998, 124(20). 
 
Barber, B. (2000) “Pakistan's Nuclear Arsenal Underestimated, Reports Say”. The 
Washington Times 9.6.2000. 
http://www.fas.org/news/pakistan/2000/e20000609pakistan.htm (visited 18.11.2002). 
 90
Chanda, N. (1998) ”Test Match”. Far Eastern Economic Review 11.6.1998. 
 
Chanda, N., Rashid, A., Forney, M., Sidhva, S. & Lutterbeck, D. (1998a) ”The Race Is 
On”. Far Eastern Economic Review 11.6.1998. 
 
Chanda, N., Rashid, A., Lutterbeck, D., Forney, M. & Sidhva, S. (1998b) ”Nuclear 
Fallout”. Far Eastern Economic Review 28.5.1998. 
 
Dhume, S. (1998) ”Realistically Moral”. An Interview with the Special Advisor for Indian 
Prime Minister Jaswant Singh. Far Eastern Economic Review 6.8.1998. 
 
Economist 6.1.2001 ”Pakistan’s Peculiar Election”. 358(8203). 
 
Economist 26.5.2001 ”India Decides to Try Talks” 359(8223). 
 
Economist 14.7.2001a “It’s Good to Talk” 360(8230). 
 
Economist 14.7.2001b “A Pipe of Peace?” 360(8230). 
 
Economist 25.8.2001 “The Price of Friendship” 360(8236). 
 
Economist 29.9.2001a “Bribing Allies” 360(8241). 
 
Economist 29.9.2001b “What Now?” 360(8241). 
 
Helsingin Sanomat 23.9.2001. “Yhdysvallat luopuu Pakistanin ja Intian pakotteista”. 
 
Jakobson, L. (1998) ”Pommin paluu”. Suomen Kuvalehti 22/1998. 
 
Lifschultz, L. (1998) ”Doom Thy Neighbour”. Far Eastern Economic Review 4.6.1998. 
 
Omestad, T., Chellaney, B. & Gul, A. (2000) “Fanfare, and Fear of War”. US News & 
World Report 20.3.2000, 128(11). 
 
Rashid, A. & Dhume, S. (1998) ”Will it? Won’t it?” Far Eastern Economic Review 
6.8.1998. 
 
Rashid, A. & Sidhva, S. (1998) ”Might and Menace”. Far Eastern Economic Review 
4.6.1998. 
 
Zimmermann, T. & Chellaney, B. (1996) “Nuclear Ambitions”. US News & World Report 
12.2.1996, 120(6). 
 
Weiner, T. (1996) “US Suspects China Is Helping Pakistan Build Missile Factory”. New 
York Times 26.8.1996. http://www.fas.org/news/pakistan/1996/960826-nyt.htm (visited 
18.11.2002). 
 
 
 91
US government sources 
 
Cronin, R.& Leitch LePoer, B. (1993) ”South Asia. US Interests and Policy Issues”. 
Congressional Research Service Issue Brief, updated 12.2.1993. 
http://www.fas.org/spp/starwars/crs/93-243f.htm (visited 20.11.2002). 
 
US Department of Defense (1995) News Briefing: No Firm Evidence of Chinese MTCR 
Violation 22.6.1995. http://www.fas.org/news/pakistan/1995/35783339-35787495.htm 
(visited 18.11.2002). 
 
US Department of State (1994) Report to Congress: Update on Progress Toward Regional 
Nonproliferation in South Asia. Bureau of South Asian Affairs 8.2.1994. 
http://www.fas.org/irp/threat/940216-327448.htm (visited 20.11.2002). 
  
US Department of State (1995a) Statement by, Assistant Secretary of State for South Asian 
Affairs R. Raphael Before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on Near Eastern and 
South Asian Affairs on US Policy towards South Asia, 7.3.1995. 
http://dosfan.lib.uic.edu/ERC/bureaus/sa/950307RaphaelUSPolicy.html (visited 
20.1.2002). 
 
US Department of State (1995b) “Statement by Assistant Secretary for South Asian Affairs 
R. Raphael before the Subcommittee on Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs of the 
Senate Foreign Relations Committee. South Asia After the Cold War: India and Pakistan”, 
14.9.1995. Dispatch 25.9.1995, 6(39). 
http://dosfan.lib.uic.edu/ERC/briefing/dispatch/1995/html/Dispatchv6no39.html (visited 
20.1.2002). 
 
US Department of State (1996) Special Briefing on US-China Discussions on Non-
Proliferation and Nuclear-related Exports, 10.5.1996. 
http://dosfan.lib.uic.edu/ERC/bureaus/eap/960510BurnsChina.html (visited 20.1.2002). 
 
US Department of State (1997) Report to Congress: Update on Progress Toward Regional 
Nonproliferation in South Asia. Bureau of South Asian Affairs 15.6.1997. 
http://www.fas.org/irp/threat/970615-dos-nonpro.htm (visited 20.11.2002). 
 
US Department of State (1998) Daily Press Briefing by J. Rubin, 22.6.1998. 
http://www.fas.org/news/india/1998/06/980622db.html (visited 15.11.2002). 
 
US Department of State (1999) Statement by Assistant Secretary of State for South Asian 
Affairs K.. Inderfurth Before the Senate Foreign Relations Subcommittee on the Near East 
and South Asia, 25.5.1999. http://www.fas.org/news/india/1999/990525-india-usia.htm 
(visited 15.11.2002). 
 
US Department of State (2000a) Background Note: India. Bureau of South Asian Affairs 
March 2000. http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/3454.htm (visited 20.11.2002). 
 
US Department of State (2000b) Background Note: Pakistan. Bureau of South Asian 
Affairs March 2000. http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/3453.htm (visited 20.11.2002). 
 
US Department of State (2000c) Strategic Plan, September 2000. 
http://www.state.gov/www/global/general_foreign_policy/2000_dos_stratplan_body.pdf 
(visited 20.11.2002). 
 
 92
US Department of State (2001a) Fact Sheet: Sanctions on India and Pakistan, 28.9.2001. 
http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2001/5101.htm (visited 22.11.2002). 
 
US Department of State (2001b) Statement to the Press by Assistant Secretary of State for 
South Asia C. Rocca, 2.8.2001. 
http://usembassy.state.gov/islamabad/wwwh01080204.html (visited 25.11.2002). 
 
US Department of State (2002a) Press Briefing on Board Plane en Route Islamabad by 
Secretary of State C. Powell, 15.1.2002. http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2002/7278.htm 
(visited 22.11.2002). 
 
US Department of State (2002b) Statement of Bolton, J., Under Secretary of State for Arms 
Control and International Security to the Conference on Disarmament 24.1.2002. 
http://usinfo.state.gov/topical/pol/arms/02012402.htm (visited 26.11.2002). 
 
US-India joint press statement (1995) “US, India Continue Dialogue on Defense 
Cooperation”, 15.9.1995. http://www.fas.org/news/india/1995/44321440-44324438.htm 
(visited 14.11.2002). 
 
The White House (1998) Statement by the Press Secretary: Easing of Sanctions on India 
and Pakistan, 7.9.1998. http://www.fas.org/news/india/1998/11/981107-wh1.htm (visited 
15.11.2002). 
 
The White House (1999) Presidential Determination No. 2000-04, 27.10.1999. 
http://www.fas.org/news/india/1999/991027-india-wh1.htm (visited 15.11.2002). 
 
The White House (2000) Joint US-India Statement. US-India Relations: A Vision for the 
21st Century, 21.3.2000. http://www.fas.org/news/india/2000/000321-india-wh2.htm 
(visited 15.11.2002). 
 
